Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6196
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "7466"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "7466"
    "slug" => "the-value-of-lies-in-an-ultimatum-game-with-imperfect-information"
    "yearMonth" => "2012-06"
    "year" => "2012"
    "title" => "The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D., DUBART, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2012). The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information. Dans: 3ème Conférence Annuelle de l'Association Française d'Economie Expérimentale (ASFEE)."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "DUBART Delphine"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => "3ème Conférence Annuelle de l'Association Française d'Economie Expérimentale (ASFEE)"
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
      "en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Nous étudions le problème du mensonge dans un jeu de l'ultimatum, dans lequel les receveurs n'ont qu'une information imparfaite quant à la somme d'argent reçue par les offreurs. Les derniers peuvent envoyer un message invérifiable quant au montant reçu. En moyenne, 88.5 des offreurs vont communiquer un montant inférieur à la somme réelle. Le mensonge est associé systématiquement à une offre réelle plus faible."
      "en" => "Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about the endowment received at the outset of the game. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the rest of them are likely to declare a lower-than-actual endowment to the responders, simply in order to reduce their expected endowment and be able to submit smaller offers. In the second part of the paper, we report on an experiment testing this game. On average, 88.5% of the proposers understate the actual endowment by 19%. Regression analysis shows that a one-dollar gap between the actual and declared amounts prompts proposers to reduce their offer by 19 cents. However, responders appear not to take such claims seriously, and thus the frequency of rejections increases. The consequence is a net welfare loss, that is specific to such a "free-to-lie" environment."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-19T06:22:04.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information"
    "docSurtitle" => "Communications dans une conférence"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D., DUBART Delphine"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D., DUBART Delphine</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2012</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information</b><br><span>2012-06 | Communications dans une conférence </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 7.771229
  +"parent": null
}