Year
2021
Authors
LE GRAND François, Ragot Xavier
Abstract
This paper presents a positive and normative study of a world financial market when sovereign countries can default on their debt. We construct a tractable model that enables us to study sovereign default in general equilibrium. The amount of safe assets is thus endogenous and determined by international risk-sharing. We characterize the equilibrium structure and we show that the market equilibrium can generate multiple equilibria. In addition, the market equilibrium is not constrained-efficient because countries do not fully internalize the value of their debt being used as liquidity. We prove that a world fund issuing a safe asset increases aggregate welfare. The fund’s relationship with the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights is discussed.
LE GRAND, F. et RAGOT, X. (2021). Sovereign default and liquidity: The case for a world safe asset. Journal of International Economics, 131, pp. 103462.