Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233
#_id: "B00809922"
#_source: array:39 [
"bid" => "B00809922"
"academId" => "32283"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
"fullName" => "Sam GARG"
"lastName" => "GARG"
"firstName" => "Sam"
"title" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur"
"en" => "Professor"
]
"email" => "samgarg@essec.edu"
"status" => "ACTIF"
"campus" => "Campus de Singapour"
"departments" => []
"phone" => ""
"sites" => []
"facNumber" => "32283"
"externalCvUrl" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/cv/garg-sam/pdf"
"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=LJtE3tcAAAAJ"
"facOrcId" => "https://orcid.org/https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1738-1316"
"career" => array:2 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2241
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2023-01-02"
"endDate" => "2025-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur associé"
"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Singapour"
"en" => "Singapore"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2242
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2025-09-01"
"endDate" => null
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur"
"en" => "Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"diplomes" => array:1 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2235
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2011"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Doctor of Philosophy, Business administration, Other Discipline"
"fr" => "Doctor of Philosophy, Sciences de Gestion, Autre discipline"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Stanford University"
"en" => "Stanford University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "États-Unis"
"en" => "United States of America"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"bio" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => """
<p>Sam Garg (PhD Stanford) is a professor of Management (Strategy & Entrepreneurship) at ESSEC Business School in Singapore. Previously, he was the Liwei Huang Associate Professor of Business at HKUST Business School, where he also co-directed the elite interdisciplinary program BIBU (Biotech in Business). During his career, he has also held visiting appointments at INSEAD and Singapore Management University. He is one of the few business school faculty members globally to have been associated with top schools in Asia, Europe and USA.<br />\n
<br />\n
<span style="color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9)">Sam is an award-winning scholar and teacher. His research is at the intersection of governance and entrepreneurship. Specific research interests include CEO-board relationship, board processes and leadership structures. Examples of his research include effective board processes in privately-held technology ventures, effective board leadership structures when these ventures transition into public-listed firms, and scaling up of senior executive teams. He has published in leading academic journals and also serves on the editorial boards of many of them. Notably, Sam is an Associate Editor of Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, a premier academic journal. He is a regular speaker in key management conferences as keynote/plenary speaker, consortia mentor for junior faculty/ doctoral students, and/or paper presenter.</span><br />\n
<br />\n
<span style="color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9)">Sam has been teaching undergraduates, masters and doctoral students, as well as executives on topics such as strategy, entrepreneurship, innovation, governance, board processes, and “becoming a CEO”. He has also conducted customized workshops and has been invited to address executives, investors and board members in industry conferences.</span><br />\n
<br />\n
<span style="color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9)">Sam is involved in the community with startups, and regularly lends support to governance initiatives such as those that advocate women on boards and in leadership positions. He serves on the inaugural academic advisory board/discussion circle of Temasek's Stewardship Asia Center based in Singapore. In the past, he served on the board of a notable charity in Hong Kong. He co-authored the acclaimed book "Inspire to Innovate: Management and Innovation in Asia," published by Palgrave MacMillan (UK). This book earned distinction as a finalist for the global best management book of the year award by the Management Consulting Association, UK. He is often quoted in press.</span><br />\n
<br />\n
<span style="color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9)">Before joining academia, Sam worked with established as well as young, entrepreneurial firms, and was also a founder-CEO of an online payments venture, well before the term "fintech" became part of the everyday lexicon.</span></p>\n
"""
]
"department" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"industrrySectors" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Services et logiciels informatiques - Biotechnologie et sciences de la vie"
"en" => "IT Services & Software - Biotechnology & Life Sciences"
]
"researchFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Stratégie - Entrepreneuriat - Théorie organisationnelle - Comportement organisationnel - rapports de force - ESG governance"
"en" => "Strategy - Entrepreneurship - Organizational Theory - Organizational Behavior - power dynamics - ESG governance"
]
"teachingFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Stratégie - Ethique des affaires et philosophie - Entrepreneuriat - Management"
"en" => "Strategy - Business Ethics & Business Philosophy - Entrepreneurship - Management"
]
"distinctions" => array:2 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2243
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "2024-12-15"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Best Paper Award at the India Strategy Conference, sponsored by the Academy of Management Strategy Division"
"en" => "Best Paper Award at the India Strategy Conference, sponsored by the Academy of Management Strategy Division"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Prix"
"en" => "Awards"
]
"tri" => " 1 "
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad"
"en" => "Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Inde"
"en" => "India"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2244
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "2024-10-05"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Runner-up for Best Paper Award, at the Strategic Management Society Annual Conference (Strategic Leadership and Governance Interest Group) in Oct 2024"
"en" => "Runner-up for Best Paper Award, at the Strategic Management Society Annual Conference (Strategic Leadership and Governance Interest Group) in Oct 2024Runner-up for Best Paper Award, at the Strategic Management Society Annual Conference (Strategic Leadership and Governance Interest Group) in Oct 2024"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Prix"
"en" => "Awards"
]
"tri" => " 1 "
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Strategic Management Society"
"en" => "Strategic Management Society"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "États-Unis"
"en" => "United States of America"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"teaching" => array:1 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2240
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2025"
"program" => null
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
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"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis director"
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
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]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
]
"otherActivities" => array:6 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2237
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2021-01-01"
"endDate" => "2027-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "102"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités de recherche"
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"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-direction d'une revue - Co-rédacteur en chef"
"en" => "Senior or Associate Editor"
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"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Rédacteur en chef - Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal"
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
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+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2234
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2018-01-01"
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"uuid" => "103"
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"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'un comité de lecture"
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"fr" => "Comité de lecture - Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal"
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+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2238
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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]
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+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2232
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2022-01-01"
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}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2236
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2239
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2021-01-01"
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"uuid" => "204"
"type" => array:2 [
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"subType" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Member of an academic association"
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"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Member, academic advisory board (aka Stewardship Discussion Circle), Temasek-sponsored Stewardship Asia Centre, Singapore, 2021 – (Temasek is Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, one of the largest in the world)"
"en" => "Member, academic advisory board (aka Stewardship Discussion Circle), Temasek-sponsored Stewardship Asia Centre, Singapore, 2021 – (Temasek is Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, one of the largest in the world)"
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"en" => "Stewardship Discussion Circle"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Singapour"
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]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"theses" => array:1 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2245
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2025"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2025"
"student" => "TRÖBINGER M."
