Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "2573"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "2573"
    "slug" => "tax-competition-and-information-sharing-in-europe-a-signaling-game"
    "yearMonth" => "2010-02"
    "year" => "2010"
    "title" => "Tax Competition and Information Sharing in Europe: A Signaling Game"
    "description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et WARIN, T. (2010). Tax Competition and Information Sharing in Europe: A Signaling Game. <i>International Journal of Economics and Business Research</i>, 2(1), pp. 76-86."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "FOURÇANS André"
        "bid" => "B00000199"
        "slug" => "fourcans-andre"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "WARIN T."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:3 [
      0 => "Fiscalité"
      1 => "Harmonisation"
      2 => "Théorie des jeux"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:56"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "76-86"
      "volume" => "2"
      "number" => "1"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Une analyse qui s?écarte de l?approche traditionnelle en matière d?harmonisation fiscale. Le modèle de théorie des jeux avec signal montre que cette possibilité de signal peut déboucher sur un système stable et non pas sur « le moins disant fiscal » généralement considéré."
      "en" => "A challenging view to tax harmonisation though a game theoretical model with signalling. Contrary to the traditional view, signalling leads to stability rather than a "race to the bottom"."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T11:21:49.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Tax Competition and Information Sharing in Europe: A Signaling Game"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/fourcans-andre">FOURÇANS André</a>, WARIN T."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">FOURÇANS André, WARIN T.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2010</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Fiscalité</a>, <a href="#">Harmonisation</a>, <a href="#">Théorie des jeux</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Tax Competition and Information Sharing in Europe: A Signaling Game</b><br><span>2010-02 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Tax Competition and Information Sharing in Europe: A Signaling Game</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.953466
  +"parent": null
}