Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6196
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "1989"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "1989"
    "slug" => "macroeconomic-implications-of-voucher-privatization-in-a-model-with-incomplete-information"
    "yearMonth" => "2000-01"
    "year" => "2000"
    "title" => "Macroeconomic Implications of Voucher Privatization in a Model with Incomplete Information"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2000). Macroeconomic Implications of Voucher Privatization in a Model with Incomplete Information. <i>Journal of Economic Policy Reform</i>, pp. 147-164."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:40"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "147-164"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "La privatisation de masse dans les pays de l'Est s'accompagne d'un accroissement de la richesse des agents privés qui devraient augmenter leur consommation. L'article étudie les conséquences macroéconomiques que cet effet de richesse peut engendrer dans une économie caractérisée par un taux de chômage élevé lorsque les priorités de l'Etat ne sont pas bien identifiées. Le modèle est basé sur un jeu à deux périodes entre le gouvernement et les agents privés. Nous mettons en évidence la possibilité d'occurrence d'un équilibre Bayesien mélangeant. Celui-ci s'accompagne d'un coût pour les gouvernements qui souhaitent une privatisation rapide."
      "en" => "Voucher privatization implies a significant wealth transfer from the state to private agents who, in turn, would increase consumption. This paper investigates the consequences of this wealth effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium in an economy with a high unemployment rate.The model builds a two-stage game between the government and private agents. We verify the existence of a pooling bayesian equilibrium in which private agents cannot guess whether a policy of fast privatization will be continued in the future or not. This configuration presents an endogeneous probability of privatization slowdown. As a consequence, the wealth effect is moderated and the genuine fast privatizer government bears an "undue" credibility cost in terms of employment."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-19T15:22:10.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Macroeconomic Implications of Voucher Privatization in a Model with Incomplete Information"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2000</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Macroeconomic Implications of Voucher Privatization in a Model with Incomplete Information</b><br><span>2000-01 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Macroeconomic Implications of Voucher Privatization in a Model with Incomplete Information</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.106091
  +"parent": null
}