Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216 ▼
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12465"
#_source: array:26 [
"id" => "12465"
"slug" => "12465-balance-billing-as-an-adherence-to-treatment-signalling-device"
"yearMonth" => "2021-09"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., LAMIRAUD, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2021). Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</i>, 177(3), pp. 359-390. 
BESANCENOT, D., LAMIRAUD, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2021). Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment S "
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMIRAUD Karine"
"bid" => "B00278040"
"slug" => "lamiraud-karine"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "balance billing"
1 => "treatment adherence"
2 => "signalling game"
3 => "health-care systems"
]
"updatedAt" => "2022-01-26 09:18:56"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/balance-billing-as-an-adherence-to-treatment-signalling-device-101628jite-2021-0011 https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/balance-billing-as-an-adherence-to-treatment-signalling-devic "
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "359-390"
"volume" => "177"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in the regulated sector (where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance) and a physician working in the unregulated sector (where a balance-billing scheme operates). In the latter, patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyzes the signalling properties of this mechanism. The model reveals that a small extra fee allows obtaining a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and will benefit from a larger care effort on the part of their physician. We also analyze the other equilibria of the game. In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in "
"en" => "In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in the regulated sector (where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance) and a physician working in the unregulated sector (where a balance-billing scheme operates). In the latter, patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyzes the signalling properties of this mechanism. The model reveals that a small extra fee allows obtaining a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and will benefit from a larger care effort on the part of their physician. We also analyze the other equilibria of the game. In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in "
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-03-18T01:21:43.000Z"
"docTitle" => "Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device"
"docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
"authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/lamiraud-karine">LAMIRAUD Karine</a>, <a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT Damien <a href="/cv/lamiraud-karine">LAMIRAUD Karine</a>, <a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, "
"docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">LAMIRAUD Karine, VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT Damien</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2021</span> <span class="document-property-authors">LAMIRAUD Karine, VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT Damien</span><br "
"keywordList" => "<a href="#">balance billing</a>, <a href="#">treatment adherence</a>, <a href="#">signalling game</a>, <a href="#">health-care systems</a> <a href="#">balance billing</a>, <a href="#">treatment adherence</a>, <a href="#">signalling game</a "
"docPreview" => "<b>Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device</b><br><span>2021-09 | Journal articles </span> <b>Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device</b><br><span>2021-09 | Journal art "
"docType" => "research"
"publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/balance-billing-as-an-adherence-to-treatment-signalling-device-101628jite-2021-0011" target="_blank">Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device</a> <a href="https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/balance-billing-as-an-adherence-to-treatment-signall "
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 8.726935
+"parent": null
}
