Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "12465"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "12465"
    "slug" => "balance-billing-as-an-adherence-to-treatment-signalling-device"
    "yearMonth" => "2021-09"
    "year" => "2021"
    "title" => "Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D., LAMIRAUD, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2021). Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</i>, 177(3), pp. 359-390."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "LAMIRAUD Karine"
        "bid" => "B00278040"
        "slug" => "lamiraud-karine"
      ]
      1 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "balance billing"
      1 => "treatment adherence"
      2 => "signalling game"
      3 => "health-care systems"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2022-01-26 09:18:56"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/balance-billing-as-an-adherence-to-treatment-signalling-device-101628jite-2021-0011"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "359-390"
      "volume" => "177"
      "number" => "3"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting  a physician working in the regulated sector (where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance) and a physician working in the unregulated sector (where a balance-billing scheme operates). In the latter, patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyzes the signalling properties of this mechanism. The model reveals that a small extra fee allows obtaining a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and will benefit from a larger care effort on the part of their physician. We also analyze the other equilibria of the game."
      "en" => "In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting  a physician working in the regulated sector (where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance) and a physician working in the unregulated sector (where a balance-billing scheme operates). In the latter, patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyzes the signalling properties of this mechanism. The model reveals that a small extra fee allows obtaining a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and will benefit from a larger care effort on the part of their physician. We also analyze the other equilibria of the game."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-23T09:21:42.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/lamiraud-karine">LAMIRAUD Karine</a>, <a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT Damien"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">LAMIRAUD Karine, VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT Damien</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2021</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">balance billing</a>, <a href="#">treatment adherence</a>, <a href="#">signalling game</a>, <a href="#">health-care systems</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device</b><br><span>2021-09 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/balance-billing-as-an-adherence-to-treatment-signalling-device-101628jite-2021-0011" target="_blank">Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.249052
  +"parent": null
}