Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196
#_id: "B00561609"
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"fullName" => "Wilfried SAND-ZANTMAN"
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"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=aDNxrA4AAAAJ"
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6221
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]
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}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6222
#_index: null
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"en" => "Université de Nantes"
]
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]
]
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}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6223
#_index: null
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]
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}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6224
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]
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}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6225
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5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6226
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6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6227
#_index: null
#_id: null
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7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6228
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}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6229
#_index: null
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}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6230
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}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6231
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11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6232
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12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6233
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13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6234
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14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6235
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#6198
#_index: null
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1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#6200
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2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#6197
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#_id: null
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#6236
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1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#6237
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2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#6238
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3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#6239
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4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#6240
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5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#6241
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6210
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1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6211
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2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6212
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3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6213
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4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6214
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5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6215
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6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6216
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}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6217
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}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6218
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}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6219
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}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6220
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}
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6201
#_index: null
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}
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}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6199
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]
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}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6202
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}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6203
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}
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}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6206
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}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6207
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}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6208
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]
]
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}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6209
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#_id: null
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}
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6242
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6243
#_index: null
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}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6244
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => null
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => null
"student" => "LEMAIRE S."
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}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6245
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2014"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2014"
"student" => "LIU X."
"firstJob" => "Lecturer at Aston, UK"
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}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6246
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2015"
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"endDate" => "2015"
"student" => "LOMBARDI A."
"firstJob" => "Economist at Compass Lexecon, Buenos Aires"
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]
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]
+lang: "fr"
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}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6247
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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"endDate" => "2016"
"student" => "MARÉCHAL F."
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]
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]
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}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6248
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2016"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2016"
"student" => "MONTES R."
"firstJob" => """
Economist at\n
Compass Lexecon, Washington
"""
"label" => array:2 [
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]
"country" => array:2 [
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]
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}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6249
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2007"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2007"
"student" => "NIKOLOWA R."
"firstJob" => "senior lecturer at Queen Mary University London"
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]
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}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6250
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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"endDate" => "2012"
"student" => "POUYET J."
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"label" => array:2 [
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"en" => "HDR Jury member"
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]
"institution" => array:2 [
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]
"country" => array:2 [
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]
]
+lang: "fr"
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}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6251
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2020"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2020"
"student" => "RHODES A."
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"label" => array:2 [
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}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6252
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2012"
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"student" => "SAUER D."
"firstJob" => "senior manager at Deloitte&Touche"
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}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6253
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2011"
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"student" => "VALERO V."
"firstJob" => "Lecturer at Loughborough, UK"
"label" => array:2 [
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"role" => array:2 [
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]
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}
]
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6254
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6938"
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"slug" => "privacy-and-data"
"yearMonth" => "2019-07"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Privacy and Data"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2019). Privacy and Data. Dans: 19th Annual SAET Conference 2019, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory."
"authors" => array:2 [
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"bid" => "B00536871"
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}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6256
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7394"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7394"
"slug" => "the-ownership-of-data"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "The Ownership of Data"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2019). The Ownership of Data. Dans: 17th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference 2019."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "17th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference 2019"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6258
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7395"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7395"
"slug" => "the-ownership-of-data"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "The Ownership of Data"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2019). The Ownership of Data. Dans: 2019 Bergen Competition Policy Conference."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2019 Bergen Competition Policy Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6255
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5637"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5637"
"slug" => "contracting-for-privacy"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Contracting for Privacy"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2019). Contracting for Privacy. Dans: 2019 Midwest Economic Theory Conference."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2019 Midwest Economic Theory Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6259
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11026"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11026"
"slug" => "constitutional-design-and-regional-favoritism"
"yearMonth" => "2002-01"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "Constitutional Design and Regional Favoritism"
"description" => "SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2002). Constitutional Design and Regional Favoritism. <i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i>, 4(1), pp. 71-93."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9779.00089"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "71-93"
"volume" => "4"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Using a principal‐agent framework, this paper analyzes a public good provision problem in which a central government tries to favor one of the regions for political reasons. We show how this favoritism leads to some distortions of the allocation scheme compared to the benevolent case. We then study the effects of decentralization, modeled here by giving an outside option to the minority region. We exhibit a trade‐off between rent and equality and study the allocative and redistributive effects of a decentralized setting."
