Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196
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"slug" => "lui-daphne"
"fullName" => "Daphne LUI"
"lastName" => "LUI"
"firstName" => "Daphne"
"title" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"email" => "lui@essec.edu"
"status" => "ACTIF"
"campus" => "Campus de Singapour"
"departments" => []
"phone" => "+65 6835 7513"
"sites" => []
"facNumber" => "1976"
"externalCvUrl" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/cv/lui-daphne/pdf"
"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=JHPtc-8AAAAJ"
"facOrcId" => "https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9072-2650"
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6203
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"label" => array:2 [
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"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
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]
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}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6204
#_index: null
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}
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"diplomes" => []
"bio" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => """
<p>Daphne Lui is Associate Professor of Accounting and Associate Academic Director of the Global BBA program at ESSEC, based on the Singapore campus. Her research interests are in the areas of financial reporting quality, corporate disclosure, financial intermediaries, and executive compensation. She is also interested in applying machine learning in her research projects.</p>\n
\n
<p>At ESSEC, Daphne has taught in various programs including Masters in Management, Masters in Finance, Masters in Strategy & Management of International Business, PhD, in addition to the Global BBA program. </p>\n
\n
<p>Prior to pursuing an academic career, Daphne worked in corporate finance advising multinational clients on capital raising and corporate restructuring issues. She graduated from London Business School with an MSc in Finance and a PhD in Accounting.</p>\n
"""
]
"department" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
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"fr" => "Comptabilité financière et audit - Finance d'entreprise"
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6201
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]
"country" => array:2 [
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]
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}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6195
#_index: null
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"startDate" => "2013"
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]
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]
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}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6199
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3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6202
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6198
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2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6197
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6205
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"year" => "2019"
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1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6206
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2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6207
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3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6208
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4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6209
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6210
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "913"
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"slug" => "cross-listing-and-corporate-malfeasance-evidence-from-p-chip-firms"
"yearMonth" => "2020-08"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Cross-Listing and Corporate Malfeasance: Evidence from P-Chip Firms"
"description" => "FILIP, A., HUANG, Z. et LUI, D. (2020). Cross-Listing and Corporate Malfeasance: Evidence from P-Chip Firms. <i>Journal of Corporate Finance</i>, 63, pp. 101232."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:1 [
"bid" => "B00306497"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "LUI Daphne"
"bid" => "B00183502"
"slug" => "lui-daphne"
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2 => array:1 [
"name" => "FILIP Andrei"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUANG Zhongwei"
]
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"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "China's private sector"
1 => "P-chips"
2 => "Enforcement difficulty"
3 => "Corporate malfeasance"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119916301808?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "101232"
"volume" => "63"
"number" => null
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"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The rapid growth of the private sector in China in recent decades has created a large number of capital-hungry private sector firms. An increasing number of these firms choose to raise equity capital on international exchanges, which typically have stronger disclosure, corporate governance, and investor protection regulations. In light of international investors' and regulators' concerns about the corporate finance practice of China's private sector firms, particularly regarding the integrity of their reported earnings, we investigate whether these firms aggressively manipulate their accounts by examining those listed in Hong Kong, commonly known as P-chips. We find systematic evidence that P-chips engage in more earnings management and other corporate misbehaviors than their counterparts in Hong Kong. We posit and provide evidence consistent with cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a possible explanation to P-chips' questionable practice, and discuss its implications."
"en" => "The rapid growth of the private sector in China in recent decades has created a large number of capital-hungry private sector firms. An increasing number of these firms choose to raise equity capital on international exchanges, which typically have stronger disclosure, corporate governance, and investor protection regulations. In light of international investors' and regulators' concerns about the corporate finance practice of China's private sector firms, particularly regarding the integrity of their reported earnings, we investigate whether these firms aggressively manipulate their accounts by examining those listed in Hong Kong, commonly known as P-chips. We find systematic evidence that P-chips engage in more earnings management and other corporate misbehaviors than their counterparts in Hong Kong. We posit and provide evidence consistent with cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a possible explanation to P-chips' questionable practice, and discuss its implications."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-07T10:22:09.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
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}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6212
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1107"
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"id" => "1107"
"slug" => "equity-analysts-and-the-markets-assessment-of-risk"
"yearMonth" => "2012-12"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "Equity Analysts and the Market's Assessment of Risk"
"description" => "LUI, D., MARKOV, S. et TAMAYO, A. (2012). Equity Analysts and the Market's Assessment of Risk. <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i>, 50(5), pp. 1287-1317."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LUI Daphne"
"bid" => "B00183502"
"slug" => "lui-daphne"
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1 => array:1 [
"name" => "MARKOV S."
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2 => array:1 [
"name" => "TAMAYO A."
