Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188
#_id: "B00536871"
#_source: array:39 [
"bid" => "B00536871"
"academId" => "2034"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
"fullName" => "Anastasios DOSIS"
"lastName" => "DOSIS"
"firstName" => "Anastasios"
"title" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur associé"
"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"email" => "dosis@essec.edu"
"status" => "ACTIF"
"campus" => "Campus de Cergy"
"departments" => []
"phone" => "+33 (0)1 34 43 30 89"
"sites" => []
"facNumber" => "2034"
"externalCvUrl" => "https://sites.google.com/view/anastasiosdosis/cv?authuser=1"
"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=dLLmOkoAAAAJ"
"facOrcId" => "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2734-4391"
"career" => array:5 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2194
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2013-09-01"
"endDate" => "2021-08-31"
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"type" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur assistant"
"en" => "Assistant Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2195
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2013-09-01"
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"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions"
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"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chercheur"
"en" => "Researcher"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "THEMA"
"en" => "THEMA"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2196
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2012-09-01"
"endDate" => "2013-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chargé d'Enseignement"
"en" => "Teaching Fellow"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "University of Warwick"
"en" => "University of Warwick"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Royaume-Uni"
"en" => "United Kingdom"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2197
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2008-09-01"
"endDate" => "2009-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Visiting Fellow"
"en" => "Visiting Fellow"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "University of Warwick"
"en" => "University of Warwick"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Royaume-Uni"
"en" => "United Kingdom"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2198
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2021-09-01"
"endDate" => null
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"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
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"label" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
]
"diplomes" => array:4 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2190
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2014"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Ph.D in Economics"
"fr" => "Ph.D en Economie"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "University of Warwick"
"en" => "University of Warwick"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Royaume-Uni"
"en" => "United Kingdom"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2192
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2008"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "MPhil in Economics"
"fr" => "MPhil en Economie"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "National and Kapodistrian University of Athens"
"en" => "National and Kapodistrian University of Athens"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Grèce"
"en" => "Greece"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2189
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2006"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "MSc in Applied Mathematics for Business and Finance"
"fr" => "MSc en Mathématiques Appliquées pour le Commerce et Finance"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Athens University of Economics and Business"
"en" => "Athens University of Economics and Business"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Grèce"
"en" => "Greece"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2193
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2005"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "BSc in Management Science and Technology"
"fr" => "BSc en Sciences de Gestion et Technologie"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Athens University of Economics and Business"
"en" => "Athens University of Economics and Business"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Grèce"
"en" => "Greece"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
]
"bio" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
<p>Anastasios a obtenu son doctorat de l'Université de Warwick en Angleterre avant de rejoindre l'ESSEC en 2013. Il est un théoricien de l'économie avec un intérêt particulier pour la théorie des jeux et ses applications à l'organisation industrielle, à l'économie financière et à la theorie de contrat. Ses articles ont été publiés dans les revues les plus prestigieux.</p>\n
\n
<p> </p>\n
"""
"en" => "<p>Anastasios received his PhD from University of Warwick in England before he moved to ESSEC in 2013. He is an economic theorist with a special interest in game theory and its applications to industrial organisation, financial economics and mechanism design. His articles have appeared in leading academic journals.</p>\n"
]
"department" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"site" => array:2 [
"fr" => "https://sites.google.com/view/anastasiosdosis/research?authuser=1"
"en" => "https://sites.google.com/view/anastasiosdosis/research?authuser=1"
]
"industrrySectors" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Banques - Internet et E-commerce de détail - Assurance"
"en" => "Banks - Internet and E-Commerce Retail - Insurance"
]
"researchFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie industrielle - Microéconomie et théorie des jeux - Marchés financiers et institutions financières - Finance d'entreprise"
"en" => "Industrial Economics - Microeconomics & Game Theory - Financial Markets & Institutions - Corporate Finance"
]
"teachingFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie industrielle - Microéconomie et théorie des jeux - Autre domaine - Comportement organisationnel - Finance d'entreprise"
"en" => "Industrial Economics - Microeconomics & Game Theory - Other teaching domain - Organizational Behavior - Corporate Finance"
]
"distinctions" => array:1 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2199
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "2009-09-01"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Warwick Economics Postgraduate Research Fellowship"
"en" => "Warwick Economics Postgraduate Research Fellowship"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Bourses"
"en" => "Grants"
]
"tri" => " 2 "
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
]
"teaching" => []
"otherActivities" => array:2 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2187
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => null
"year" => null
"uuid" => "104"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités de recherche"
"en" => "Research activities"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Reviewer pour un journal"
"en" => "Reviewer for a journal"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Relecteur pour Economic Theory; Economics Letters; International Game Theory Review; International Journal of Game Theory; Theoretical Economics"
"en" => "Reviewer for Economic Theory; Economics Letters; International Game Theory Review; International Journal of Game Theory; Theoretical Economics"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
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]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2191
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2015-01-01"
"endDate" => "2015-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "502"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Professional activities"