"en" => "Using a principal‐agent framework, this paper analyzes a public good provision problem in which a central government tries to favor one of the regions for political reasons. We show how this favoritism leads to some distortions of the allocation scheme compared to the benevolent case. We then study the effects of decentralization, modeled here by giving an outside option to the minority region. We exhibit a trade‐off between rent and equality and study the allocative and redistributive effects of a decentralized setting."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#5851
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11027"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11027"
"slug" => "information-acquisition-political-game-and-the-delegation-of-authority"
"yearMonth" => "2002-09"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "Information acquisition, political game and the delegation of authority"
"description" => "LAFFONT, J.J. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2002). Information acquisition, political game and the delegation of authority. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i>, 18(3), pp. 407-428."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Laffont Jean-Jacques"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:1 [
0 => "Decentralization; Elections; Information"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268002000988"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "407-428"
"volume" => "18"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In this paper, we investigate the relevance of decentralizing public good decision-making from a political and informational perspective. First, we explain why different levels of jurisdiction (central and local) are likely to take their decisions under different informational structures. We derive the incentives of both potential decision-makers to look for the relevant pieces of information. Then, we identify two majors trade-offs in the constitutional debate. We show that the choice between centralization and decentralization can be seen either as a choice between better information and political distortions, or as a choice between better information and internalization of external effects."
"en" => "In this paper, we investigate the relevance of decentralizing public good decision-making from a political and informational perspective. First, we explain why different levels of jurisdiction (central and local) are likely to take their decisions under different informational structures. We derive the incentives of both potential decision-makers to look for the relevant pieces of information. Then, we identify two majors trade-offs in the constitutional debate. We show that the choice between centralization and decentralization can be seen either as a choice between better information and political distortions, or as a choice between better information and internalization of external effects."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6257
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11028"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11028"
"slug" => "economic-integration-and-political-accountability"
"yearMonth" => "2004-10"
"year" => "2004"
"title" => "Economic integration and political accountability"
"description" => "SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2004). Economic integration and political accountability. <i>European Economic Review</i>, 48(5), pp. 1001-1025."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:1 [
0 => "Political economy; Asymmetric information; Economic integration; Yardstick competition"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292103001533"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1001-1025"
"volume" => "48"
"number" => "5"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influences the accountability of politicians. Assuming that politicians are controlled by the voters through reelection rules, we analyze to what extent economic integration affects the form of those rules and the efforts made by politicians. We define economic integration by the existence of policies and shocks interdependences between countries. Then, from a political point of view, this integration is shown to be a two-sided phenomenon. Shock-interdependence allows yardstick comparison, increases political accountability and therefore efforts while policy-interdependence induces a lack of responsibility and harms the extent to which politicians can be controlled."
"en" => "This paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influences the accountability of politicians. Assuming that politicians are controlled by the voters through reelection rules, we analyze to what extent economic integration affects the form of those rules and the efforts made by politicians. We define economic integration by the existence of policies and shocks interdependences between countries. Then, from a political point of view, this integration is shown to be a two-sided phenomenon. Shock-interdependence allows yardstick comparison, increases political accountability and therefore efforts while policy-interdependence induces a lack of responsibility and harms the extent to which politicians can be controlled."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6260
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11029"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11029"
"slug" => "citizen-candidacy-with-asymmetric-information"
"yearMonth" => "2006-02"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information"
"description" => "CASAMATTA, G. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2006). Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information. <i>The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Advances</i>, 5(1)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Casamatta Georges"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:1 [
0 => "information; political competition"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/bejte/5/1/article-bejte.2005.5.1.1244.xml.xml"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => "5"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We extend a simple version of the citizen candidacy model (developed by Osborne-Slivinski (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist only two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to any number of (potential) candidates. In the second one, only one of the non-median types chooses to become candidates for the election and those equilibria hold for a number of (potential) candidates at most equal to 3. This is in sharp contrast with the complete information framework in which only the median type individuals stand for office when the entry cost is sufficiently low."
"en" => "We extend a simple version of the citizen candidacy model (developed by Osborne-Slivinski (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist only two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to any number of (potential) candidates. In the second one, only one of the non-median types chooses to become candidates for the election and those equilibria hold for a number of (potential) candidates at most equal to 3. This is in sharp contrast with the complete information framework in which only the median type individuals stand for office when the entry cost is sufficiently low."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6261
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11030"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11030"
"slug" => "signalling-and-the-design-of-delegated-management-contracts-for-public-utilities"
"yearMonth" => "2006-12"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities"
"description" => "MARTIMORT, D. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2006). Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i>, 37(4), pp. 763-782."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Martimort David"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00056.x"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "763-782"
"volume" => "37"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We analyze the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf. Governments are privately informed about the quality of the facility, while risk‐neutral contractors undertake a nonverifiable operating effort. The design of the contract signals the quality of the facility in such a way that the better this quality, the greater the share of operating risk kept by the government. This feature reduces the agent's marginal incentives, creating a tradeoff between signalling and moral hazard. We provide extensions of our framework in several directions, allowing for risk aversion on the agent's side, double moral hazard, and political delegation. The model is supported by some stylized facts from the water industry."