]
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"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Equity analysts"
1 => "Investment risk"
2 => "Risk ratings"
3 => "Factor loadings"
4 => "Credit ratings"
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"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00462.x"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
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"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The traditional view of equity analysts is that they are a source of new information about future cash flows. We broaden this view by demonstrating that equity analysts are also a substantive source of new information about priced risk. In particular, we document that, when announced, changes in analyst risk ratings distinctly and significantly affect equity returns, and are generally followed by significant changes in Fama–French factor loadings. Also, while less frequent than credit rating changes, equity risk rating changes are timelier, and with a larger overall stock price impact than credit rating changes."
"en" => "The traditional view of equity analysts is that they are a source of new information about future cash flows. We broaden this view by demonstrating that equity analysts are also a substantive source of new information about priced risk. In particular, we document that, when announced, changes in analyst risk ratings distinctly and significantly affect equity returns, and are generally followed by significant changes in Fama–French factor loadings. Also, while less frequent than credit rating changes, equity risk rating changes are timelier, and with a larger overall stock price impact than credit rating changes."
]
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"fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-07T10:22:09.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
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}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6214
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2639"
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"id" => "2639"
"slug" => "the-effect-of-regulations-on-pension-risk-shifting-evidence-from-the-u-s-and-europe"
"yearMonth" => "2016-05"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "The Effect of Regulations on Pension Risk Shifting: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe"
"description" => "GUAN, Y. et LUI, D. (2016). The Effect of Regulations on Pension Risk Shifting: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe. <i>Journal of Business Finance and Accounting</i>, 45(5), pp. 765–799."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LUI Daphne"
"bid" => "B00183502"
"slug" => "lui-daphne"
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1 => array:1 [
"name" => "GUAN Y."
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"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/297588356_The_Effect_of_Regulations_on_Pension_Risk_Shifting_Evidence_from_the_US_and_Europe"
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"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper provides evidence that pension regulations can incentivize or curb risk shifting in the investment of defined benefit (DB) plan assets. We document that in the U.S., whereby the pension insurance premium charged by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is largely flat, financially distressed firms with severely underfunded plans shift pension investment risk. We further find that risk shifting is mitigated in the U.K. after the implementation of risk-adjusted pension insurance premium, and in the Netherlands where full pension funding is mandatory. Overall the results in this paper lend support to the view that structural flaws in the U.S. statutory pension insurance scheme incentivize high-risk sponsors to gamble their pension assets when distress terminations of their plans become foreseeable."
"en" => "This paper provides evidence that pension regulations can incentivize or curb risk shifting in the investment of defined benefit (DB) plan assets. We document that in the U.S., whereby the pension insurance premium charged by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is largely flat, financially distressed firms with severely underfunded plans shift pension investment risk. We further find that risk shifting is mitigated in the U.K. after the implementation of risk-adjusted pension insurance premium, and in the Netherlands where full pension funding is mandatory. Overall the results in this paper lend support to the view that structural flaws in the U.S. statutory pension insurance scheme incentivize high-risk sponsors to gamble their pension assets when distress terminations of their plans become foreseeable."
]
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"fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
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3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6211
#_index: "academ_contributions"
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"slug" => "what-makes-a-stock-risky-evidence-from-sell-side-analysts-risk-ratings"
"yearMonth" => "2007-06"
"year" => "2007"
"title" => "What makes a stock risky? Evidence from sell-side analysts' risk ratings"
"description" => "LUI, D., MARKOV, S. et TAMAYO, A. (2007). What makes a stock risky? Evidence from sell-side analysts' risk ratings. <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i>, 45(3), pp. 629-665."
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"name" => "LUI Daphne"
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1 => array:1 [
"name" => "MARKOV Stanimir"
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2 => array:1 [
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"updatedAt" => "2022-09-20 11:50:04"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2007.00242.x"
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]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We examine the determinants and the informativeness of financial analysts' risk ratings using a large sample of research reports issued by Salomon Smith Barney, now Citigroup, over the period 1997–2003. We find that the cross-sectional variation in risk ratings is largely explained by variables commonly viewed as measures of risk, such as idiosyncratic risk, size, book-to-market, and leverage. In addition, earnings-based measures of risk, such as earnings quality and accounting losses, also contribute to explaining the cross-sectional variation in the risk ratings. Finally, we document that the risk ratings can be used to predict future return volatility after controlling for other predictors of future volatility. We conclude that analysts play an important role as providers of information about investment risk."