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"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Consulting"
"en" => "Consulting"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Projet: "Price Discrimination and Unfairness of Prices in EU Competition Law and Policy: Applicability to the CRA Industry", (avec F. Jenny et P. Langhor), 2015, Projet politique alloué par European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)"
"en" => "Project: "Price Discrimination and Unfairness of Prices in EU Competition Law and Policy: Applicability to the CRA Industry", (with F. Jenny and P. Langhor), 2015, Policy project allocated by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
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]
"country" => array:2 [
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]
]
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+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2188}
}
]
"theses" => []
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:24.000Z"
"contributions" => array:44 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2201
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5399"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5399"
"slug" => "an-efficient-competitive-market-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2014-12"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "An Efficient Competitive Market with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2014). An Efficient Competitive Market with Adverse Selection. Dans: 2014 Econometric Society European Winter Meeting."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
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]
"ouvrage" => "2014 Econometric Society European Winter Meeting"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
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]
"type" => array:2 [
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"support_type" => array:2 [
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"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2203
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5637"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5637"
"slug" => "contracting-for-privacy"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Contracting for Privacy"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2019). Contracting for Privacy. Dans: 2019 Midwest Economic Theory Conference."
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0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
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1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2019 Midwest Economic Theory Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
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"pages" => null
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"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2205
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5837"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5837"
"slug" => "efficient-competition-in-markets-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2019-09"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Efficient Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). Efficient Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection. Dans: 46th Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists (EGRIE) 2019."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "46th Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists (EGRIE) 2019"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
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"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
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"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
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]
"countries" => array:2 [
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]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
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]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2202
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5838"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5838"
"slug" => "efficient-decentralised-regulation-in-competitive-insurance-markets-ith-asymmetric-information"
"yearMonth" => "2015-06"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Efficient Decentralised Regulation in Competitive Insurance Markets ith Asymmetric Information"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2015). Efficient Decentralised Regulation in Competitive Insurance Markets ith Asymmetric Information. Dans: Oligo Workshop 2015: Optimal Firm Behavior and Game-Theoretic Modeling of Competition."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
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]
"ouvrage" => "Oligo Workshop 2015: Optimal Firm Behavior and Game-Theoretic Modeling of Competition"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
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"en" => "Economics"
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"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
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}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2206
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5839"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5839"
"slug" => "efficient-reinsurance-in-health-insurance-markets"
"yearMonth" => "2018-04"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Efficient Reinsurance in Health Insurance Markets"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2018). Efficient Reinsurance in Health Insurance Markets. Dans: 16th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference 2018."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
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"ouvrage" => "16th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference 2018"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
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"type" => array:2 [
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"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
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"countries" => array:2 [
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"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
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}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2200
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6214"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6214"
"slug" => "interest-rates-and-investment-under-competitive-screening-and-moral-hazard"
"yearMonth" => "2018-11"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Interest Rates and Investment under Competitive Screening and Moral Hazard"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2018). Interest Rates and Investment under Competitive Screening and Moral Hazard. Dans: 2018 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists (ASSET)."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
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"ouvrage" => "2018 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists (ASSET)"
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"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
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+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2204
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6238"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6238"
"slug" => "investment-under-adverse-selection-and-low-interest"
"yearMonth" => "2017-07"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Investment under Adverse Selection and Low Interest"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2017). Investment under Adverse Selection and Low Interest. Dans: 17th Annual Meeting of the European Financial Management Association (EFMA)."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "17th Annual Meeting of the European Financial Management Association (EFMA)"
"keywords" => []
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"authors_fields" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Economics"