"en" => "We analyze the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf. Governments are privately informed about the quality of the facility, while risk‐neutral contractors undertake a nonverifiable operating effort. The design of the contract signals the quality of the facility in such a way that the better this quality, the greater the share of operating risk kept by the government. This feature reduces the agent's marginal incentives, creating a tradeoff between signalling and moral hazard. We provide extensions of our framework in several directions, allowing for risk aversion on the agent's side, double moral hazard, and political delegation. The model is supported by some stylized facts from the water industry."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6262
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11031"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11031"
"slug" => "contracting-for-an-innovation-under-bilateral-asymmetric-information"
"yearMonth" => "2010-06"
"year" => "2010"
"title" => "Contracting for an Innovation Under Bilateral Asymmetric Information"
"description" => "MARTIMORT, D., POUDOU, J.C. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2010). Contracting for an Innovation Under Bilateral Asymmetric Information. <i>Journal of Industrial Economics</i>, 58(2), pp. 324-348."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "MARTIMORT DAVID"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "POUDOU JEAN-CHRISTOPHE"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/40662186"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "324-348"
"volume" => "58"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We analyze licensing contracts between informed innovators and developers exerting profit‐increasing effort. Those contracts must simultaneously induce innovators to convey information on the value of their ideas, while inducing developers to exert effort and protecting the innovators' intellectual property rights. We show that the best innovators signal themselves by taking more royalties even if it reduces the developers' share of returns and their incentives. Moreover, royalties are more likely to be used when property rights are easy to enforce and pre‐contractual evidence on innovation quality is hard to produce."
"en" => "We analyze licensing contracts between informed innovators and developers exerting profit‐increasing effort. Those contracts must simultaneously induce innovators to convey information on the value of their ideas, while inducing developers to exert effort and protecting the innovators' intellectual property rights. We show that the best innovators signal themselves by taking more royalties even if it reduces the developers' share of returns and their incentives. Moreover, royalties are more likely to be used when property rights are easy to enforce and pre‐contractual evidence on innovation quality is hard to produce."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6263
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11032"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11032"
"slug" => "public-and-private-investments-in-regulated-network-industries-coordination-and-competition-issues"
"yearMonth" => "2010-12"
"year" => "2010"
"title" => "Public and Private Investments in Regulated Network Industries: Coordination and Competition Issues"
"description" => "JULLIEN, B., POUYET, J. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2010). Public and Private Investments in Regulated Network Industries: Coordination and Competition Issues. <i>Review of Network Economics</i>, 9(4)."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:1 [
"bid" => "B00717494"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Jullien Bruno"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "POUYET Jerome"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "investment"
1 => "regulation"
2 => "information"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.2202/1446-9022.1232"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => "9"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyzes the relationship between a national regulator, an incumbent and a local government in a context where investment in a new network has to be undertaken. In the light of the recent debates on the competition between private firms and local governments, we analyze the limits to be put on the local public intervention in these markets. We show that banning local government intervention can be welfare-enhancing either in the presence inter-districts externality or with asymmetric information or in case of conflicting objectives between the regulator and local governments."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the relationship between a national regulator, an incumbent and a local government in a context where investment in a new network has to be undertaken. In the light of the recent debates on the competition between private firms and local governments, we analyze the limits to be put on the local public intervention in these markets. We show that banning local government intervention can be welfare-enhancing either in the presence inter-districts externality or with asymmetric information or in case of conflicting objectives between the regulator and local governments."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6264
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11033"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11033"
"slug" => "dynamic-cooperation-in-local-public-goods-supply-with-imperfect-monitoring"
"yearMonth" => "2011-01"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring"
"description" => "CHEIKBOSSIAN, G. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2011). Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring. <i>Annals of Economics and Statistics</i>, (101/102), pp. 327-345."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Cheikbossian Guillaume"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/41615486"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "327-345"
"volume" => null
"number" => "101/102"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous analysons une situation dans laquelle deux pays contribuent à des biens publics locaux engendrant des externalités entre pays. Dans un cadre de jeux répétés où le niveau de bien public dépend à la fois de l'effort non observable effectué par chaque pays et d'un choc aléatoire, nous caractérisons les conditions sous lesquelles il existe un équilibre avec des trigger strategies permettant de soutenir la coopération. Déplus, nous montrons que l'introduction à la marge d'une corrélation positive entre les chocs aléatoires entraîne une manipulation de l'information et donc diminue les possibilités de coopération entre pays."
