Année
2023
Auteurs
CONTI Raffaele, ZHANG Huiyan, BRANSTETTER Lee, MAMADEHUSSENE Samir
Abstract
We consider the context of a technology market where participants (in particular, sellers) differ in reputation, and sellers observed participating in the transactions might suffer a reputation loss. Our theoretical model predicts that low-reputation idea sellers, thanks to the improvement in information disclosure, are more likely to be involved in technology transactions; at the same time, high-reputation idea sellers, to protect their reputations, might prefer avoiding any transactions. This shift in seller composition might affect the quantity and quality of collaborations. To test our theory, we assess the effect of the Physician Payment Sunshine Act on physician-firm collaborations. Overall, our findings indicate that while information disclosure might benefit some market participants, it can have unintended negative consequences for others.
ZHANG, H., BRANSTETTER, L., CONTI, R. et MAMADEHUSSENE, S. (2023). Who gains and who loses from more information in technology markets? Evidence from the Sunshine Act. Strategic Management Journal, 44(10), pp. 2377-2412.