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"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
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+"_type": "_doc"
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+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2207
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6729"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6729"
"slug" => "nash-equilibrium-in-general-selection-markets"
"yearMonth" => "2015-07"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Nash Equilibrium in General Selection Markets"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2015). Nash Equilibrium in General Selection Markets. Dans: 14th Conference for Research and Economic Theory and Econometrics (CRETE 2015)."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "14th Conference for Research and Economic Theory and Econometrics (CRETE 2015)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2208
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6771"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6771"
"slug" => "on-signaling-and-screening"
"yearMonth" => "2016-04"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "On Signaling and Screening"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2016). On Signaling and Screening. Dans: 14th International Industrial Organization Conference (2016 IIOC)."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "14th International Industrial Organization Conference (2016 IIOC)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2209
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6772"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6772"
"slug" => "on-signalling-and-screening-in-markets-with-asymmetric-information"
"yearMonth" => "2016-08"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2016). On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information. Dans: 43rd European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) Conference."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "43rd European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2210
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6778"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6778"
"slug" => "on-the-equilibria-of-informed-principal-games-with-interdependent-values"
"yearMonth" => "2016-07"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "On the Equilibria of Informed Principal Games with Interdependent Values"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2016). On the Equilibria of Informed Principal Games with Interdependent Values. Dans: 15th Conference for Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "15th Conference for Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2211
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6938"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6938"
"slug" => "privacy-and-data"
"yearMonth" => "2019-07"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Privacy and Data"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2019). Privacy and Data. Dans: 19th Annual SAET Conference 2019, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "19th Annual SAET Conference 2019, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2212
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7139"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7139"
"slug" => "signalling-productivity-and-investment"
"yearMonth" => "2016-07"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Signalling Productivity and Investment"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2016). Signalling Productivity and Investment. Dans: 27th International Conference on Game Theory."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "27th International Conference on Game Theory"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2213
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7188"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7188"
"slug" => "strategic-experimentation-in-an-rd-race"
"yearMonth" => "2018-05"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Strategic Experimentation in an R&D race"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et MUTHOO, A. (2018). Strategic Experimentation in an R&D race. Dans: 2018 Conference on “Auctions, competition, regulation, and public policy”."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "MUTHOO A."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2018 Conference on “Auctions, competition, regulation, and public policy”"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2214
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7247"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7247"
"slug" => "testing-for-adverse-selection-in-credit-markets"
"yearMonth" => "2017-07"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Testing for Adverse Selection in Credit Markets"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2017). Testing for Adverse Selection in Credit Markets. Dans: 16th Conference for Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "16th Conference for Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
15 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2215
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7323"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7323"
"slug" => "the-financial-accelerator-in-a-model-of-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2016-07"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "The Financial Accelerator in a Model of Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2016). The Financial Accelerator in a Model of Adverse Selection. Dans: Ioannina Meeting on Applied Economics and Finance (IMAEF 2016)."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Ioannina Meeting on Applied Economics and Finance (IMAEF 2016)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
16 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7394"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7394"
"slug" => "the-ownership-of-data"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "The Ownership of Data"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2019). The Ownership of Data. Dans: 17th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference 2019."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "17th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference 2019"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
17 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2217
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7395"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7395"
"slug" => "the-ownership-of-data"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "The Ownership of Data"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2019). The Ownership of Data. Dans: 2019 Bergen Competition Policy Conference."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2019 Bergen Competition Policy Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
18 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2218
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7874"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7874"
"slug" => "a-more-general-definition-of-equilibrium-in-markets-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2016-02"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "A More General Definition of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2016). <i>A More General Definition of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "I provide a general definition of equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. An equilibrium is defined as a menu of contracts that makes non-negative aggregate profits such that there exists no other menu that includes it as a subset and makes strictly positive aggregate profits. I show that every efficient menu of contracts is also an equilibrium menu of contracts. Furthermore, I characterise a general sufficient condition under which every equilibrium menu of contracts is efficient, restoring that way the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. I provide two possible interpretations for this new definition."