"en" => "We examine the determinants and the informativeness of financial analysts' risk ratings using a large sample of research reports issued by Salomon Smith Barney, now Citigroup, over the period 1997–2003. We find that the cross-sectional variation in risk ratings is largely explained by variables commonly viewed as measures of risk, such as idiosyncratic risk, size, book-to-market, and leverage. In addition, earnings-based measures of risk, such as earnings quality and accounting losses, also contribute to explaining the cross-sectional variation in the risk ratings. Finally, we document that the risk ratings can be used to predict future return volatility after controlling for other predictors of future volatility. We conclude that analysts play an important role as providers of information about investment risk."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-07T10:22:09.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 7.1917896
+"parent": null
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6215
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10764"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10764"
"slug" => "disclosure-transparency-and-disagreement-among-economic-agents-the-case-of-goodwill-impairment"
"yearMonth" => "2019-01"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Disclosure Transparency and Disagreement Among Economic Agents: The Case of Goodwill Impairment"
"description" => "ANDREICOVICI, I., JENY, A. et LUI, D. (2019). Disclosure Transparency and Disagreement Among Economic Agents: The Case of Goodwill Impairment. <i>European Accounting Review</i>, 29(1), pp. 1-26."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LUI Daphne"
"bid" => "B00183502"
"slug" => "lui-daphne"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANDREICOVICI I."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "JENY Anne"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Corporate Disclosure"
1 => "Sell-side Analysts"
2 => "Goodwill Impairment"
3 => "Disagreement"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09638180.2019.1677259"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1-26"
"volume" => "29"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We examine whether more transparent disclosure about goodwill impairment tests conveys useful information to sell-side analysts about the parameters used in the complex and often opaque impairment testing process. Drawing on a sample of European companies from 2006 to 2014, we construct a unique dataset on the transparency of goodwill impairment disclosure and develop two analyst disagreement measures by extracting analysts’ opinions about firms’ impairment decisions in brokers’ reports. We show that the level of disclosure transparency is negatively associated with both disagreement among analysts, a proxy for information uncertainty, and disagreement between analysts and managers, a proxy for information asymmetry. Further, we find that discount-rate-related disclosure transparency is associated with both types of analyst disagreement, while cash-flow-related disclosure transparency is associated with disagreement between analysts and managers only. Our paper speaks to the usefulness of goodwill impairment test disclosures to analysts, while also highlighting that opportunistic and boilerplate disclosure by some firms hampers the ability to resolve information asymmetry and information uncertainty."
"en" => "We examine whether more transparent disclosure about goodwill impairment tests conveys useful information to sell-side analysts about the parameters used in the complex and often opaque impairment testing process. Drawing on a sample of European companies from 2006 to 2014, we construct a unique dataset on the transparency of goodwill impairment disclosure and develop two analyst disagreement measures by extracting analysts’ opinions about firms’ impairment decisions in brokers’ reports. We show that the level of disclosure transparency is negatively associated with both disagreement among analysts, a proxy for information uncertainty, and disagreement between analysts and managers, a proxy for information asymmetry. Further, we find that discount-rate-related disclosure transparency is associated with both types of analyst disagreement, while cash-flow-related disclosure transparency is associated with disagreement between analysts and managers only. Our paper speaks to the usefulness of goodwill impairment test disclosures to analysts, while also highlighting that opportunistic and boilerplate disclosure by some firms hampers the ability to resolve information asymmetry and information uncertainty."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-07T10:22:09.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 7.1917896
+"parent": null
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#5851
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "13191"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "13191"
"slug" => "analyst-independence-and-earnings-management"
"yearMonth" => "2023-01"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Analyst independence and earnings management"
"description" => "HUANG, Z., JEANJEAN, T. et LUI, D. (2023). Analyst independence and earnings management. <i>Journal of Business Finance and Accounting</i>, 50, pp. 598-621."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:1 [
"bid" => "B00306497"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "LUI Daphne"
"bid" => "B00183502"
"slug" => "lui-daphne"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUANG Zhongwei"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "JEANJEAN Thomas"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-08-25 14:42:38"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12655"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "598-621"
"volume" => "50"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We examine whether analyst independence contributes to analysts’ monitoring role in deterring accruals earnings management. We first report a negative association between earnings management and the ratio of independent analysts to brokerage analysts covering a firm. Next, through the lens of the promotion of independent sell-side research institutions by the 2003 Global Research Analyst Settlement, we document a significant decrease in earnings management on firms affected by the Global Settlement's mandate for time-limited support to back independent research institutions. Additionally, we find that, as the aforementioned support ended, the extent of monitoring effectiveness reverted to a level indistinguishable from that before the Global Settlement. Finally, using closures and mergers of independent research institutions as a quasi-natural experiment, we provide corroborating evidence consistent with analyst independence leading to more effective monitoring."
