Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "12891"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "12891"
    "slug" => "advertising-and-endogenous-exit-in-a-differentiated-duopoly"
    "yearMonth" => "2006-03"
    "year" => "2006"
    "title" => "Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly"
    "description" => "MANTOVANI, A. et MION, G. (2006). Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly. <i>Recherches Economiques de Louvain</i>, 72(1), pp. 19."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "MION Giordiano"
        "bid" => "B00802892"
        "slug" => "mion-giordano"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "MANTOVANI Andrea"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2023-01-27 01:00:42"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.3917/rel.721.0019"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "19"
      "volume" => "72"
      "number" => "1"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => """
        Dans cet article nous considérons un jeu de duopole en deux étapes, dans lequel les entreprises décident d’abord si elles souhaitent investir dans la publicité, puis se concurrencent ensuite en prix. Nous montrons que la publicité a deux effets : d’une part, elle élargie le marché pour les deux entreprises, et d’autre part, elle redirige une partie de la demande vers le produit publicisé.\n
        Nous obtenons, en fonction des paramètres, des équilibres symétrique et asymétriques. Les deux cas les plus intéressants sont un jeu de coordination, où les deux entreprises peuvent simultanément investir ou ne pas investir, et un jeu chicken, où seule l’une des deux entreprises investie tandis que l’autre peut éventuellement sortir (de manière endogène) du marché. Nos résultats suggèrent que la différenciation des produits joue un rôle ambigu sur l’investissement en publicité et qu’une substituabilité forte entre produits peut donner lieu à un problème de coordination.
        """
      "en" => """
        In this paper we consider a two-stage duopoly game where firms first decide whether to invest in advertising and then compete in prices. Advertising has two effects : a market enlargement for both firms and a predatory gain for the investing firm only.\n
        Both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria may arise. The two most interesting cases are a coordination game where both firms investing and non-investing are equilibria, and a chicken game where only one firm invests while the other is possibly driven (endogenously) out of the market. Our results suggest that product differentiation has an ambiguous impact on investment in advertising and that strong product substitutability may induce a coordination problem.
        """
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-22T04:21:50.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/mion-giordano">MION Giordiano</a>, MANTOVANI Andrea"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">MION Giordiano, MANTOVANI Andrea</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2006</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly</b><br><span>2006-03 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.3917/rel.721.0019" target="_blank">Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.6474495
  +"parent": null
}