"en" => "I provide a general definition of equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. An equilibrium is defined as a menu of contracts that makes non-negative aggregate profits such that there exists no other menu that includes it as a subset and makes strictly positive aggregate profits. I show that every efficient menu of contracts is also an equilibrium menu of contracts. Furthermore, I characterise a general sufficient condition under which every equilibrium menu of contracts is efficient, restoring that way the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. I provide two possible interpretations for this new definition."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
19 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2219
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7896"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7896"
"slug" => "an-efficient-mechanism-for-competitive-markets-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2016-02"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "An Efficient Mechanism for Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2016). <i>An Efficient Mechanism for Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:14"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
20 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2220
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7924"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7924"
"slug" => "bertand-competition-and-the-existence-of-pure-strategy-nash-equilibrium-in-markets-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2016-02"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Bertand Competition and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2016). <i>Bertand Competition and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
21 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2221
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8039"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8039"
"slug" => "experimentation-in-dynamic-rd-competition"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et MUTHOO, A. (2019). <i>Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "MUTHOO A."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study a two-stage, winner-takes-all, R&D race, in which, at the outset, firms are uncertain regarding the viability of the project. Learning through experimentation introduces a bilateral (dynamic) feedback mechanism. For relatively low-value products, the equilibrium stopping time coincides with the socially efficient stopping time although firms might experiment excessively in equilibrium; for relatively high-value products, firms might reduce experimentation and stop rather prematurely due to the fundamental free-riding effect. Perhaps surprisingly, a decrease in the value of the product can spur experimentation."
"en" => "We study a two-stage, winner-takes-all, R&D race, in which, at the outset, firms are uncertain regarding the viability of the project. Learning through experimentation introduces a bilateral (dynamic) feedback mechanism. For relatively low-value products, the equilibrium stopping time coincides with the socially efficient stopping time although firms might experiment excessively in equilibrium; for relatively high-value products, firms might reduce experimentation and stop rather prematurely due to the fundamental free-riding effect. Perhaps surprisingly, a decrease in the value of the product can spur experimentation."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
22 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2222
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8085"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8085"
"slug" => "interest-rates-and-investment-under-competitive-screening-and-moral-hazard"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Interest Rates and Investment Under Competitive Screening and Moral Hazard"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). <i>Interest Rates and Investment Under Competitive Screening and Moral Hazard</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
This paper studies the effect of (market) interest rate changes on investment under competitive screening and moral hazard. Lower (higher) rates ease (hinder) the provision of incentives to entrepreneurs with positive NPV projects to invest in their best project but hinder (ease) banks’ efforts to distinguish them from entrepreneurs with\n
negative NPV projects. This might result in a hump-shaped investment curve. Under low rates, screening through limit pricing leaves insufficient profits to low-wealth entrepreneurs to invest in their best project, and consequently, several project qualities might co-exist in equilibrium. Several testable and other implications on the effectiveness\n
of unconventional monetary policy to boost investment are discussed.
"""
"en" => """
This paper studies the effect of (market) interest rate changes on investment under competitive screening and moral hazard. Lower (higher) rates ease (hinder) the provision of incentives to entrepreneurs with positive NPV projects to invest in their best project but hinder (ease) banks’ efforts to distinguish them from entrepreneurs with\n
negative NPV projects. This might result in a hump-shaped investment curve. Under low rates, screening through limit pricing leaves insufficient profits to low-wealth entrepreneurs to invest in their best project, and consequently, several project qualities might co-exist in equilibrium. Several testable and other implications on the effectiveness\n
of unconventional monetary policy to boost investment are discussed.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
23 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2223
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8095"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8095"
"slug" => "investment-adverse-selection-and-optimal-redistributive-taxation"
"yearMonth" => "2016-02"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Investment, Adverse Selection and Optimal Redistributive Taxation"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2016). <i>Investment, Adverse Selection and Optimal Redistributive Taxation</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
24 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2224
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8292"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8292"
"slug" => "on-signalling-and-screening-in-markets-with-asymmetric-information"
"yearMonth" => "2016-02"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2016). <i>On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
25 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2225
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8296"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8296"
"slug" => "on-the-informed-principal-model-with-common-values"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). <i>On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
This paper reconsiders the general informed principal model with unilateral private information and common values. First, it identifies some fundamental properties of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation (i.e., the undominated for the principal allocation within the set of incentive compatible and individually rational for the agent type by type allocations). Based on these properties: (i) it constructs a more\n
robust, and perhaps simpler, proof of the “if part” of Theorem 1 (i.e., the main result) of Maskin and Tirole (1992), and, (ii) it establishes that if the principal is restricted to offering mechanisms in which only she makes announcements (e.g., direct revelation mechanisms), then the conclusion of that theorem holds even in environments in which the RSW allocation is not interim efficient relative to any non-degenerate\n
