Year
2025
Authors
JANDHYALA Srividya, CHOUDHURY Arnab, NANDKUMAR Anand
Abstract
Political and regulatory actors routinely adopt or enforce policies to protect domestic firms at the expense of foreign firms. However, since courts are expected to be neutral and act independently, a question arises whether (and why) they discriminate against foreign firms. We argue that the courts are nationalistic, which emanates from judges differentiating between in-group (domestic) and out-group (foreign) members. In a sample of 58,754 patent disputes adjudicated by US federal district courts between 1983 and 2016, we find domestic patent holders and challengers are more successful than their foreign counterparts. Rulings involving foreign firms are more likely to exhibit nationalistic rhetoric. Judicial ideology moderates the differential odds of success between domestic and foreign firms. Thus, the legal system is another source of economic nationalism.
CHOUDHURY, A., JANDHYALA, S. et NANDKUMAR, A. (2025). Economic nationalism and the home court advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 46(1), pp. 242-272.