"firstJob" => ""
"label" => array:2 [
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"role" => array:2 [
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:23.000Z"
"contributions" => array:22 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2247
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14349"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14349"
"slug" => "14349-women-entrepreneurship-in-korean-livestreaming-new-business-models-and-the-weak-governance-of-online-platforms"
"yearMonth" => "2023-09"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Women Entrepreneurship In Korean Livestreaming: New Business Models And The Weak Governance Of Online Platforms"
"description" => "GARG, S. (2023). Women Entrepreneurship In Korean Livestreaming: New Business Models And The Weak Governance Of Online Platforms. Dans: 2023 Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Frankfurt."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
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"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
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"ouvrage" => "2023 Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2025-03-24 15:21:15"
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"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
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"type" => array:2 [
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"countries" => array:2 [
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"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
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"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"parent": null
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2249
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14381"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14381"
"slug" => "14381-strategies-for-scaling-up"
"yearMonth" => "2023-08"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Strategies for Scaling Up"
"description" => "GARG, S. (2023). Strategies for Scaling Up. Dans: 83rd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 2023. Boston."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
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"ouvrage" => "83rd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 2023"
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"updatedAt" => "2023-09-27 01:00:43"
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"type" => array:2 [
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"countries" => array:2 [
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"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"parent": null
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2251
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14891"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14891"
"slug" => "14891-an-empirical-exploration-of-boards-of-directors-of-technology-ventures"
"yearMonth" => "2024-06"
"year" => "2024"
"title" => "An Empirical Exploration of Boards of Directors of Technology Ventures"
"description" => "GARG, S., HOWARD, M. et PAHNKE, E. (2024). An Empirical Exploration of Boards of Directors of Technology Ventures. Dans: 2024 Workshop for Journal of Business Venturing Special Issue on Venture Boards. Zurich."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
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1 => array:1 [
"name" => "HOWARD Michael"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "PAHNKE Emily"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2024 Workshop for Journal of Business Venturing Special Issue on Venture Boards"
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"updatedAt" => "2024-07-10 01:01:22"
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"abstract" => array:2 [
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"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
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"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
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+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
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}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2248
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15660"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15660"
"slug" => "15660-remedies-for-growing-pains-how-venture-leaders-manage-stalemates-when-scaling-senior-exec-teams"
"yearMonth" => "2024-12"
"year" => "2024"
"title" => "Remedies For Growing Pains: How Venture Leaders Manage Stalemates When Scaling Senior Exec Teams"
"description" => "GARG, S. et RHEE, C.G. (2024). Remedies For Growing Pains: How Venture Leaders Manage Stalemates When Scaling Senior Exec Teams. Dans: 2024 India Strategy Conference. Ahmedabad, Gujarat."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
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1 => array:1 [
"name" => "RHEE CJ Garg"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2024 India Strategy Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2025-05-02 16:09:23"
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"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
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"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
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"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
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"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"parent": null
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2252
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15725"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15725"
"slug" => "15725-business-scholars-on-boards-and-innovation"
"yearMonth" => "2024-08"
"year" => "2024"
"title" => "Business scholars on boards and innovation"
"description" => "GARG, S. (2024). Business scholars on boards and innovation. Dans: 84th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (AOM 2024). Chicago."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
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"ouvrage" => "84th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (AOM 2024)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2025-06-03 14:49:57"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
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"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
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"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
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"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
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+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"parent": null
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2246
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7289"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7289"
"slug" => "7289-the-dangers-of-deep-knowledge-new-ventures-in-the-u-s-solar-industry"
"yearMonth" => "2011-09"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "The Dangers of Deep Knowledge: New Ventures in the U.S. Solar Industry"
"description" => "FURR, N.R., CAVARRETTA, F. et GARG, S. (2011). The Dangers of Deep Knowledge: New Ventures in the U.S. Solar Industry. Dans: West Coast Research Symposium."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CAVARRETTA Fabrice"
"bid" => "B00119673"
"slug" => "cavarretta-fabrice"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "FURR N.R."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "West Coast Research Symposium"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2250