beliefs. Second, it provides a sufficient condition that allows for the complete characterisation of the set of equilibrium
"""
"en" => """
This paper reconsiders the general informed principal model with unilateral private information and common values. First, it identifies some fundamental properties of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation (i.e., the undominated for the principal allocation within the set of incentive compatible and individually rational for the agent type by type allocations). Based on these properties: (i) it constructs a more\n
robust, and perhaps simpler, proof of the “if part” of Theorem 1 (i.e., the main result) of Maskin and Tirole (1992), and, (ii) it establishes that if the principal is restricted to offering mechanisms in which only she makes announcements (e.g., direct revelation mechanisms), then the conclusion of that theorem holds even in environments in which the RSW allocation is not interim efficient relative to any non-degenerate\n
beliefs. Second, it provides a sufficient condition that allows for the complete characterisation of the set of equilibrium
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
26 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2226
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8303"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8303"
"slug" => "optimal-ex-post-risk-adjustment-in-markets-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Optimal Ex Post Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). <i>Optimal Ex Post Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
This paper studies general health insurance markets. It proposes an ex post risk adjustment scheme that discourages risk selection and promotes efficient competition. Under the proposed risk adjustment scheme, the regulator engages in transfers that are conditional\n
on the ex post profits of insurers. The risk adjustment scheme is entirely budget balanced, as it does not call for government subsidies, and requires the regulator to hold minimal information to implement it. Equilibrium is shown to exist and be efficient in any environment with a finite number of types and states even if single-crossing is not satisfied.
"""
"en" => """
This paper studies general health insurance markets. It proposes an ex post risk adjustment scheme that discourages risk selection and promotes efficient competition. Under the proposed risk adjustment scheme, the regulator engages in transfers that are conditional\n
on the ex post profits of insurers. The risk adjustment scheme is entirely budget balanced, as it does not call for government subsidies, and requires the regulator to hold minimal information to implement it. Equilibrium is shown to exist and be efficient in any environment with a finite number of types and states even if single-crossing is not satisfied.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
27 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2227
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8312"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8312"
"slug" => "optimal-redistributive-taxation-in-credit-markets-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). <i>Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "I study optimal redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection. Under symmetric information, the tax system is non-distortionary and unambiguously benefits high-risk types at the expense of low-risk types. Under asymmetric information, a range of taxes exists that creates Pareto improvements relative to the (zero-tax) market allocation by increasing aggregate investment. For sufficiently high taxes, an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment."
"en" => "I study optimal redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection. Under symmetric information, the tax system is non-distortionary and unambiguously benefits high-risk types at the expense of low-risk types. Under asymmetric information, a range of taxes exists that creates Pareto improvements relative to the (zero-tax) market allocation by increasing aggregate investment. For sufficiently high taxes, an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
28 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2228
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8315"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8315"
"slug" => "optimal-trading-for-an-informed-seller"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Optimal Trading for an Informed Seller"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). <i>Optimal Trading for an Informed Seller</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
A seller with perfect monopoly power trades an indivisible object with a buyer. Both the seller’s and the buyer’s valuations for the object depend on its quality, which is privately known by the seller. Moreover, the seller has perfect information about the buyer’s valuation for each quality. Even though posting a fixed price is ex ante optimal, it might not be interim individually rational and hence not necessarily implementable. The set of interim optimal allocations is characterised\n
by solving a parametric linear maximisation program. These allocations\n
might differ from simple price-posting. If the seller offers a menu of contracts, then allocations that are not interim optimal can be supported as equilibriumallocations.\n
However, this sub-optimality result seems not to be robust if there are\n
at least two buyers who can counter-offer menus of contracts after the seller’s offer. In that case, an allocation is an equilibrium allocation if and only if it is interim optimal.
"""
"en" => """
A seller with perfect monopoly power trades an indivisible object with a buyer. Both the seller’s and the buyer’s valuations for the object depend on its quality, which is privately known by the seller. Moreover, the seller has perfect information about the buyer’s valuation for each quality. Even though posting a fixed price is ex ante optimal, it might not be interim individually rational and hence not necessarily implementable. The set of interim optimal allocations is characterised\n
by solving a parametric linear maximisation program. These allocations\n
might differ from simple price-posting. If the seller offers a menu of contracts, then allocations that are not interim optimal can be supported as equilibriumallocations.\n
However, this sub-optimality result seems not to be robust if there are\n
at least two buyers who can counter-offer menus of contracts after the seller’s offer. In that case, an allocation is an equilibrium allocation if and only if it is interim optimal.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
29 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2229
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2091"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2091"
"slug" => "nash-equilibrium-in-competitive-insurance"
"yearMonth" => "2017-03"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2017). Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance. <i>Economics Letters</i>, 152, pp. 5-8."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Insurance"
1 => "Adverse selection"
2 => "Duopoly"
3 => "Contracts"
4 => "Nash equilibrium"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176516305390"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "5-8"
"volume" => "152"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "I formalize a rather stylized insurance market with adverse selection as a standard duopoly. I formally specify demand functions and profits and prove that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation is efficient."
