Year
2023
Abstract
Recent literature on common ownership has employed econometric findings on the correlation between parallel holdings and prices on specific product markets to support policy claims directed to intervene in the investment strategies of the worlds largest investment corporations. Regardless of the validity of such econometric findings, direct intervention in the investment strategies of large investment management corporations may produce a series of unwanted negative repercussions on the positive externalities that are correlated to the presence of parallel holdings (e.g. enhanced pursuance of ESG objectives) without actually sorting out the expected pro-competitive effects – because of the presence of other co-causation factors that determine price increases. Sound policy interventions should also consider the larger picture (concentration on the product markets, concentration on the financial services market, status of governance practices and policies and finally also geopolitical variables) before embarking in any policy strategy in this field.
CORRADI, M. (2023). Common Ownership by Investment Management Corporations and EU Policies. Please, Play Puzzles and not Mikado! Dans: Marco Corradi, Julian Nowag eds. Intersections Between Corporate and Antitrust Law. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 265-286.