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7290"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7290"
"slug" => "7290-the-dangers-of-deep-knowledge-new-ventures-in-the-u-s-solar-industry"
"yearMonth" => "2011-08"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "The Dangers of Deep Knowledge: New Ventures in the U.S. Solar Industry"
"description" => "FURR, N.R., CAVARRETTA, F. et GARG, S. (2011). The Dangers of Deep Knowledge: New Ventures in the U.S. Solar Industry. Dans: Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2011."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CAVARRETTA Fabrice"
"bid" => "B00119673"
"slug" => "cavarretta-fabrice"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "FURR N.R."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2011"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2253
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7291"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7291"
"slug" => "7291-the-dangers-of-deep-knowledge-new-ventures-in-the-u-s-solar-industry"
"yearMonth" => "2011-07"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "The Dangers of Deep Knowledge: New Ventures in the U.S. Solar Industry"
"description" => "FURR, N.R., CAVARRETTA, F. et GARG, S. (2011). The Dangers of Deep Knowledge: New Ventures in the U.S. Solar Industry. Dans: EGOS Annual Meeting 2011."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CAVARRETTA Fabrice"
"bid" => "B00119673"
"slug" => "cavarretta-fabrice"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "FURR N.R."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "EGOS Annual Meeting 2011"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2254
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2898"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2898"
"slug" => "2898-who-changes-course-the-role-of-domain-knowledge-and-novel-framing-in-making-technology-changes"
"yearMonth" => "2012-09"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "Who Changes Course? The Role of Domain Knowledge and Novel Framing In Making Technology Changes"
"description" => "FURR, N.R., CAVARRETTA, F. et GARG, S. (2012). Who Changes Course? The Role of Domain Knowledge and Novel Framing In Making Technology Changes. <i>Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal</i>, 6(3), pp. 236-256."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CAVARRETTA Fabrice"
"bid" => "B00119673"
"slug" => "cavarretta-fabrice"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "FURR N. R."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1002/sej.1137"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "236-256"
"volume" => "6"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Les fondations d’une entreprise sont établies tôt dans sa vie quand ses dirigeants recherchent des opportunités dans leur environnement. L’équipe dirigeante traite des informations qui peuvent signaler un besoin de changement, et leur flexibilité cognitive affecte alors la chance qu’un tel changement ait lieu. Si l’origine des dirigeants influent ce processus, la littérature n’identifie pas comment l’origine en particulier influe sur l’ampleur des changements qui seront réalisés. Ainsi, nous comparons les effets différentiels entre des équipes dominées par des individus expérimentés dans le domaine d’activité focal, ou extérieur au domaine, ou par des individus complémentaires. Nous observons la population des entreprises productrices de photovoltaïque américaines entre 1992 et 2007 et nous trouvons que les équipes dominées par des individus extérieurs au domaine, en particulier le PDG, effectuent des changements de technologie plus forts. Par contre, l’expertise dans le domaine a un effet inertiel sur le changement : même combiné à une équipe complémentaire, ceci réduit la change de changement technologique. Ces résultats contribuent à la discussion sur les types et antécédents de changement organisationnel, la composition des équipes dirigeantes, et les fondements psychologiques de la stratégie."
"en" => "The foundations of established firms are laid when, early in life, venture executives explore dynamic landscapes in search of opportunities. During this search, the executive team processes information that might signal the need to change, and their cognitive flexibility in processing this information affects the likelihood of such changes. While executive backgrounds affect this information processing, current literature does not identify how executive backgrounds impact the extent of change a firm undertakes. Therefore, we compare the effects of teams dominated by domain insiders, domain outsiders, and complementary teams (blending insiders and outsiders) on the likelihood of different degrees of technology change. In an examination of the population of U.S. solar photovoltaic manufacturing ventures from 1992 to 2007, we find that teams with extra-domain expertise, particularly at the CEO level, undertake more significant technology change. By contrast, intra-domain expertise has an inertial effect on change: even when combined in complementary team configurations, domain expertise reduces chances of significant technology change. These findings expand the discussion of types and antecedents of organization change, top management team composition, and the psychological foundations of strategy."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2255
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "13831"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "13831"
"slug" => "13831-boards-of-directors-and-strategic-management-in-public-firms-and-new-ventures"
"yearMonth" => "2021-08"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "Boards of Directors and Strategic Management in Public Firms and New Ventures"
"description" => "WESTPHAL, J.D. et GARG, S. (2021). Boards of Directors and Strategic Management in Public Firms and New Ventures. Dans: Irene M. Duhaime, Michael A. Hitt, Majorie A. Lyles eds. <i>Strategic Management: State of the Field and Its Future</i>. 1 ed. Oxford University Press, pp. 411-426."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "WESTPHAL James D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Strategic Management: State of the Field and Its Future"
"keywords" => array:9 [
0 => "boards of directors"
1 => "venture boards"
2 => "corporate governance"
3 => "board process"
4 => "CEO-board relationship"
5 => "diversity"
6 => "technology and innovation"
7 => "strategic decision making"
8 => "symbolic management"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-08 15:57:04"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190090883.003.0023"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "411-426"
"volume" => ""
"number" => "7.1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chapitres"
"en" => "Book chapters"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This chapter examines contemporary theory and research on boards of directors in strategic management. After briefly reviewing the evolution of research on corporate boards and strategic management, we describe contemporary theoretical perspectives and emerging topics in the literature, and identify a variety of future research opportunities. We then turn to recent research in the rapidly growing literature on venture boards and strategy. Our review of recent work on boards of public companies and new ventures reveals a common emphasis on behavioral processes in the boardroom, in dyadic CEO-board interactions outside the boardroom, and in relations between directors and external constituents. We describe numerous opportunities to extend these complementary literatures by linking behavioral processes in boards to issues of diversity, technology and innovation, culture and institutions, and competitive strategy."
