Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "10764"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "10764"
    "slug" => "disclosure-transparency-and-disagreement-among-economic-agents-the-case-of-goodwill-impairment"
    "yearMonth" => "2020-01"
    "year" => "2020"
    "title" => "Disclosure Transparency and Disagreement Among Economic Agents: The Case of Goodwill Impairment"
    "description" => "ANDREICOVICI, I., JENY, A. et LUI, D. (2020). Disclosure Transparency and Disagreement Among Economic Agents: The Case of Goodwill Impairment. <i>European Accounting Review</i>, 29(1), pp. 1-26."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "LUI Daphne"
        "bid" => "B00183502"
        "slug" => "lui-daphne"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "ANDREICOVICI I."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "JENY Anne"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "Corporate Disclosure"
      1 => "Sell-side Analysts"
      2 => "Goodwill Impairment"
      3 => "Disagreement"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2024-12-12 15:18:31"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09638180.2019.1677259"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "1-26"
      "volume" => "29"
      "number" => "1"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "We examine whether more transparent disclosure about goodwill impairment tests conveys useful information to sell-side analysts about the parameters used in the complex and often opaque impairment testing process. Drawing on a sample of European companies from 2006 to 2014, we construct a unique dataset on the transparency of goodwill impairment disclosure and develop two analyst disagreement measures by extracting analysts’ opinions about firms’ impairment decisions in brokers’ reports. We show that the level of disclosure transparency is negatively associated with both disagreement among analysts, a proxy for information uncertainty, and disagreement between analysts and managers, a proxy for information asymmetry. Further, we find that discount-rate-related disclosure transparency is associated with both types of analyst disagreement, while cash-flow-related disclosure transparency is associated with disagreement between analysts and managers only. Our paper speaks to the usefulness of goodwill impairment test disclosures to analysts, while also highlighting that opportunistic and boilerplate disclosure by some firms hampers the ability to resolve information asymmetry and information uncertainty."
      "en" => "We examine whether more transparent disclosure about goodwill impairment tests conveys useful information to sell-side analysts about the parameters used in the complex and often opaque impairment testing process. Drawing on a sample of European companies from 2006 to 2014, we construct a unique dataset on the transparency of goodwill impairment disclosure and develop two analyst disagreement measures by extracting analysts’ opinions about firms’ impairment decisions in brokers’ reports. We show that the level of disclosure transparency is negatively associated with both disagreement among analysts, a proxy for information uncertainty, and disagreement between analysts and managers, a proxy for information asymmetry. Further, we find that discount-rate-related disclosure transparency is associated with both types of analyst disagreement, while cash-flow-related disclosure transparency is associated with disagreement between analysts and managers only. Our paper speaks to the usefulness of goodwill impairment test disclosures to analysts, while also highlighting that opportunistic and boilerplate disclosure by some firms hampers the ability to resolve information asymmetry and information uncertainty."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
      "en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T11:21:48.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Disclosure Transparency and Disagreement Among Economic Agents: The Case of Goodwill Impairment"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/lui-daphne">LUI Daphne</a>, ANDREICOVICI I., JENY Anne"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">LUI Daphne, ANDREICOVICI I., JENY Anne</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2020</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Corporate Disclosure</a>, <a href="#">Sell-side Analysts</a>, <a href="#">Goodwill Impairment</a>, <a href="#">Disagreement</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Disclosure Transparency and Disagreement Among Economic Agents: The Case of Goodwill Impairment</b><br><span>2020-01 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09638180.2019.1677259" target="_blank">Disclosure Transparency and Disagreement Among Economic Agents: The Case of Goodwill Impairment</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.673992
  +"parent": null
}