"en" => "This paper develops a two-country model where each country invests in a local public good generating positive cross-countries externalities. In a repeated game setting where the level of public good depends on a non-observable effort by each country plus a random shock, we characterize the existence condition of a cut-off trigger strategy equilibrium inducing full cooperation. Moreover, we show that introducing a small positive correlation between the two country-specific shocks gives rise to a manipulation of information thereby restricting the prospects of cooperation."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6265
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11034"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11034"
"slug" => "contracting-and-the-disclosure-of-ideas-in-the-innovation-process"
"yearMonth" => "2011-01"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process"
"description" => "MARTIMORT, D., POUDOU, J.C. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2011). Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process. <i>Annals of Economics and Statistics</i>, (101/102), pp. 287."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Martimort David"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Poudou Jean-Christophe"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/41615484"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "287"
"volume" => null
"number" => "101/102"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article analyse les contrats entre un innovateur détenteur d'une idée et un développeur. L'innovateur détient une information privée sur la valeur de l'idée tandis que le développeur peut exercer un effort non verifiable au moment du développement. Le développeur peut toutefois rompre cette relation, après avoir acquis de l'information sur la valeur de l'idée. Nous montrons que le contrat d'équilibre induit une réduction des incitations monétaires du développeur dont l'ampleur dépend de la force des droits de propriété intellectuelle. En particulier, lorsque ces droits sont incorrectement protégés, seuls des contrats mélangeants (pooling contracts) apparaissent et seule une partie de l'information est révélée à l'équilibre."
"en" => "We analyze contracting between an innovator endowed with an idea and a project developer. The innovator has private information about the value of his idea, whereas the developer must exert some non-verifiable effort at the development stage. The developer may also threaten to leave the relationship after being informed on the value of the idea. The equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives, but differently so depending on the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). In particular, with intermediate IPR, only pooling contracts arise, with a limited amount of information being revealed at equilibrium."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6266
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11035"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11035"
"slug" => "solving-the-global-warming-problem-beyond-markets-simple-mechanisms-may-help"
"yearMonth" => "2013-05"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Solving the Global Warming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help!"
"description" => "MARTIMORT, D. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2013). Solving the Global Warming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help! <i>Canadian Journal of Economics</i>, 46(2), pp. 361-378."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Martimort David"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/42705883"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "361-378"
"volume" => "46"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogeneous countries are key constraints on the design of those agreements. Mechanisms must prevent two sorts of free‐riding problems – free riding in effort provision and free riding in participation. As markets might fail to solve simultaneously those two problems, we construct instead a simple menu of options that trades off the provision of incentives for participating countries and the provision of incentives to participate. With such a mechanism, all countries voluntarily contribute to a fund, although at different intensities, but only the most efficient ones effectively reduce their pollution below its ‘business as usual’ level."
"en" => "This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogeneous countries are key constraints on the design of those agreements. Mechanisms must prevent two sorts of free‐riding problems – free riding in effort provision and free riding in participation. As markets might fail to solve simultaneously those two problems, we construct instead a simple menu of options that trades off the provision of incentives for participating countries and the provision of incentives to participate. With such a mechanism, all countries voluntarily contribute to a fund, although at different intensities, but only the most efficient ones effectively reduce their pollution below its ‘business as usual’ level."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6267
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11036"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11036"
"slug" => "termination-fees-revisited"
"yearMonth" => "2013-11"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Termination Fees Revisited"
"description" => "JULLIEN, B., REY, P. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2013). Termination Fees Revisited. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i>, 31(6), pp. 738-750."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Jullien Bruno"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Rey Patrick"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Termination fee"
1 => "Communication"
2 => "Network"
3 => "Mobile"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718713000532"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "738-750"
"volume" => "31"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We reconsider the question of the optimal level of termination fees between communication networks in the context of heterogeneous usage and elastic participation. The interaction between these two features yields new insights; in our model: i) The profit maximizing reciprocal termination fee is above marginal cost; ii) the welfare maximizing termination fee is also above cost; iii) the welfare-maximizing termination fee is below the profit-maximizing one in the absence of termination-based price discrimination, but can be above it otherwise."
