Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6196
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8399"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8399"
    "slug" => "socially-efficient-managerial-dishonesty"
    "yearMonth" => "2005-05"
    "year" => "2005"
    "title" => "Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2005). <i>Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Au début des années 2000, l'Administration américaine a renforcé de manière significative les sanctions contre les directeurs de grandes entreprises qui, de manière mal intentionnée, communiquent des fausses informations financières. A partir d'un jeu séquentiel entre gestionnaires et fournisseurs en présence d'information asymétrique, l'article démontre qu'un renforcement de la sanction peut provoquer - dans certains cas - un accroissement de la fréquence de faillites."
      "en" => "As a reaction to the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, the US Administration dramatically tightened sanctions against managers who disclose misleading financial information. This paper argues that such a reform might come with some unpleasant macroeconomic effects. The model is cast as a game between the manager of a publicly listed company and the supplier of an essential input, under asymmetric information about the type of the firm. The analysis focuses on the Hybrid Bayesian Equilibrium where at least some managers choose to communicate a false information about the true type of the firm. We show that by dissuading "virtuous lies", whereby a manager strives to win time for a financially distressed company, a tougher sanction brings about a higher frequency of default."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-19T03:21:55.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty"
    "docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2005</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty</b><br><span>2005-05 | Documents de travail </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.77326
  +"parent": null
}