"en" => "This chapter examines contemporary theory and research on boards of directors in strategic management. After briefly reviewing the evolution of research on corporate boards and strategic management, we describe contemporary theoretical perspectives and emerging topics in the literature, and identify a variety of future research opportunities. We then turn to recent research in the rapidly growing literature on venture boards and strategy. Our review of recent work on boards of public companies and new ventures reveals a common emphasis on behavioral processes in the boardroom, in dyadic CEO-board interactions outside the boardroom, and in relations between directors and external constituents. We describe numerous opportunities to extend these complementary literatures by linking behavioral processes in boards to issues of diversity, technology and innovation, culture and institutions, and competitive strategy."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:3 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
2 => "description.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2256
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "13832"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "13832"
"slug" => "13832-venture-governance-a-new-horizon-for-corporate-governance"
"yearMonth" => "2020-05"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Venture Governance: A New Horizon for Corporate Governance"
"description" => "GARG, S. (2020). Venture Governance: A New Horizon for Corporate Governance. <i>Academy of Management Perspectives</i>, 34(2), pp. 252-265."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-08 15:59:08"
"publicationUrl" => "https://journals.aom.org/doi/abs/10.5465/amp.2017.0178"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "252-265"
"volume" => "34"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The corporate governance literature has predominantly focused on large, publicly listed firms. As part of this special symposium on innovations in corporate governance, this paper focuses on ventures as a novel governance configuration. It explains how venture governance mitigates some fundamental corporate governance issues, such as the agency problem; the presence of external directors who have limited motivation and insufficient sectoral knowledge, and are consumed by onerous compliance matters; and boards’ formal structure and large size, which limit effective communication and information processing. But while novel features of ventures mitigate these fundamental issues in public firm governance, three new governance issues emerge in ventures: (1) the “principal problem,” (2) customers as a source of external governance, and (3) lack of formal board structure. The paper presents evidence and observations on how these new governance issues are addressed in innovative ways by venture boards. Finally, it discusses the relevance of these new governance issues and solutions for public firms."
"en" => "The corporate governance literature has predominantly focused on large, publicly listed firms. As part of this special symposium on innovations in corporate governance, this paper focuses on ventures as a novel governance configuration. It explains how venture governance mitigates some fundamental corporate governance issues, such as the agency problem; the presence of external directors who have limited motivation and insufficient sectoral knowledge, and are consumed by onerous compliance matters; and boards’ formal structure and large size, which limit effective communication and information processing. But while novel features of ventures mitigate these fundamental issues in public firm governance, three new governance issues emerge in ventures: (1) the “principal problem,” (2) customers as a source of external governance, and (3) lack of formal board structure. The paper presents evidence and observations on how these new governance issues are addressed in innovative ways by venture boards. Finally, it discusses the relevance of these new governance issues and solutions for public firms."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2257
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "13833"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "13833"
"slug" => "13833-opening-the-black-box-boards-of-directors-competitive-aggressiveness-and-firm-performance"
"yearMonth" => "2021-08"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "Opening the Black Box: Boards of Directors, Competitive Aggressiveness, and Firm Performance"
"description" => "CHO, J., GARG, S. et LEE, J. (2021). Opening the Black Box: Boards of Directors, Competitive Aggressiveness, and Firm Performance. <i>Academy of Management Proceedings</i>, 2021(1), pp. 12953."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "CHO Jaeyoung"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "LEE Jangwoo"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-02-23 10:03:43"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2021.12953abstract"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "12953"
"volume" => "2021"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This study develops and tests the theoretical model that examines how the board’s composition and leadership structure relates to competitive aggressiveness and, ultimately, performance outcomes in the context of emerging economy firms where the separation of ownership and control is not the central issue. Analyzing a sample of 570 listed Korean firms from 1998 to 2017, we find that more independent directors and the separated role of a firm’s CEO and chairperson help improve the corporate ability and tendency to identify and seize opportunities for pursuing competitive aggressiveness and therefore to link temporal competitive advantages that yield superior performance outcomes. The important implications of these findings are discussed."
