Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "11034"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "11034"
    "slug" => "contracting-and-the-disclosure-of-ideas-in-the-innovation-process"
    "yearMonth" => "2011-01"
    "year" => "2011"
    "title" => "Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process"
    "description" => "MARTIMORT, D., POUDOU, J.C. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2011). Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process. <i>Annals of Economics and Statistics</i>, (101/102), pp. 287."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
        "bid" => "B00561609"
        "slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "MARTIMORT David"
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "POUDOU Jean-Christophe"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/41615484"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "287"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => "101/102"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Cet article analyse les contrats entre un innovateur détenteur d'une idée et un développeur. L'innovateur détient une information privée sur la valeur de l'idée tandis que le développeur peut exercer un effort non verifiable au moment du développement. Le développeur peut toutefois rompre cette relation, après avoir acquis de l'information sur la valeur de l'idée. Nous montrons que le contrat d'équilibre induit une réduction des incitations monétaires du développeur dont l'ampleur dépend de la force des droits de propriété intellectuelle. En particulier, lorsque ces droits sont incorrectement protégés, seuls des contrats mélangeants (pooling contracts) apparaissent et seule une partie de l'information est révélée à l'équilibre."
      "en" => "We analyze contracting between an innovator endowed with an idea and a project developer. The innovator has private information about the value of his idea, whereas the developer must exert some non-verifiable effort at the development stage. The developer may also threaten to leave the relationship after being informed on the value of the idea. The equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives, but differently so depending on the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). In particular, with intermediate IPR, only pooling contracts arise, with a limited amount of information being revealed at equilibrium."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-22T06:21:50.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/sand-zantman-wilfried">SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried</a>, MARTIMORT David, POUDOU Jean-Christophe"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried, MARTIMORT David, POUDOU Jean-Christophe</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2011</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process</b><br><span>2011-01 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41615484" target="_blank">Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.0641575
  +"parent": null
}