Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11037"
#_source: array:26 [
"id" => "11037"
"slug" => "a-mechanism-design-approach-to-climate-change-agreements"
"yearMonth" => "2016-06"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements"
"description" => "MARTIMORT, D. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2016). A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i>, 14(3), pp. 669-718."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "MARTIMORT David"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:9 [
0 => "D82"
1 => "Asymmetric and Private Information"
2 => "Mechanism DesignH23"
3 => "Externalities"
4 => "Redistributive Effects"
5 => "Environmental Taxes and SubsidiesQ54"
6 => "Climate"
7 => "Natural Disasters"
8 => "Global Warming"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-abstract/14/3/669/2194880?redirectedFrom=fulltext"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "669-718"
"volume" => "14"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We take a mechanism design perspective to investigate how environmental agreements should account for multilateral externalities, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation by sovereign countries. The optimal mechanism involves a tradeoff between a free rider problem in the effort provision of participating countries and the necessity of inducing countries to ratify the agreement. This mechanism can be approximated by a simple menu with attractive implementation and robustness properties. Limits on enforcement and commitment might nevertheless hinder the performance of this menu, making the “business as usual” scenario more likely."
"en" => "We take a mechanism design perspective to investigate how environmental agreements should account for multilateral externalities, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation by sovereign countries. The optimal mechanism involves a tradeoff between a free rider problem in the effort provision of participating countries and the necessity of inducing countries to ratify the agreement. This mechanism can be approximated by a simple menu with attractive implementation and robustness properties. Limits on enforcement and commitment might nevertheless hinder the performance of this menu, making the “business as usual” scenario more likely."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-20T04:21:49.000Z"
"docTitle" => "A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements"
"docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
"authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/sand-zantman-wilfried">SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried</a>, MARTIMORT David"
"docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried, MARTIMORT David</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2016</span>"
"keywordList" => "<a href="#">D82</a>, <a href="#">Asymmetric and Private Information</a>, <a href="#">Mechanism DesignH23</a>, <a href="#">Externalities</a>, <a href="#">Redistributive Effects</a>, <a href="#">Environmental Taxes and SubsidiesQ54</a>, <a href="#">Climate</a>, <a href="#">Natural Disasters</a>, <a href="#">Global Warming</a>"
"docPreview" => "<b>A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements</b><br><span>2016-06 | Journal articles </span>"
"docType" => "research"
"publicationLink" => "<a href="https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-abstract/14/3/669/2194880?redirectedFrom=fulltext" target="_blank">A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements</a>"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 8.947243
+"parent": null
}