"en" => "We reconsider the question of the optimal level of termination fees between communication networks in the context of heterogeneous usage and elastic participation. The interaction between these two features yields new insights; in our model: i) The profit maximizing reciprocal termination fee is above marginal cost; ii) the welfare maximizing termination fee is also above cost; iii) the welfare-maximizing termination fee is below the profit-maximizing one in the absence of termination-based price discrimination, but can be above it otherwise."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
15 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6268
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11037"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11037"
"slug" => "a-mechanism-design-approach-to-climate-change-agreements"
"yearMonth" => "2016-06"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements"
"description" => "MARTIMORT, D. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2016). A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i>, 14(3), pp. 669-718."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Martimort David"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:9 [
0 => "D82"
1 => "Asymmetric and Private Information"
2 => "Mechanism DesignH23"
3 => "Externalities"
4 => "Redistributive Effects"
5 => "Environmental Taxes and SubsidiesQ54"
6 => "Climate"
7 => "Natural Disasters"
8 => "Global Warming"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-abstract/14/3/669/2194880?redirectedFrom=fulltext"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "669-718"
"volume" => "14"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We take a mechanism design perspective to investigate how environmental agreements should account for multilateral externalities, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation by sovereign countries. The optimal mechanism involves a tradeoff between a free rider problem in the effort provision of participating countries and the necessity of inducing countries to ratify the agreement. This mechanism can be approximated by a simple menu with attractive implementation and robustness properties. Limits on enforcement and commitment might nevertheless hinder the performance of this menu, making the “business as usual” scenario more likely."
"en" => "We take a mechanism design perspective to investigate how environmental agreements should account for multilateral externalities, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation by sovereign countries. The optimal mechanism involves a tradeoff between a free rider problem in the effort provision of participating countries and the necessity of inducing countries to ratify the agreement. This mechanism can be approximated by a simple menu with attractive implementation and robustness properties. Limits on enforcement and commitment might nevertheless hinder the performance of this menu, making the “business as usual” scenario more likely."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
16 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6269
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11038"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11038"
"slug" => "an-offer-you-cant-refuse-early-contracting-with-endogenous-threat"
"yearMonth" => "2017-08"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "An Offer You Can't Refuse: Early Contracting With Endogenous Threat"
"description" => "JULLIEN, B., POUYET, J. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2017). An Offer You Can't Refuse: Early Contracting With Endogenous Threat. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i>, 48(3), pp. 733-748."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:1 [
"bid" => "B00717494"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Jullien Bruno"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "POUYET Jerome"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/26305460?seq=1"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "733-748"
"volume" => "48"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "A seller has private information on the future gains from trade with a buyer, but the buyer has the option to invest to produce the good internally. Both the buyer and the seller can efficiently trade ex post under complete information. Despite the lack of information, the buyer sometimes gains by making an early contract offer to the seller. The early contract divides the different types of sellers according to their information, which renders the threat of producing the good in‐house credible and enables the buyer to extract a larger share of the gains from trade. Several extensions are investigated."
"en" => "A seller has private information on the future gains from trade with a buyer, but the buyer has the option to invest to produce the good internally. Both the buyer and the seller can efficiently trade ex post under complete information. Despite the lack of information, the buyer sometimes gains by making an early contract offer to the seller. The early contract divides the different types of sellers according to their information, which renders the threat of producing the good in‐house credible and enables the buyer to extract a larger share of the gains from trade. Several extensions are investigated."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
17 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6270
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11039"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11039"
"slug" => "entry-and-merger-policy"
"yearMonth" => "2017-12"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Entry and Merger Policy"
"description" => "JAUNAUX, L., LEFOUILI, Y. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2017). Entry and Merger Policy. <i>Economics Letters</i>, 161, pp. 124-129."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Jaunaux Laure"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Lefouili Yassine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Merger policy"
1 => "Entry"
2 => "Uncertainty"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176517304251"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "124-129"
"volume" => "161"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This note examines merger policy towards new entrants. We show that the optimal policy is driven by a simple sufficient statistic and that, under certain conditions, competition authorities should commit to being more lenient towards successful, rather than unsuccessful, entrants."
"en" => "This note examines merger policy towards new entrants. We show that the optimal policy is driven by a simple sufficient statistic and that, under certain conditions, competition authorities should commit to being more lenient towards successful, rather than unsuccessful, entrants."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
18 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6271
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11040"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11040"
"slug" => "internet-regulation-two-sided-pricing-and-sponsored-data"
"yearMonth" => "2018-05"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data"
"description" => "JULLIEN, B. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2018). Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i>, 58, pp. 31-62."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Jullien Bruno"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Internet"
1 => "net-neutrality"
2 => "screening"
3 => "zero-rating"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167718718300183"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "31-62"
"volume" => "58"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks’ incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid content)."