"en" => "We examine whether analyst independence contributes to analysts’ monitoring role in deterring accruals earnings management. We first report a negative association between earnings management and the ratio of independent analysts to brokerage analysts covering a firm. Next, through the lens of the promotion of independent sell-side research institutions by the 2003 Global Research Analyst Settlement, we document a significant decrease in earnings management on firms affected by the Global Settlement's mandate for time-limited support to back independent research institutions. Additionally, we find that, as the aforementioned support ended, the extent of monitoring effectiveness reverted to a level indistinguishable from that before the Global Settlement. Finally, using closures and mergers of independent research institutions as a quasi-natural experiment, we provide corroborating evidence consistent with analyst independence leading to more effective monitoring."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-07T10:22:09.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 7.1917896
+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6213
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14028"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14028"
"slug" => "do-firms-respond-to-auditors-red-flags-evidence-from-the-expanded-audit-report"
"yearMonth" => "2022-12"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "Do Firms Respond to Auditors' Red Flags? Evidence from the Expanded Audit Report"
"description" => "JENY, A., ANDREICOVI, I. et LUI, D. (2022). Do Firms Respond to Auditors' Red Flags? Evidence from the Expanded Audit Report. Dans: 8th Paris Financial Management Conference (PFMC) 2022. Paris."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LUI Daphne"
"bid" => "B00183502"
"slug" => "lui-daphne"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JENY Anne"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANDREICOVI I"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "8th Paris Financial Management Conference (PFMC) 2022"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-11-29 16:34:57"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-07T10:22:09.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 7.1917896
+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6216
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14575"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14575"
"slug" => "do-firms-respond-to-auditors-red-flags-evidence-from-the-expanded-audit-report"
"yearMonth" => "2022-08"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "Do Firms Respond to Auditors’ Red Flags? Evidence from the Expanded Audit Report"
"description" => "ANDREICOVICI, I.I., JENY, A. et LUI, D. (2022). Do Firms Respond to Auditors’ Red Flags? Evidence from the Expanded Audit Report. Dans: 2022 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting. San Diego."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LUI Daphne"
"bid" => "B00183502"
"slug" => "lui-daphne"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANDREICOVICI Ionela-Irina"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "JENY Anne"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2022 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-10-27 01:01:26"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-07T10:22:09.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 7.1917896
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6217
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14588"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14588"
"slug" => "the-impact-of-cost-stickiness-on-income-smoothing-evidence-from-employment-protection-regulations"
"yearMonth" => "2023-11"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "The impact of cost stickiness on income smoothing: evidence from employment protection regulations"
"description" => "FILIP, A., LIU, J. et LUI, D. (2023). The impact of cost stickiness on income smoothing: evidence from employment protection regulations. <i>Accounting and Business Research</i>, In press."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LUI Daphne"
"bid" => "B00183502"
"slug" => "lui-daphne"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "FILIP Andrei"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "LIU Junqi"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-11-15 09:51:40"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00014788.2023.2266803"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => "In press"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Prior literature suggests that cost stickiness increases the ex-ante volatility and reduces the predictability of earnings. We examine whether managers intentionally undo such consequences by dampening earnings volatility. Exploiting the staggered adoption of wrongful discharge laws as an exogenous instrument for cost stickiness, we document that cost stickiness increases managers’ income-smoothing activities. This response is more pronounced in firms whose earnings are more sensitive to labour costs than their industry peers are and in firms with stronger information-provision incentives. Additional analyses indicate that income smoothing improves sticky-cost firms’ earnings informativeness and that the identified impact of cost stickiness is primarily driven by labour costs. Our results suggest that labour regulations can influence managers’ financial reporting incentives via cost behaviour."
"en" => "Prior literature suggests that cost stickiness increases the ex-ante volatility and reduces the predictability of earnings. We examine whether managers intentionally undo such consequences by dampening earnings volatility. Exploiting the staggered adoption of wrongful discharge laws as an exogenous instrument for cost stickiness, we document that cost stickiness increases managers’ income-smoothing activities. This response is more pronounced in firms whose earnings are more sensitive to labour costs than their industry peers are and in firms with stronger information-provision incentives. Additional analyses indicate that income smoothing improves sticky-cost firms’ earnings informativeness and that the identified impact of cost stickiness is primarily driven by labour costs. Our results suggest that labour regulations can influence managers’ financial reporting incentives via cost behaviour."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-07T10:22:09.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 7.1917896
+"parent": null
}
]
"avatar" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00183502.jpg"
"contributionCounts" => 9
"personalLinks" => array:2 [
0 => "<a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9072-2650" target="_blank">ORCID</a>"
1 => "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=JHPtc-8AAAAJ" target="_blank">Google scholar</a>"
]
"docTitle" => "Daphne LUI"
"docSubtitle" => "Professeur associé"
"docDescription" => "Département: Comptabilité et contrôle de gestion<br>Campus de Singapour"
"docType" => "cv"
"docPreview" => "<img src="https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00183502.jpg"><span><span>Daphne LUI</span><span>B00183502</span></span>"
]
#_index: "academ_cv"
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.862393
+"parent": null
}
