Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2216
#_id: "B00825033"
#_source: array:40 [
"bid" => "B00825033"
"academId" => "35101"
"slug" => "han-li"
"fullName" => "Li HAN"
"lastName" => "HAN"
"firstName" => "Li"
"title" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur associé"
"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"email" => "li.han@essec.edu"
"status" => "ACTIF"
"campus" => "Campus de Singapour"
"departments" => []
"phone" => ""
"sites" => []
"facNumber" => "35101"
"externalCvUrl" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/en/cv/han-li/pdf"
"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=1GvGvkYAAAAJ&hl=en"
"facOrcId" => "https://orcid.org/"
"career" => array:1 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2220
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2024-09-01"
"endDate" => null
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur associé"
"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2216}
}
]
"diplomes" => array:1 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2218
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2008"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Doctor of Philosophy, Economy, Economics"
"fr" => "Doctor of Philosophy, Economie, Economie"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Harvard University"
"en" => "Harvard University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "États-Unis"
"en" => "United States of America"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2216}
}
]
"bio" => array:2 [
"fr" => "<p dir="ltr">Li Han est professeure associée au département d'économie de l'ESSEC Business School, sur le campus Asie-Pacifique. Avant de rejoindre l'ESSEC, elle occupait le même poste à l'Université des Sciences et Technologies de Hong Kong depuis 2016. Ses recherches se concentrent principalement sur le point de rencontre entre l'économie du développement et l'économie politique, avec une attention particulière portée sur la manière dont la politique et les régimes autoritaires influencent la mobilité sociale à l'échelle nationale et provoquent des répercussions internationales. Bien que son expertise régionale initiale porte sur la Chine, elle a élargi son champ de recherche pour inclure l'Afrique et l'Asie du Sud. Ses travaux ont été publiés dans des revues prestigieuses telles que The Economic Journal, The Journal of Public Economics et The Journal of Development Economics.</p>\n"
"en" => "<p dir="ltr">Li Han est professeure associée au département d'économie de l'ESSEC Business School, sur le campus Asie-Pacifique. Avant de rejoindre l'ESSEC, elle occupait le même poste à l'Université des Sciences et Technologies de Hong Kong depuis 2016. Ses recherches se concentrent principalement sur le point de rencontre entre l'économie du développement et l'économie politique, avec une attention particulière portée sur la manière dont la politique et les régimes autoritaires influencent la mobilité sociale à l'échelle nationale et provoquent des répercussions internationales. Bien que son expertise régionale initiale porte sur la Chine, elle a élargi son champ de recherche pour inclure l'Afrique et l'Asie du Sud. Ses travaux ont été publiés dans des revues prestigieuses telles que The Economic Journal, The Journal of Public Economics et The Journal of Development Economics.</p>\n"
]
"department" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"site" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"industrrySectors" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"researchFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie du développement - Economie du travail"
"en" => "Development Economics - Labor Economics"
]
"teachingFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"distinctions" => []
"teaching" => []
"otherActivities" => []
"theses" => []
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:22.000Z"
"contributions" => array:11 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2221
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15290"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15290"
"slug" => "can-conditional-grants-attract-better-students-evidence-from-chinese-teachers-colleges"
"yearMonth" => "2020-10"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Can Conditional Grants Attract Better Students? Evidence from Chinese Teachers’ Colleges"
"description" => "HAN, L. et XIE, J. (2020). Can Conditional Grants Attract Better Students? Evidence from Chinese Teachers’ Colleges. <i>Economics of Education Review</i>, 78(102034)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "XIE Jiaxin"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:09:07"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2020.102034"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => "78"
"number" => "102034"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2219
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15289"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15289"
"slug" => "marketing-communist-party-membership-in-china"
"yearMonth" => "2021-01"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "Marketing Communist Party membership in China"
"description" => "HAN, L. et LI, T. (2021). Marketing Communist Party membership in China. <i>Public Choice</i>, 188(2021), pp. 241–268."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "LI Tao"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:07:28"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00827-0"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "241–268"
"volume" => "188"
"number" => "2021"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The selection of political officials is under-studied in economic analysis of authoritarian politics. In the absence of elections, the autocracy alone is burdened with the task of selecting the right candidate for every political position. This paper tries to empirically investigate an authoritarian political selection market where a dictator “sells” potentially valuable political membership to eligible supporters who have to pay a “price” in terms of screening cost. We highlight one dilemma that many contemporary autocracies face, namely the need to recruit educated elites who usually have better options in the private sector and are less dependent on the regime. This paper argues that autocracies can minimize this challenge by actively screening for unobservable loyalty conditional on observed technical skills. Using micro-level Chinese Communist Party college recruitment data, we show that the party adopts a discriminative strategy of lowering (but not removing) the screening cost for high-ability students and more intensively screening for loyalty among low-ability students. Using brainwashing course scores as a measurement of loyalty provides suggestive evidence that party members of a given ability level have more loyalty than nonmembers at the same ability level."