"en" => "We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks’ incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid content)."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
19 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6272
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11041"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11041"
"slug" => "the-value-of-personal-information-in-online-markets-with-endogenous-privacy"
"yearMonth" => "2019-03"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "The Value of Personal Information in Online Markets with Endogenous Privacy"
"description" => "MONTES, R., SAND-ZANTMAN, W. et VALLETTI, T. (2019). The Value of Personal Information in Online Markets with Endogenous Privacy. <i>Management Science</i>, 65(3), pp. 1342-1362."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Montes Rodrigo"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Valletti Tommaso"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2989"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1342-1362"
"volume" => "65"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We investigate the effects of price discrimination on prices, profits, and consumer surplus when (a) at least one competing firm can use consumers’ private information to price discriminate yet (b) consumers can prevent such use by paying a “privacy cost.” Unlike a monopolist, competing duopolists do not always benefit from a higher privacy cost because each firm’s profit decreases—and consumer surplus increases—with that cost. Under such competition, the optimal strategy for an owner of consumer data that sells information in a single block is selling to only one firm, thereby maximizing the stakes for rival buyers. The resulting inefficiencies imply that policy makers should devote more attention to discouraging exclusivity deals and less to ensuring that consumers can easily protect their privacy."
"en" => "We investigate the effects of price discrimination on prices, profits, and consumer surplus when (a) at least one competing firm can use consumers’ private information to price discriminate yet (b) consumers can prevent such use by paying a “privacy cost.” Unlike a monopolist, competing duopolists do not always benefit from a higher privacy cost because each firm’s profit decreases—and consumer surplus increases—with that cost. Under such competition, the optimal strategy for an owner of consumer data that sells information in a single block is selling to only one firm, thereby maximizing the stakes for rival buyers. The resulting inefficiencies imply that policy makers should devote more attention to discouraging exclusivity deals and less to ensuring that consumers can easily protect their privacy."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
20 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6273
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11042"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11042"
"slug" => "un-modele-de-citoyens-candidats-en-information-asymetrique"
"yearMonth" => "2002-05"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique"
"description" => "CASAMATTA, G. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2002). Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique. <i>Revue Economique</i>, 53(3), pp. 537-544."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Casamatta Georges"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:47"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/3502984"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "537-544"
"volume" => "53"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article propose une extension en information saymétrique du modèle de citoyens-candidats développé par Osborne-Slivinsky [1996]. Nous montrons que l'introduction d'information asymétrique sur les goûts des agents conduit à relativiser la prédominance des candidats médians. Nous montrons également que l'introduction de cette incertitude tend à augmenter le nombre de candidats."
"en" => "This article proposes an extension in an asymmetric information framework of the citizen-candidates model developed by Osborne-Slivinsky [1996]. We show that introducing asymmetric information on the tastes of the agents tends to minor the prevalence of median candidates. We also show that this uncertainty leads to an increase in the number of candidates."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
21 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6274
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11043"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11043"
"slug" => "analyse-economique-des-pratiques-de-fidelisation"
"yearMonth" => "2013-03"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Analyse économique des pratiques de fidélisation"
"description" => "SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2013). Analyse économique des pratiques de fidélisation. <i>Revue française d'économie</i>, XXVIII(3), pp. 37."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:47"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.cairn-int.info/revue-francaise-d-economie-2013-3-page-37.htm"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "37"
"volume" => "XXVIII"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
Le développement des NTIC et l’ouverture à la concurrence de nouveaux secteurs industriels ont conduit à une généralisation des pratiques de fidélisation et de suivi de la clientèle.\n
Cet article présente l’analyse économique de ces pratiques, de leur impact sur la concurrence et le bien-être des consommateurs. Nous expliquons pourquoi, dans un cadre monopolistique, la fidélisation peut se comprendre comme une façon d’inciter à la consommation, au profit de la firme et parfois également des consommateurs. Nous montrons ensuite que, dans un univers plus concurrentiel, cette pratique tend à intensifier le degré de concurrence effective, au bénéfice quasi exclusif des consommateurs. Nous discutons enfin de l’impact pro ou anticoncurrentiel de pratiques reliées, par exemple les contrats de long terme et les offres de rétention.
