Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8348"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8348"
    "slug" => "profit-sharing-as-tax-saving-and-incentive-device"
    "yearMonth" => "2004-10"
    "year" => "2004"
    "title" => "Profit-sharing as Tax Saving and Incentive Device"
    "description" => "CHAU, M. et CONTENSOU, F. (2004). <i>Profit-sharing as Tax Saving and Incentive Device</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CONTENSOU François"
        "bid" => "B00000121"
        "slug" => "contensou-francois"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "CHAU M."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "La théorie du contrat de travail dans la situation où l'effort de l'employé est inobservable, repose pour l'essentiel sur le modèle "principal-agent". Ce texte propose une analyse des contrats optimaux lorsque l'employeur est soumis à des contraintes institutionnelles en particulier fiscales et étudie l'impact des taux de contribution sociale sur les choix de l'employeur, cet impact ayant un double aspect fiscal et incitatif."
      "en" => "The theory of labor contract with worker's chosen effort level mainly rests upon the principal-agent paradigm. In many labor markets however, the principal is not as free as assumed in the standard theory, but is submitted to some binding institutional constraints. It is requested in particular to post a wage level, i.e. a non random component of compensation to which high rates of social contribution may apply. The proposed model adapts the standard analysis to situations in which tax rules and possibly predetermined profit-sharing patterns interfere with free contracting. It formalizes the two-faced aspect of profit sharing having an impact on the firm's objective through tax saving effect and incentive effect."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-25T00:21:45.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Profit-sharing as Tax Saving and Incentive Device"
    "docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/contensou-francois">CONTENSOU François</a>, CHAU M."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CONTENSOU François, CHAU M.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2004</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Profit-sharing as Tax Saving and Incentive Device</b><br><span>2004-10 | Documents de travail </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Profit-sharing as Tax Saving and Incentive Device</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.953466
  +"parent": null
}