"en" => "The selection of political officials is under-studied in economic analysis of authoritarian politics. In the absence of elections, the autocracy alone is burdened with the task of selecting the right candidate for every political position. This paper tries to empirically investigate an authoritarian political selection market where a dictator “sells” potentially valuable political membership to eligible supporters who have to pay a “price” in terms of screening cost. We highlight one dilemma that many contemporary autocracies face, namely the need to recruit educated elites who usually have better options in the private sector and are less dependent on the regime. This paper argues that autocracies can minimize this challenge by actively screening for unobservable loyalty conditional on observed technical skills. Using micro-level Chinese Communist Party college recruitment data, we show that the party adopts a discriminative strategy of lowering (but not removing) the screening cost for high-ability students and more intensively screening for loyalty among low-ability students. Using brainwashing course scores as a measurement of loyalty provides suggestive evidence that party members of a given ability level have more loyalty than nonmembers at the same ability level."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2223
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15288"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15288"
"slug" => "trading-favours-through-the-revolving-door-evidence-from-chinas-primary-land-market"
"yearMonth" => "2023-01"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Trading Favours through the Revolving Door: Evidence from China’s Primary Land Market."
"description" => "CHEN, T., HAN, L., KUNG, J. et XIE, J. (2023). Trading Favours through the Revolving Door: Evidence from China’s Primary Land Market. <i>Economic Journal</i>, 133(649), pp. 70–97."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "CHEN Ting"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "KUNG James"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "XIE Jiaxin"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:10:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac060"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "70–97"
"volume" => "133"
"number" => "649"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "By matching data on land transactions in China’s primary land market with detailed curricula vitae of board directors in publicly listed firms, we identify a pattern of ‘revolving-door’ exchanges between local officials and firms. The officials discounted the price of land that they sold to the said firms, and were subsequently rewarded with board appointments upon retirement. Specifically, these ‘client officials’ are three times as likely to be recruited by the ‘patron firms’ as board directors and enjoy a salary that is 23% higher, and 81% more company shares by comparison with directors who did not help firms to secure cheap land deals. All of these, however, are conditional on patron firms being able to receive a price discount, which averaged 19.4% when they purchased them in normal times. However, when client officials were constrained from providing a price discount during a surprise audit, the likelihood of client officials recruited as board directors was halved, with the price discount and extra compensation received by the patrons and clients, respectively, vanishing altogether. By providing evidence of the reciprocal benefits received by both parties, we demonstrate that the revolving door is used as a ‘payment’ rather than a ‘connection’ device in the Chinese context."
"en" => "By matching data on land transactions in China’s primary land market with detailed curricula vitae of board directors in publicly listed firms, we identify a pattern of ‘revolving-door’ exchanges between local officials and firms. The officials discounted the price of land that they sold to the said firms, and were subsequently rewarded with board appointments upon retirement. Specifically, these ‘client officials’ are three times as likely to be recruited by the ‘patron firms’ as board directors and enjoy a salary that is 23% higher, and 81% more company shares by comparison with directors who did not help firms to secure cheap land deals. All of these, however, are conditional on patron firms being able to receive a price discount, which averaged 19.4% when they purchased them in normal times. However, when client officials were constrained from providing a price discount during a surprise audit, the likelihood of client officials recruited as board directors was halved, with the price discount and extra compensation received by the patrons and clients, respectively, vanishing altogether. By providing evidence of the reciprocal benefits received by both parties, we demonstrate that the revolving door is used as a ‘payment’ rather than a ‘connection’ device in the Chinese context."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2215
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15291"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15291"
"slug" => "how-does-intergenerational-investment-respond-to-changes-in-the-marriage-market-evidence-from-china"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "How Does Intergenerational Investment Respond to Changes in the Marriage Market? Evidence from China."