"""
"en" => "The rise of new information technologies and the opening to competition of previously monopolized sectors have induced more dynamic pricing practices, in particular the development of loyalty rewards. We aim at looking at the economic motivations and impacts of this new trend, in particular with regards to effective competition and consumer welfare. First, we explain that, in a monopolistic setting, loyalty rewards can induce more consumption and benefit both firms and consumers. Then, in a duopolistic setting, we show that behavior-based price discrimination increases effective competition and benefits consumers. At last, we discuss the pro- or anti-competitive impacts of related practices, such as long-term contracting and retention offers."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
22 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6275
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11044"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11044"
"slug" => "accords-environnementaux"
"yearMonth" => "2014-04"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Accords environnementaux"
"description" => "MARTIMORT, D. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2014). Accords environnementaux. <i>Revue Economique</i>, 65(4), pp. 481-497."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Martimort David"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:47"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2014-4-page-481.htm"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "481-497"
"volume" => "65"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article offre une perspective nouvelle sur les accords environnementaux, perspective basée sur la théorie des mécanismes incitatifs. Nous montrons l’existence d’un arbitrage fondamental entre incitations et participation et présentons une condition qui doit être nécessairement satisfaite pour implémenter les efforts de premier rang. Nous discutons ensuite les difficultés à satisfaire cette condition selon que l’option de statu quo qui prévaut lorsque la négociation collective échoue est un scénario non coopératif ou une configuration basée sur les droits acquis. Nous montrons qu’un marché de droits permet d’atteindre des niveaux d’effort efficaces si cette condition est satisfaite. Nous discutons enfin quelques propriétés des mécanismes de second rang qui émergent dans le cas contraire."
"en" => "This article proposes a perspective on international climate agreements, based on mechanism design. We exhibit a trade-off between incentives and participation. We derive a general condition under which the first-best allocation can be implemented. We then discuss how this condition is affected by the assumptions on the status quo, in particular whether a non-cooperative or a grandfathering solution prevails when the negotiation fails. We show that, when the feasibility condition is satisfied, a market-based solution can indeed implement the first best allocation. At last, when the condition does not hold, we characterize the main properties of the second-best solution."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
23 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6276
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11045"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11045"
"slug" => "quel-role-pour-les-acteurs-publics-dans-lincitation-privee-aux-investissements"
"yearMonth" => "2018-06"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Quel rôle pour les acteurs publics dans l’incitation privée aux investissements ?"
"description" => "JULLIEN, B., POUYET, J. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2018). Quel rôle pour les acteurs publics dans l’incitation privée aux investissements ? <i>Revue Economique</i>, 69(6), pp. 985-1007."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:1 [
"bid" => "B00717494"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Jullien Bruno"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "POUYET Jerome"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "investment"
1 => "regulation"
2 => "information"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2018-6-page-985.htm"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "985-1007"
"volume" => "69"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Une entreprise doit investir pour fournir un service à une autorité publique. L’autorité publique peut, une fois l’investissement privé et l’incertitude concernant la valeur du service réalisés, fournir ce service par ses propres moyens. Si une telle intervention peut améliorer l’efficacité ex post, elle réduit les incitations à investir ex ante et le bien-être social. Nous étudions différentes modalités de l’intervention de l’autorité publique (possibilité d’investir seulement, ou possibilité de négocier avec l’entreprise sous la menace de duplication de l’investissement) suivant l’information qui est à sa disposition. Nos résultats suggèrent qu’autoriser l’autorité publique à négocier avec l’entreprise améliore le bien-être."
"en" => "A firm may provide a service to a public authority but this requires a prior investment. Once the private investment and the uncertainty concerning the social value of the service are realized, the public authority can provide the service by its own means. Although such a decision may be welfare-increasing from an ex post point of view, it can reduce the ex ante incentives to invest. We study different options for the public authority (depending on whether it can negotiate with the firm and invest, or invest only), both under complete and incomplete information on the social value of the service. Our results suggest that allowing the local authority to negotiate with the firm tends to improve welfare"
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
24 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6277
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11672"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11672"
"slug" => "choix-constitutionnel-et-delegation-strategique"
"yearMonth" => "2000-09"
"year" => "2000"
"title" => "Choix Constitutionnel et Délégation Stratégique"
"description" => "SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2000). Choix Constitutionnel et Délégation Stratégique. <i>Revue d'économie politique</i>, 110(5), pp. 683-700."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:54"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "683-700"
"volume" => "110"
"number" => "5"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
25 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6278
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "11673"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "11673"
"slug" => "the-economics-of-platforms-a-theory-guide-for-competition-policy"
"yearMonth" => "2021-03"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy"
"description" => "JULLIEN, B. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2021). The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy. <i>Information Economics and Policy</i>, 54, pp. 100880."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JULLIEN Bruno"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:1 [
0 => "Networks, Platforms, Markets, Competition policy"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167624520301244"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "100880"
"volume" => "54"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We propose an analysis of platform competition based on the academic literature with a view towards competition policy. First, we discuss to which extent competition can emerge in digital markets and show which forms it can take. In particular, we underline the role of dynamics, but also of platform differentiation, consumers multi-homing and beliefs to allow competition in platform markets. Second, we analyze competition policy issues and discuss how rules designed for standard markets can perform in two-sided markets. We show that multi-sided externalities create new opportunities for anti-competitive conducts, often related to pricing and contractual imperfections."
