Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6196
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8358"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8358"
    "slug" => "quality-improvement-and-a-goodwill-accumulation-in-a-dynamic-duopoly"
    "yearMonth" => "2002-10"
    "year" => "2002"
    "title" => "Quality Improvement and a Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly"
    "description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et PASIN, F. (2002). <i>Quality Improvement and a Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
        "bid" => "B00000177"
        "slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "PASIN F."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Dans cet article, les activités d'accumulation du capital publicitaire et de gestion de la qualité de deux firmes en concurrence sont étudiées à partir d'un jeu différentiel. Un modèle de Lanchester est proposé pour représenter la concurrence inter-marques où, pour chaque joueur, le taux d'attraction dépend du niveau de goodwill et le taux d'abandon est fonction du niveau de qualité. Un algorithme numérique permet de déterminer l'équilibre de Nash de chaque compétiteur en termes d'effort publicitaire et d'effort d'amélioration de la qualité à partir de diverses configurations initiales. En outre, une analyse de sensibilité conduit à identifier les facteurs-clé de la performance concurrentielle."
      "en" => "In this paper, goodwill and quality management of two competing firms are analyzed in a differential game framework. A Lanchester model is used to represent market share competition where own attraction rate depends on own goodwill, while own abandon rate depends on own quality. The search for a Nash solution by a numerical algorithm leads to determine for each competitor the optimal advertising and quality improvement efforts under various initial configurations. Moreover, a study of key-factors of performance points out the most appropriate reengineering projects to be implemented by a small inefficient firm in order to better its competitive position."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Management"
      "en" => "Management"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-16T22:21:53.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Quality Improvement and a Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly"
    "docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/el-ouardighi-fouad">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad</a>, PASIN F."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad, PASIN F.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Management</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2002</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Quality Improvement and a Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly</b><br><span>2002-10 | Documents de travail </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Quality Improvement and a Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.967929
  +"parent": null
}