"description" => "HAN, L. et SHI, X. (2019). How Does Intergenerational Investment Respond to Changes in the Marriage Market? Evidence from China. <i>Journal of Development Economics</i>, 139(June), pp. 109-121."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SHI Xinzheng"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:11:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.03.002"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "109-121"
"volume" => "139"
"number" => "June"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper examines how intergenerational investment responds to changes in the marriage market. Two major channels are modeled and empirically tested: first, expecting gender-specific impacts on the future marriage market for their children, parents' adjustments in educational investment differ by the gender of children, and second, changes in marriage market conditions have contemporaneous impacts on intrahousehold bargaining because they change existing couples' remarriage options, which affects their educational investment in their children. We test our model by exploiting a policy change in favor of local urban men in the urban marriage market in China. We find that educational investment by local-local couples decreases for sons but changes little for daughters. Consistent with the decrease in children's educational investment, female-favored consumption decreases while male-favored consumption increases. These results provide evidence of interaction between the intrahousehold bargaining and the future marriage prospect effects."
"en" => "This paper examines how intergenerational investment responds to changes in the marriage market. Two major channels are modeled and empirically tested: first, expecting gender-specific impacts on the future marriage market for their children, parents' adjustments in educational investment differ by the gender of children, and second, changes in marriage market conditions have contemporaneous impacts on intrahousehold bargaining because they change existing couples' remarriage options, which affects their educational investment in their children. We test our model by exploiting a policy change in favor of local urban men in the urban marriage market in China. We find that educational investment by local-local couples decreases for sons but changes little for daughters. Consistent with the decrease in children's educational investment, female-favored consumption decreases while male-favored consumption increases. These results provide evidence of interaction between the intrahousehold bargaining and the future marriage prospect effects."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2224
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15292"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15292"
"slug" => "centralized-deployment-and-teacher-incentive-evidence-from-reforms-in-rural-china"
"yearMonth" => "2017-02"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Centralized Deployment and Teacher Incentive: Evidence from Reforms in Rural China."
"description" => "HAN, L., AN, X. et LIU, M. (2017). Centralized Deployment and Teacher Incentive: Evidence from Reforms in Rural China. <i>Economic Development and Cultural Change</i>, 65(2), pp. 297-337."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "AN Xuehui"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "LIU Mingxing"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:12:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1086/689448"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "297-337"
"volume" => "65"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This article evaluates teacher deployment centralization reform in the context of rural China. The administration of regular teacher deployment has been gradually moved from the township (or local school district) up to the county government since 2001. We exploit variations in the timing of deployment centralization and use as a comparison group contract teachers who were not directly affected. Data collected from Gansu Province in 2000 and 2004 show that deployment centralization negatively affected teacher effort and student test scores. Changes in wage structure suggest a likely channel: the implementation of localized performance pay was disrupted by the centralization of teacher deployment."
"en" => "This article evaluates teacher deployment centralization reform in the context of rural China. The administration of regular teacher deployment has been gradually moved from the township (or local school district) up to the county government since 2001. We exploit variations in the timing of deployment centralization and use as a comparison group contract teachers who were not directly affected. Data collected from Gansu Province in 2000 and 2004 show that deployment centralization negatively affected teacher effort and student test scores. Changes in wage structure suggest a likely channel: the implementation of localized performance pay was disrupted by the centralization of teacher deployment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2217
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15293"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15293"
"slug" => "fiscal-incentives-and-policy-choices-of-local-governments-evidence-from-china"
"yearMonth" => "2015-09"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Fiscal Incentives and Policy Choices of Local Governments: Evidence from China."
"description" => "HAN, L. et KUNG, J. (2015). Fiscal Incentives and Policy Choices of Local Governments: Evidence from China. <i>Journal of Development Economics</i>, 116(September), pp. 89-104."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KUNG James"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:13:56"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.04.003"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "89-104"
"volume" => "116"
"number" => "September"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper examines how fiscal incentives affect the policy choices of local governments in the context of China. Based on exogenous changes in the intergovernmental revenue-sharing scheme, we construct a simulated instrumental variable to resolve the endogeneity problem. We find evidence that local governments shifted their efforts from fostering industrial growth to “urbanizing” China, i.e., to developing the real estate and construction sectors, when their retention rate of enterprise tax revenue was reduced. The increase from the new revenue source compensated for half of the losses in revenue that resulted from the reassignment of fiscal rights. The reassignment had also the effect of retarding the industrial growth of domestically-owned firms in particular."