"en" => "We propose an analysis of platform competition based on the academic literature with a view towards competition policy. First, we discuss to which extent competition can emerge in digital markets and show which forms it can take. In particular, we underline the role of dynamics, but also of platform differentiation, consumers multi-homing and beliefs to allow competition in platform markets. Second, we analyze competition policy issues and discuss how rules designed for standard markets can perform in two-sided markets. We show that multi-sided externalities create new opportunities for anti-competitive conducts, often related to pricing and contractual imperfections."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
26 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6279
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12570"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12570"
"slug" => "the-ownership-of-data"
"yearMonth" => "2021-07"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "The Ownership of Data"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2021). The Ownership of Data. Dans: 19th Conference on Research on Economic Theory and Econometrics (CRETE) 2021. Naxos."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "19th Conference on Research on Economic Theory and Econometrics (CRETE) 2021"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2022-02-09 11:36:16"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
27 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6280
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12770"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12770"
"slug" => "the-ownership-of-data"
"yearMonth" => "2023-11"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "The Ownership of Data"
"description" => "DOSIS, A. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2023). The Ownership of Data. <i>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization</i>, 39(3), pp. 615-641."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
"bid" => "B00536871"
"slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-11-15 09:05:43"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac001"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "615-641"
"volume" => "39"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study the effects of property rights over the use of data on market outcomes. To do so, we consider a model in which a monopolistic firm offers a service to a set of heterogeneous users. The use of the service generates valuable data, but data monetization entails a privacy cost for users. A trade-off emerges between under-processing and over-monetization of data. We show that both the firm and users prefer the users (the firm) to own the rights for low (high) values of data. We further discuss the robustness of our results when allowing more possible contracts for the data owner and show that the main trade-off is robust to these extensions."
"en" => "We study the effects of property rights over the use of data on market outcomes. To do so, we consider a model in which a monopolistic firm offers a service to a set of heterogeneous users. The use of the service generates valuable data, but data monetization entails a privacy cost for users. A trade-off emerges between under-processing and over-monetization of data. We show that both the firm and users prefer the users (the firm) to own the rights for low (high) values of data. We further discuss the robustness of our results when allowing more possible contracts for the data owner and show that the main trade-off is robust to these extensions."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
28 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6281
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14484"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14484"
"slug" => "the-environmental-impact-of-internet-regulation"
"yearMonth" => "2023-10"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "The Environmental Impact of Internet Regulation"
"description" => " POUDOU, J.C. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2023). The Environmental Impact of Internet Regulation. <i>Information Economics and Policy</i>, In press, pp. 101060."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
"bid" => "B00561609"
"slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => " POUDOU Jean Christophe"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Carbon Emission"
1 => "Environmental Externalities"
2 => "Investment"
3 => "Net Neutrality"
4 => "Regulation"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-10-19 13:57:21"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101060"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "101060"
"volume" => "In press"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We address the need to regulate Internet infrastructure usage to take into account environmental externalities. We model the interactions between an internet service provider and some content providers in settings where the former chooses the network size and the latter influence congestion on the network. We then discuss how different regulatory frameworks (Net Neutrality, Laissez-Faire, Price Regulation) impact both the economic efficiency and the environmental performance. In particular, we highlight that inducing more efficiency effort from the content providers may either improve or worsen the final environmental outcome, and provide some conditions for one case or the other to prevail."
"en" => "We address the need to regulate Internet infrastructure usage to take into account environmental externalities. We model the interactions between an internet service provider and some content providers in settings where the former chooses the network size and the latter influence congestion on the network. We then discuss how different regulatory frameworks (Net Neutrality, Laissez-Faire, Price Regulation) impact both the economic efficiency and the environmental performance. In particular, we highlight that inducing more efficiency effort from the content providers may either improve or worsen the final environmental outcome, and provide some conditions for one case or the other to prevail."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-02T02:22:04.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.771605
+"parent": null
}
]
"avatar" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00561609.jpg"
"contributionCounts" => 29
"personalLinks" => array:2 [
0 => "<a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7177-9117" target="_blank">ORCID</a>"
1 => "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=aDNxrA4AAAAJ" target="_blank">Google scholar</a>"
]
"docTitle" => "Wilfried SAND-ZANTMAN"
"docSubtitle" => "Professeur"
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"docPreview" => "<img src="https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00561609.jpg"><span><span>Wilfried SAND-ZANTMAN</span><span>B00561609</span></span>"
]
#_index: "academ_cv"
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+"_type": "_doc"
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}