"en" => "I formalize a rather stylized insurance market with adverse selection as a standard duopoly. I formally specify demand functions and profits and prove that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation is efficient."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
30 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2230
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2128"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2128"
"slug" => "on-signalling-and-screening-in-markets-with-asymmetric-information"
"yearMonth" => "2018-03"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2018). On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i>, 75, pp. 140-149."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Signalling"
1 => "Competitive screening"
2 => "Asymmetric information"
3 => "Existence"
4 => "Efficiency"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304406818300107"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "140-149"
"volume" => "75"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper studies markets with asymmetric information. When the market is modelled as a standard signalling game, inefficient outcomes arise due to the arbitrariness of off-the-equilibrium path beliefs. Such inefficient outcomes are shown not to arise in a novel game that combines signalling and competitive screening. In this game, the informed party makes an initial offer to all uninformed parties, but the uninformed parties are allowed to make counter-offers after accepting the initial offer. The initial offer serves as a barrier to potential cream-skimming deviations, and hence, equilibrium is shown to generically exist. As such, the paper also contributes to the literature that focuses on laying strategic foundations for efficient competition in competitive screening markets."
"en" => "This paper studies markets with asymmetric information. When the market is modelled as a standard signalling game, inefficient outcomes arise due to the arbitrariness of off-the-equilibrium path beliefs. Such inefficient outcomes are shown not to arise in a novel game that combines signalling and competitive screening. In this game, the informed party makes an initial offer to all uninformed parties, but the uninformed parties are allowed to make counter-offers after accepting the initial offer. The initial offer serves as a barrier to potential cream-skimming deviations, and hence, equilibrium is shown to generically exist. As such, the paper also contributes to the literature that focuses on laying strategic foundations for efficient competition in competitive screening markets."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
31 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2231
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2489"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2489"
"slug" => "signalling-productivity-and-investment"
"yearMonth" => "2019-09"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Signalling, Productivity and Investment"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). Signalling, Productivity and Investment. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</i>, 175(3), pp. 459-501."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318008433_Signalling_Productivity_and_Investment"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "459-501"
"volume" => "175"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper studies the effect of inter-entrepreneurial productivity variation on investment under asymmetric information and signalling in the credit market. When productivity is not sufficiently dispersed, safe-type entrepreneurs face borrowing constraints and might under- or over-invest relative to the social optimum. Reversals in the order of productivities cause large fluctuations in investment and output. Better economic conditions, expansionary monetary policy and decreases in default probabilities do not always boost investment and welfare. When the model is extended to allow for endogenous occupational choice, would-be safe-type entrepreneurs might inefficiently select to become workers. In a numerical example, it is shown that (a) the interest rate elasticity of investment is considerably higher during booms than during busts, and (b) a decrease in interest rates during busts has an effect on both the intensive and extensive margin."
"en" => "This paper studies the effect of inter-entrepreneurial productivity variation on investment under asymmetric information and signalling in the credit market. When productivity is not sufficiently dispersed, safe-type entrepreneurs face borrowing constraints and might under- or over-invest relative to the social optimum. Reversals in the order of productivities cause large fluctuations in investment and output. Better economic conditions, expansionary monetary policy and decreases in default probabilities do not always boost investment and welfare. When the model is extended to allow for endogenous occupational choice, would-be safe-type entrepreneurs might inefficiently select to become workers. In a numerical example, it is shown that (a) the interest rate elasticity of investment is considerably higher during booms than during busts, and (b) a decrease in interest rates during busts has an effect on both the intensive and extensive margin."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
32 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2232
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2643"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2643"
"slug" => "the-effects-of-redistributive-taxation-in-credit-markets-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2019-11"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "The Effects of Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). The Effects of Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection. <i>Economics Letters</i>, 184."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Credit market"
1 => "Adverse selection"
2 => "Taxation"
3 => "Redistribution"
4 => "Welfare"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176519302939"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => "184"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper studies the effects of redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection and shows that there exists a range of taxes that creates Pareto improvements relative to the (zero-tax) market allocation by increasing aggregate investment. For sufficiently high taxes, an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment."