"en" => "This paper examines how fiscal incentives affect the policy choices of local governments in the context of China. Based on exogenous changes in the intergovernmental revenue-sharing scheme, we construct a simulated instrumental variable to resolve the endogeneity problem. We find evidence that local governments shifted their efforts from fostering industrial growth to “urbanizing” China, i.e., to developing the real estate and construction sectors, when their retention rate of enterprise tax revenue was reduced. The increase from the new revenue source compensated for half of the losses in revenue that resulted from the reassignment of fiscal rights. The reassignment had also the effect of retarding the industrial growth of domestically-owned firms in particular."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2222
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15294"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15294"
"slug" => "how-status-inheritance-rules-affect-marital-sorting-theory-and-evidence-from-urban-china"
"yearMonth" => "2015-12"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "How Status Inheritance Rules Affect Marital Sorting: Theory and Evidence from Urban China"
"description" => "HAN, L., LI, T. et ZHAO, Y. (2015). How Status Inheritance Rules Affect Marital Sorting: Theory and Evidence from Urban China. <i>Economic Journal</i>, 125(589), pp. 850–1887."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "LI Tao"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "ZHAO YH"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:15:36"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12283"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "850–1887"
"volume" => "125"
"number" => "589"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Using a matching model, we show that marital sorting by status tends to decline as parental statuses become less complementary in determining their children’s status. Our test explores a policy change in China in which men are granted the same rights as women in passing residency permits (hukou) to their children regardless of their spouse’s hukou – a change resulting in a less complementary status inheritance technology. We find that this change disrupted the previously rigid sorting by hukou and that the position of local men in the urban marriage market improved, whereas that of local women deteriorated."
"en" => "Using a matching model, we show that marital sorting by status tends to decline as parental statuses become less complementary in determining their children’s status. Our test explores a policy change in China in which men are granted the same rights as women in passing residency permits (hukou) to their children regardless of their spouse’s hukou – a change resulting in a less complementary status inheritance technology. We find that this change disrupted the previously rigid sorting by hukou and that the position of local men in the urban marriage market improved, whereas that of local women deteriorated."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2225
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15295"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15295"
"slug" => "encouraging-classroom-peer-interactions-evidence-from-chinese-migrant-schools"
"yearMonth" => "2014-03"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Encouraging classroom peer interactions: Evidence from Chinese migrant schools"
"description" => "LI, T., HAN, L., ZHANG, L. et ROZELLE, S. (2014). Encouraging classroom peer interactions: Evidence from Chinese migrant schools. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i>, 111(March), pp. 29-45."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "LI Tao"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "ZHANG Linxiu"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "ROZELLE Scott "
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:16:53"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.014"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "29-45"
"volume" => "111"
"number" => "March"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In a randomized trial conducted with primary school students in China, we find that pairing high and low achieving classmates as benchmates and offering them group incentives for learning improved low achiever test scores by approximately 0.265 standard deviations without harming the high achievers. Offering only low achievers incentives for learning in a separate trial had no effect. Pure peer effects at the benchmate level are not sufficiently powerful to explain the differences between these two results. We interpret our evidence as suggesting that group incentives can increase the effectiveness of peer effects."
"en" => "In a randomized trial conducted with primary school students in China, we find that pairing high and low achieving classmates as benchmates and offering them group incentives for learning improved low achiever test scores by approximately 0.265 standard deviations without harming the high achievers. Offering only low achievers incentives for learning in a separate trial had no effect. Pure peer effects at the benchmate level are not sufficiently powerful to explain the differences between these two results. We interpret our evidence as suggesting that group incentives can increase the effectiveness of peer effects."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2226
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15296"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15296"
"slug" => "are-elections-a-curse-for-incumbents-in-autocracies-evidence-from-chinese-villages"
"yearMonth" => "2014-01"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Are Elections a Curse for Incumbents in Autocracies? Evidence from Chinese Villages."
