Firms regularly encounter pressure to engage in corrupt practices in their operations around the world. To deter such behavior, some countries adopted international anti-bribery conventions that monitor and penalize actions of home country firms in foreign markets. Focusing on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, we examine how U.S. enforcement actions against multinational firms operating in a given developing country influences how non-targeted (domestic) firms in that country assess their own bribing behavior. We contend non-targeted firms face negative spillover effects. To buffer against potential adverse consequences, they present more socially desirable responses following the enforcement action. We compare non-targeted firms’ assessment of bribe prevalence shortly before versus after a U.S. anti-bribery enforcement action to obtain quasi-random variation in the extent to which non-targeted firms were exposed to the enforcement action. Our analysis of up to 9262 firms across 20 countries indicate non-targeted firms’ responses are shaped by U.S. enforcement actions even when domestic firms are outside the jurisdiction of the regulation.
JANDHYALA, S. et CHENG, S. (2023). Policing the world? Effect of U.S. Anti-Corruption Enforcement Actions on Non-Targeted Firms. Dans: Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings. Academy of Management.