"en" => "This paper studies the effects of redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection and shows that there exists a range of taxes that creates Pareto improvements relative to the (zero-tax) market allocation by increasing aggregate investment. For sufficiently high taxes, an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
33 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10733"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10733"
"slug" => "optimal-ex-post-risk-adjustment-in-markets-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2019-12"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Optimal Ex Post Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). Optimal Ex Post Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i>, 85, pp. 52-59."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Health insurance"
1 => "Risk selection"
2 => "Risk adjustment"
3 => "Efficiency"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.09.003"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "52-59"
"volume" => "85"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper studies general health insurance markets and proposes a scheme of transfers among a regulator and insurers that discourages risk selection and promotes efficient competition. The proposed scheme conditions transfers on the ex post profits of insurers and requires the regulator to hold minimal information to implement it. Equilibrium exists and each equilibrium allocation is efficient in any environment with a finite number of types and states even if single-crossing is not satisfied. I argue that the proposed scheme features the characteristics of ex post risk adjustment."
"en" => "This paper studies general health insurance markets and proposes a scheme of transfers among a regulator and insurers that discourages risk selection and promotes efficient competition. The proposed scheme conditions transfers on the ex post profits of insurers and requires the regulator to hold minimal information to implement it. Equilibrium exists and each equilibrium allocation is efficient in any environment with a finite number of types and states even if single-crossing is not satisfied. I argue that the proposed scheme features the characteristics of ex post risk adjustment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
34 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2234
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10839"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10839"
"slug" => "efficient-competition-in-markets-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2020-04"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Efficient Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2020). Efficient Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection. Dans: 2020 Risk Theory Society Seminar."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2020 Risk Theory Society Seminar"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
35 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2235
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12446"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12446"
"slug" => "on-the-informed-principal-model-with-common-values"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). <i>On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:2 [
0 => "Mechanism design"
1 => "informed principle"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02130454/"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper reconsiders the general informed principal model with unilateral private information and common values. First, it identifies some fundamental properties of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation (i.e., the undominated for the principal allocation within the set of incentive compatible and individually rational for the agent type by type allocations). Based on these properties: (i) it constructs a more robust, and perhaps simpler, proof of the "if part" of Theorem 1 (i.e., the main result) of Maskin and Tirole (1992), and, (ii) it establishes that if the principal is restricted to offering mechanisms in which only she makes announcements (e.g., direct revelation mechanisms), then the conclusion of that theorem holds even in environments in which the RSW allocation is not interim efficient relative to any non-degenerate beliefs. Second, it provides a sufficient condition that allows for the complete charac-terisation of the set of equilibrium allocations even in environments in which single-crossing is not satisfied."
"en" => "This paper reconsiders the general informed principal model with unilateral private information and common values. First, it identifies some fundamental properties of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation (i.e., the undominated for the principal allocation within the set of incentive compatible and individually rational for the agent type by type allocations). Based on these properties: (i) it constructs a more robust, and perhaps simpler, proof of the "if part" of Theorem 1 (i.e., the main result) of Maskin and Tirole (1992), and, (ii) it establishes that if the principal is restricted to offering mechanisms in which only she makes announcements (e.g., direct revelation mechanisms), then the conclusion of that theorem holds even in environments in which the RSW allocation is not interim efficient relative to any non-degenerate beliefs. Second, it provides a sufficient condition that allows for the complete charac-terisation of the set of equilibrium allocations even in environments in which single-crossing is not satisfied."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
36 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2236
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12570"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12570"
"slug" => "the-ownership-of-data"
"yearMonth" => "2021-07"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "The Ownership of Data"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2021). The Ownership of Data. Dans: 19th Conference on Research on Economic Theory and Econometrics (CRETE) 2021. Naxos."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "19th Conference on Research on Economic Theory and Econometrics (CRETE) 2021"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2022-02-09 11:36:16"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
37 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2237
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12588"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12588"
"slug" => "experimentation-in-dynamic-rd-competition"
"yearMonth" => "2021-08"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et MUTHOO, A. (2021). Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition. Dans: 48th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE). Bergen."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "MUTHOO Abhinay"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "48th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2022-02-09 13:16:45"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
38 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2238
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12740"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12740"
"slug" => "price-caps-and-efficiency-in-markets-with-adverse-selection"
"yearMonth" => "2022-03"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "Price Caps and Efficiency in Markets with Adverse Selection"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2022). Price Caps and Efficiency in Markets with Adverse Selection. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i>, 99, pp. 102591."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Insurance"
1 => "Adverse selection"
2 => "Competition Price caps"
3 => "Existence Efficiency"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-01-27 01:00:41"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102591"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "102591"
"volume" => "99"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This article studies general economies with adverse selection in which symmetric companies supply (potentially multiple) plans to privately informed consumers and compete in terms of price schedules. I show that a basic price cap regulation, in which the price caps are endogenously determined by companies, discourages risk selection over efficient allocations, and therefore, equilibrium exists in every economy. Moreover, I demonstrate that in generalisations of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) economies, companies earn zero profits in equilibrium, and every equilibrium allocation is efficient."