"description" => "HAN, L. (2014). Are Elections a Curse for Incumbents in Autocracies? Evidence from Chinese Villages. <i>Public Choice</i>, 158(2014), pp. 221–242."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:18:28"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0004-3"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "221–242"
"volume" => "158"
"number" => "2014"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Are elections in autocracies a curse for incumbents? Using panel data from village elections in China, the OLS regression shows that introducing competitive elections has a relatively small effect on the removal of autocratic incumbents. However, the effect becomes much larger when the endogenous timing is instrumented with the passage of provincial election laws and village-specific election cycles. Additional evidence also suggests that removing incumbents through competitive elections enhances local governance. I interpret these results as suggesting that political selection matters in electoral autocracies."
"en" => "Are elections in autocracies a curse for incumbents? Using panel data from village elections in China, the OLS regression shows that introducing competitive elections has a relatively small effect on the removal of autocratic incumbents. However, the effect becomes much larger when the endogenous timing is instrumented with the passage of provincial election laws and village-specific election cycles. Additional evidence also suggests that removing incumbents through competitive elections enhances local governance. I interpret these results as suggesting that political selection matters in electoral autocracies."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2227
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15297"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15297"
"slug" => "is-centralized-teacher-deployment-more-equitable-evidence-from-rural-china"
"yearMonth" => "2013-03"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Is Centralized Teacher Deployment More Equitable? Evidence from Rural China"
"description" => "HAN, L. (2013). Is Centralized Teacher Deployment More Equitable? Evidence from Rural China. <i>China Economic Review</i>, 24(2013), pp. 65-76."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:19:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2012.10.001"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "65-76"
"volume" => "24"
"number" => "2013"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Is centralized teacher deployment more equitable? This paper evaluates the teacher deployment centralization reform on teacher allocation in the context of rural China. Since 2001 the administration of regular teacher deployment has been gradually moved from the township (or local school district) up to the county government. Using the data from an impoverished province, I show that deployment centralization tends to exacerbate existing inequality in the allocation of teachers in favor of communities close to the county seat by exploiting variations in the timing of centralization."
"en" => "Is centralized teacher deployment more equitable? This paper evaluates the teacher deployment centralization reform on teacher allocation in the context of rural China. Since 2001 the administration of regular teacher deployment has been gradually moved from the township (or local school district) up to the county government. Using the data from an impoverished province, I show that deployment centralization tends to exacerbate existing inequality in the allocation of teachers in favor of communities close to the county seat by exploiting variations in the timing of centralization."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2228
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15298"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15298"
"slug" => "the-gender-difference-of-peer-influence-in-higher-education"
"yearMonth" => "2009-01"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "The Gender Difference of Peer Influence in Higher Education."
"description" => "LI, T. et HAN, L. (2009). The Gender Difference of Peer Influence in Higher Education. <i>Economics of Education Review</i>, 28(1), pp. 129-134."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "HAN Li"
"bid" => "B00825033"
"slug" => "han-li"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "LI Tao"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-29 13:20:58"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2007.12.002"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "129-134"
"volume" => "28"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Investigations of the existence of residential peer effects in higher education has shown mixed results. Using data from a Chinese college, we find no evidence of robust residential peer effects. Using the same data we find evidence that females respond to peer influences, whereas males do not, consistent with social psychology theories that females are more influenced by peers."
"en" => "Investigations of the existence of residential peer effects in higher education has shown mixed results. Using data from a Chinese college, we find no evidence of robust residential peer effects. Using the same data we find evidence that females respond to peer influences, whereas males do not, consistent with social psychology theories that females are more influenced by peers."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T12:21:42.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.606331
+"parent": null
}
]
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0 => "<a href="https://orcid.org/" target="_blank">ORCID</a>"
1 => "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=1GvGvkYAAAAJ&hl=en" target="_blank">Google scholar</a>"
]
"docTitle" => "Li HAN"
"docSubtitle" => "Associate Professor"
"docDescription" => "Department: Economics<br>Campus de Singapour"
"docType" => "cv"
"docPreview" => "<img src="https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00825033.jpg"><span><span>Li HAN</span><span>B00825033</span></span>"
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]
#_index: "academ_cv"
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}