"en" => "This study develops and tests the theoretical model that examines how the board’s composition and leadership structure relates to competitive aggressiveness and, ultimately, performance outcomes in the context of emerging economy firms where the separation of ownership and control is not the central issue. Analyzing a sample of 570 listed Korean firms from 1998 to 2017, we find that more independent directors and the separated role of a firm’s CEO and chairperson help improve the corporate ability and tendency to identify and seize opportunities for pursuing competitive aggressiveness and therefore to link temporal competitive advantages that yield superior performance outcomes. The important implications of these findings are discussed."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2258
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "13834"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "13834"
"slug" => "13834-undervaluation-of-directors-in-the-board-hierarchy-impact-on-turnover-of-directors-and-ceos-in-newly-public-firms"
"yearMonth" => "2018-02"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Undervaluation of directors in the board hierarchy: Impact on turnover of directors (and CEOs) in newly public firms"
"description" => "GARG, S., LI, Q. et SHAW, J.D. (2018). Undervaluation of directors in the board hierarchy: Impact on turnover of directors (and CEOs) in newly public firms. <i>Strategic Management Journal</i>, 39(2), pp. 429-457."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:2 [
"name" => "LI Qiang"
"bid" => "JOHN"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "SHAW Jason D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-08 16:05:28"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2716"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "429-457"
"volume" => "39"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Research summary: We examine the consequences of the formalization of the board leadership structure at IPO for board-level turnover. We introduce the concept of director undervaluation. It indicates the degree to which a director’s qualifications based on normatively accepted criteria for board leadership are not duly reflected in his/her appointments to the board chair and committee chair positions. We find that the higher the average undervaluation of directors on the board (“board undervaluation”), the greater the turnover levels of undervalued directors. This effect is stronger when board interaction frequency is higher. We contribute to the behavioral perspective on corporate governance by introducing justice-based legitimacy as a key normative institution, and by providing a novel predictor of aggregate turnover of directors (as well as the firm’s CEO)."
"en" => "Research summary: We examine the consequences of the formalization of the board leadership structure at IPO for board-level turnover. We introduce the concept of director undervaluation. It indicates the degree to which a director’s qualifications based on normatively accepted criteria for board leadership are not duly reflected in his/her appointments to the board chair and committee chair positions. We find that the higher the average undervaluation of directors on the board (“board undervaluation”), the greater the turnover levels of undervalued directors. This effect is stronger when board interaction frequency is higher. We contribute to the behavioral perspective on corporate governance by introducing justice-based legitimacy as a key normative institution, and by providing a novel predictor of aggregate turnover of directors (as well as the firm’s CEO)."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2259
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "13835"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "13835"
"slug" => "13835-entrepreneurial-firms-grow-up-board-undervaluation-board-evolution-and-firm-performance-in-newly-public-firms"
"yearMonth" => "2019-11"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Entrepreneurial firms grow up: Board undervaluation, board evolution, and firm performance in newly public firms"
"description" => "GARG, S., JOHN LI, Q. et SHAW, J.D. (2019). Entrepreneurial firms grow up: Board undervaluation, board evolution, and firm performance in newly public firms. <i>Strategic Management Journal</i>, 40(11), pp. 1882-1907."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JOHN LI Qiang"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "SHAW Jason D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-12 11:51:24"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3036"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1882-1907"
"volume" => "40"
"number" => "11"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "An initial public offering (IPO) ushers in many changes to the organization's boards of directors, including the installation of a formal and comprehensive board leadership structure. This paper shows that higher board undervaluation, that is, the average degree to which directors' qualifications based on normatively accepted criteria for board leadership are not duly reflected in their appointments to the board chair and committee chair positions, is associated with higher director turnover, and with lower qualifications among new directors in the subsequent years. Further, the effect of board undervaluation on firm performance is mediated both by director turnover and new directors' qualifications. But these two mediators operate as opposite forces on performance—director turnover is associated with lower firm performance, but counter-intuitively lower new-director-qualifications are associated with higher firm performance."