"en" => "This article studies general economies with adverse selection in which symmetric companies supply (potentially multiple) plans to privately informed consumers and compete in terms of price schedules. I show that a basic price cap regulation, in which the price caps are endogenously determined by companies, discourages risk selection over efficient allocations, and therefore, equilibrium exists in every economy. Moreover, I demonstrate that in generalisations of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) economies, companies earn zero profits in equilibrium, and every equilibrium allocation is efficient."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
39 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2239
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12769"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12769"
"slug" => "on-the-informed-principal-model-with-common-values"
"yearMonth" => "2022-11"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2022). On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i>, 53(4), pp. 792-825."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-15 14:59:11"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12424"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "792-825"
"volume" => "53"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In the informed principal model with common values, I provide conditions that allow for the characterization of the set of equilibria of the game in which the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a mechanism to the agent. I further examine if and when restriction to direct revelation mechanisms is without loss of generality. Last, I provide clear guidelines for solving economic applications, such as insurance, procurement, security design, and bilateral trading, of the informed principal model. The results are compared with and shown to significantly differ from those obtained in Maskin and Tirole (1992)."
"en" => "In the informed principal model with common values, I provide conditions that allow for the characterization of the set of equilibria of the game in which the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a mechanism to the agent. I further examine if and when restriction to direct revelation mechanisms is without loss of generality. Last, I provide clear guidelines for solving economic applications, such as insurance, procurement, security design, and bilateral trading, of the informed principal model. The results are compared with and shown to significantly differ from those obtained in Maskin and Tirole (1992)."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
40 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2240
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12770"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12770"
"slug" => "the-ownership-of-data"
"yearMonth" => "2023-11"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "The Ownership of Data"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2023). The Ownership of Data. <i>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization</i>, 39(3), pp. 615-641."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-11-15 09:05:43"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac001"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "615-641"
"volume" => "39"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study the effects of property rights over the use of data on market outcomes. To do so, we consider a model in which a monopolistic firm offers a service to a set of heterogeneous users. The use of the service generates valuable data, but data monetization entails a privacy cost for users. A trade-off emerges between under-processing and over-monetization of data. We show that both the firm and users prefer the users (the firm) to own the rights for low (high) values of data. We further discuss the robustness of our results when allowing more possible contracts for the data owner and show that the main trade-off is robust to these extensions."
"en" => "We study the effects of property rights over the use of data on market outcomes. To do so, we consider a model in which a monopolistic firm offers a service to a set of heterogeneous users. The use of the service generates valuable data, but data monetization entails a privacy cost for users. A trade-off emerges between under-processing and over-monetization of data. We show that both the firm and users prefer the users (the firm) to own the rights for low (high) values of data. We further discuss the robustness of our results when allowing more possible contracts for the data owner and show that the main trade-off is robust to these extensions."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
41 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2241
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14023"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14023"
"slug" => "low-interest-rates-and-capital-misallocation"
"yearMonth" => "2022-12"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "Low Interest Rates and Capital Misallocation"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. (2022). Low Interest Rates and Capital Misallocation. Dans: 2022 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. Berlin."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2022 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-11-29 16:25:07"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-27T04:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.873446
+"parent": null
}
42 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2242
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14148"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14148"
"slug" => "low-interest-rates-and-capital-misallocation"
"yearMonth" => "2022-03"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "Low Interest Rates and Capital Misallocation"
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43 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2243
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