Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "15296"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "15296"
    "slug" => "are-elections-a-curse-for-incumbents-in-autocracies-evidence-from-chinese-villages"
    "yearMonth" => "2014-01"
    "year" => "2014"
    "title" => "Are Elections a Curse for Incumbents in Autocracies? Evidence from Chinese Villages."
    "description" => "HAN, L. (2014). Are Elections a Curse for Incumbents in Autocracies? Evidence from Chinese Villages. <i>Public Choice</i>, 158(2014), pp. 221–242."
    "authors" => array:1 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "HAN Li"
        "bid" => "B00825033"
        "slug" => "han-li"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:18:28"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0004-3"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "221–242"
      "volume" => "158"
      "number" => "2014"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Are elections in autocracies a curse for incumbents? Using panel data from village elections in China, the OLS regression shows that introducing competitive elections has a relatively small effect on the removal of autocratic incumbents. However, the effect becomes much larger when the endogenous timing is instrumented with the passage of provincial election laws and village-specific election cycles. Additional evidence also suggests that removing incumbents through competitive elections enhances local governance. I interpret these results as suggesting that political selection matters in electoral autocracies."
      "en" => "Are elections in autocracies a curse for incumbents? Using panel data from village elections in China, the OLS regression shows that introducing competitive elections has a relatively small effect on the removal of autocratic incumbents. However, the effect becomes much larger when the endogenous timing is instrumented with the passage of provincial election laws and village-specific election cycles. Additional evidence also suggests that removing incumbents through competitive elections enhances local governance. I interpret these results as suggesting that political selection matters in electoral autocracies."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-25T07:21:50.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Are Elections a Curse for Incumbents in Autocracies? Evidence from Chinese Villages."
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/han-li">HAN Li</a>"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">HAN Li</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2014</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Are Elections a Curse for Incumbents in Autocracies? Evidence from Chinese Villages.</b><br><span>2014-01 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0004-3" target="_blank">Are Elections a Curse for Incumbents in Autocracies? Evidence from Chinese Villages.</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.517593
  +"parent": null
}