"en" => "An initial public offering (IPO) ushers in many changes to the organization's boards of directors, including the installation of a formal and comprehensive board leadership structure. This paper shows that higher board undervaluation, that is, the average degree to which directors' qualifications based on normatively accepted criteria for board leadership are not duly reflected in their appointments to the board chair and committee chair positions, is associated with higher director turnover, and with lower qualifications among new directors in the subsequent years. Further, the effect of board undervaluation on firm performance is mediated both by director turnover and new directors' qualifications. But these two mediators operate as opposite forces on performance—director turnover is associated with lower firm performance, but counter-intuitively lower new-director-qualifications are associated with higher firm performance."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2260
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "13836"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "13836"
"slug" => "13836-director-undervaluation-board-evolution-and-firm-performance"
"yearMonth" => "2018-08"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Director Undervaluation, Board Evolution, and Firm Performance"
"description" => "GARG, S. et LI, Q. (2018). Director Undervaluation, Board Evolution, and Firm Performance. <i>Academy of Management Proceedings</i>, 2018(1), pp. 12709."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "LI Qiang"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-08 16:16:04"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2018.144"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "12709"
"volume" => "2018"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The behavioral perspective on corporate governance largely considers boards of directors as cooperative groups. By contrast, we put spotlight on the social comparison processes among outside directors on a board, and find that they have important implications for board evolution (both turnover and recruitment) and ultimately firm performance. We focus on the assignment of chair positions, namely the board chair and chairs of three key board committees, at initial public offering (IPO) when the board committees are installed for the first time. Our study shows that if directors are undervalued vis-à-vis fellow outside directors in the formal leadership structure of the board, they are more likely to exit; further, the new directors added to the board have overall lower qualifications. These evolutionary changes on the board, then, have significant performance consequences for the firm. Overall, a key insight is that some of the most promising entrepreneurial firms (i.e. those that undergo IPO) can decline due to mis-structuring of the board leadership structure during this important transition."
"en" => "The behavioral perspective on corporate governance largely considers boards of directors as cooperative groups. By contrast, we put spotlight on the social comparison processes among outside directors on a board, and find that they have important implications for board evolution (both turnover and recruitment) and ultimately firm performance. We focus on the assignment of chair positions, namely the board chair and chairs of three key board committees, at initial public offering (IPO) when the board committees are installed for the first time. Our study shows that if directors are undervalued vis-à-vis fellow outside directors in the formal leadership structure of the board, they are more likely to exit; further, the new directors added to the board have overall lower qualifications. These evolutionary changes on the board, then, have significant performance consequences for the firm. Overall, a key insight is that some of the most promising entrepreneurial firms (i.e. those that undergo IPO) can decline due to mis-structuring of the board leadership structure during this important transition."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
15 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2261
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14380"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14380"
"slug" => "14380-remedies-for-growing-pains-how-venture-ceos-resolve-stalemate-conflicts-with-new-professional-executives"
"yearMonth" => "2023-10"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Remedies For Growing Pains: How Venture CEOs Resolve Stalemate Conflicts With New Professional Executives"
"description" => "GARG, S., RHEE C, C. et PARK, E. (2023). Remedies For Growing Pains: How Venture CEOs Resolve Stalemate Conflicts With New Professional Executives. Dans: 2023 Strategic Management Society (SMS) Annual Conference. Toronto."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "RHEE C CJ"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "PARK E"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2023 Strategic Management Society (SMS) Annual Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-09-27 01:00:43"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"parent": null
}
16 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2262
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15417"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15417"
"slug" => "15417-directors-in-new-technology-based-ventures-an-empirical-inquiry"
"yearMonth" => "2025-03"
"year" => "2025"
"title" => "Directors in new technology-based ventures: An empirical inquiry"
"description" => "GARG, S., HOWARD, M. et COX PAHNKE, E. (2025). Directors in new technology-based ventures: An empirical inquiry. <i>Journal of Business Venturing</i>, 40(2), pp. 106431."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "HOWARD Michael"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "COX PAHNKE Emily"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Boards of directors"
1 => "Ventures"
2 => "Venture capital"
3 => "Corporate venture capital"
4 => "Founders"
]
"updatedAt" => "2025-02-13 10:06:24"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2024.106431"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "106431"
"volume" => "40"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In the emerging literature on venture boards, little research examines the association between different categories of venture directors and strategic firm outcomes. We conduct an empirical inquiry into how founder-directors, venture capitalist investor-directors and corporate venture investor-directors are related to inter-organizational alliances, innovation, and exits. In our longitudinal study based on hand-collected data on 156 medical device ventures in the US, we find that founder-directors are positively associated with patents and negatively associated with supply chain agreements. VC-directors are positively associated with exits but are negatively associated with R&D, supply chain agreements and patents. CVC-directors are negatively associated with patents and first product introductions. Adopting an abductive approach, we suggest potential mechanisms based on interviews with venture directors and CEOs and suggest future directions for venture boards scholarship."
"en" => "In the emerging literature on venture boards, little research examines the association between different categories of venture directors and strategic firm outcomes. We conduct an empirical inquiry into how founder-directors, venture capitalist investor-directors and corporate venture investor-directors are related to inter-organizational alliances, innovation, and exits. In our longitudinal study based on hand-collected data on 156 medical device ventures in the US, we find that founder-directors are positively associated with patents and negatively associated with supply chain agreements. VC-directors are positively associated with exits but are negatively associated with R&D, supply chain agreements and patents. CVC-directors are negatively associated with patents and first product introductions. Adopting an abductive approach, we suggest potential mechanisms based on interviews with venture directors and CEOs and suggest future directions for venture boards scholarship."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
17 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2263
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15440"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15440"
"slug" => "15440-fostering-positive-ceo%e2%80%90board-relationships-board-synchronization-skill-and-relationship-cycles-in-new-ventures"
"yearMonth" => "2025-05"
"year" => "2025"
"title" => "Fostering positive CEO‐board relationships: Board synchronization skill and relationship cycles in new ventures"
"description" => "GARG, S. et BINGHAM, C.B. (2025). Fostering positive CEO‐board relationships: Board synchronization skill and relationship cycles in new ventures. <i>Strategic Management Journal</i>, 46(5), pp. 1251-1292."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Bingham Christopher B."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "CEO–board relationship"
1 => "entrepreneurship"
2 => "governance"
3 => "multiple case study method"
4 => "venture capital"
]
"updatedAt" => "2025-04-10 09:40:58"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3692"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1251-1292"
"volume" => "46"
"number" => "5"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This article explores how new venture leaders foster positive CEO–board relationships, a critical yet underdeveloped topic in governance research. We examine the ongoing interactions between first-time CEOs and their boards, focusing on the tension between boards' need for influence and transparency and CEOs' desire for autonomy and control. Introducing the concept of “relationship cycles,” we demonstrate how early interactions create virtuous or vibcious feedback loops that shape long-term governance outcomes. We also propose “board synchronization skill” as a key construct, highlighting how CEOs successfully manage communication to align competing goals. Finally, we set forth a temporal contingency view of live communication that reveals how interaction effectiveness varies by stage, thereby impacting CEO–board dynamics. More broadly, this study offers a process-oriented view of governance, expanding our understanding of CEO–board relationships in ventures."
"en" => "This article explores how new venture leaders foster positive CEO–board relationships, a critical yet underdeveloped topic in governance research. We examine the ongoing interactions between first-time CEOs and their boards, focusing on the tension between boards' need for influence and transparency and CEOs' desire for autonomy and control. Introducing the concept of “relationship cycles,” we demonstrate how early interactions create virtuous or vibcious feedback loops that shape long-term governance outcomes. We also propose “board synchronization skill” as a key construct, highlighting how CEOs successfully manage communication to align competing goals. Finally, we set forth a temporal contingency view of live communication that reveals how interaction effectiveness varies by stage, thereby impacting CEO–board dynamics. More broadly, this study offers a process-oriented view of governance, expanding our understanding of CEO–board relationships in ventures."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
18 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2264
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15670"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15670"
"slug" => "15670-balancing-power-the-role-of-independent-directors-on-venture-boards"
"yearMonth" => "2025-07"
"year" => "2025"
"title" => "Balancing power: The role of independent directors on venture boards"
"description" => "LI, Y. et GARG, S. (2025). Balancing power: The role of independent directors on venture boards. <i>Journal of Business Venturing</i>, 40(4), pp. 106483."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Li Yajing"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Ventures"
1 => "Boards of directors"
2 => "Independent directors"
3 => "VC directors"
4 => "Power"
]
"updatedAt" => "2025-05-23 09:22:06"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2025.106483"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "106483"
"volume" => "40"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We develop a novel power-centric model that examines antecedents and boundary conditions for independent directors in venture boards. Using 989 U.S. biotech and pharmaceutical ventures from 2010 to 2020, we find that the structural power gap between inside directors and VC directors is negatively associated with venture board independence. We also find that VC directors' intra-group conflict through tenure variance would weaken the impact of VC directors' power over inside directors on venture board independence, while VC ownership power through investment would strengthen it. These results offer a deeper theoretical understanding of venture boards."
"en" => "We develop a novel power-centric model that examines antecedents and boundary conditions for independent directors in venture boards. Using 989 U.S. biotech and pharmaceutical ventures from 2010 to 2020, we find that the structural power gap between inside directors and VC directors is negatively associated with venture board independence. We also find that VC directors' intra-group conflict through tenure variance would weaken the impact of VC directors' power over inside directors on venture board independence, while VC ownership power through investment would strengthen it. These results offer a deeper theoretical understanding of venture boards."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
19 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2265
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15714"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15714"
"slug" => "15714-accounting-financial-expert-directors-trade-offs-of-increased-financial-monitoring"
"yearMonth" => "2024-10"
"year" => "2024"
"title" => "Accounting Financial Expert Directors: Trade-offs of Increased Financial Monitoring"
"description" => "GARG, S., KUSNADI, H. et CHO, J. (2024). Accounting Financial Expert Directors: Trade-offs of Increased Financial Monitoring. Dans: <i>44th Strategic Management Society (SMS) Annual Conference 2024</i>. Dubai: Strategic Management Society (SMS)."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KUSNADI Hanny"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "CHO Jaeyoung"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "44th Strategic Management Society (SMS) Annual Conference 2024"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2025-06-03 17:21:13"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.strategicmanagement.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/SMS-Istanbul-Full-Program.pdf"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Actes d'une conférence"
"en" => "Conference Proceedings"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"parent": null
}
20 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2266
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15724"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15724"
"slug" => "15724-remedies-for-growing-pains-how-venture-leaders-manage-stalemates-when-scaling-senior-executive-team"
"yearMonth" => "2024-08"
"year" => "2024"
"title" => "Remedies for Growing Pains: How Venture Leaders Manage Stalemates when Scaling Senior Executive Team"
"description" => "RHEE, C. et GARG, S. (2024). Remedies for Growing Pains: How Venture Leaders Manage Stalemates when Scaling Senior Executive Team. Dans: <i>Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings</i>. Academy of Management."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "RHEE Changjoon"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings"
"keywords" => array:2 [
0 => "Venture leadership"
1 => "Organizational dynamics"
]
"updatedAt" => "2025-06-03 14:41:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.5465/AMPROC.2024.12198abstract"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => "2024"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Actes d'une conférence"
"en" => "Conference Proceedings"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We investigate how venture leaders can effectively manage stalemates that arise after hiring professional executives. Using a multi-case inductive method, we analyze 21 actual top management team (TMT) stalemates—communication breakdowns between task-dependent parties—within four Hong Kong fintech ventures that raised venture capital. Our study contributes to the venture professionalization literature in several ways. We introduce negative intra-TMT dynamics into the literature by identifying stalemates that emerge during the professionalization process and classifying these stalemates as horizontal or vertical. More importantly, we develop a contingency framework that consists of four actions taken by the venture leaders to manage these stalemates. Our framework reveals that effective leaders use private mediation in horizontal stalemates and structural crafting in vertical stalemates, but not vice versa. In contrast, open discussion and decision enforcement, two actions suggested in prior conflict management literature, were found ineffective for all types of stalemates in our data. Beyond venture professionalization, we offer a fresh lens on conflict management as brokering by highlighting the space and hierarchy in the brokering process. We conclude by suggesting boundary conditions for our theoretical framework."
"en" => "We investigate how venture leaders can effectively manage stalemates that arise after hiring professional executives. Using a multi-case inductive method, we analyze 21 actual top management team (TMT) stalemates—communication breakdowns between task-dependent parties—within four Hong Kong fintech ventures that raised venture capital. Our study contributes to the venture professionalization literature in several ways. We introduce negative intra-TMT dynamics into the literature by identifying stalemates that emerge during the professionalization process and classifying these stalemates as horizontal or vertical. More importantly, we develop a contingency framework that consists of four actions taken by the venture leaders to manage these stalemates. Our framework reveals that effective leaders use private mediation in horizontal stalemates and structural crafting in vertical stalemates, but not vice versa. In contrast, open discussion and decision enforcement, two actions suggested in prior conflict management literature, were found ineffective for all types of stalemates in our data. Beyond venture professionalization, we offer a fresh lens on conflict management as brokering by highlighting the space and hierarchy in the brokering process. We conclude by suggesting boundary conditions for our theoretical framework."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
21 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2267
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15767"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15767"
"slug" => "15767-how-ceos-can-build-a-better-relationship-with-the-board"
"yearMonth" => "2025-05"
"year" => "2025"
"title" => "How CEOs Can Build a Better Relationship with the Board"
"description" => "GARG, S. et BINGHAM , C. (2025). How CEOs Can Build a Better Relationship with the Board. <i>Harvard Business Review</i>."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GARG Sam"
"bid" => "B00809922"
"slug" => "garg-sam"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BINGHAM Christopher"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:2 [
0 => "CEO-board relationship"
1 => "Governance strategy"
]
"updatedAt" => "2025-08-29 13:04:26"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hbr.org/2025/05/how-ceos-can-build-a-better-relationship-with-the-board"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "First-time CEOs often assume that more frequent and transparent communication with their boards guarantees success, but research based on 90 interviews and dozens of board observations shows that it’s not volume but timing and structure—what the authors call “board synchronization”—that determines whether a CEO-board relationship flourishes or falters. By replacing exhaustive one-on-one previews with concise written briefs, sharing the stage in formal meetings to showcase the top team rather than monopolizing the discussion, and personally leading targeted post-meeting debriefs instead of outsourcing follow-ups, CEOs can avoid the misaligned power shifts and boundary confusion that erode trust. When executed in sequence—light previews, inclusive meetings, direct debriefs—this approach transforms a reactive, mistrustful cycle into a positive, virtuous one, giving CEOs the strategic leverage they need to thrive in their critical first three years."
"en" => "First-time CEOs often assume that more frequent and transparent communication with their boards guarantees success, but research based on 90 interviews and dozens of board observations shows that it’s not volume but timing and structure—what the authors call “board synchronization”—that determines whether a CEO-board relationship flourishes or falters. By replacing exhaustive one-on-one previews with concise written briefs, sharing the stage in formal meetings to showcase the top team rather than monopolizing the discussion, and personally leading targeted post-meeting debriefs instead of outsourcing follow-ups, CEOs can avoid the misaligned power shifts and boundary confusion that erode trust. When executed in sequence—light previews, inclusive meetings, direct debriefs—this approach transforms a reactive, mistrustful cycle into a positive, virtuous one, giving CEOs the strategic leverage they need to thrive in their critical first three years."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-12-05T03:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_score": 6.247782
+"_ignored": array:2 [
0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
]
+"parent": null
}
]
"avatar" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00809922.jpg"
"contributionCounts" => 22
"personalLinks" => array:2 [
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]
"docTitle" => "Sam GARG"
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