Documents de travail
Année
2015
Abstract
This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer
can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder
with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is
effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat” role while the decision is made by the
Proposer himself. In this imperfect information setting, the Proposer can send an unverifiable
message declaring his delegation strategy. The most interesting strategy is “false delegation”, in
which the Proposer makes the decision but claims to have delegated it. In our sample, the recourse
to false delegation is significant, and a significant number of potential Delegates accept serving in
the scapegoat role. However, there are many honest Proposers, and 20% of all Delegates will refuse
to be the accomplices of a dishonest Proposer. Responders tend to more readily accept poor offers
in a setup that permits lying about delegation; the acceptance rate of the poor offer is the highest
when Delegates can refuse the scapegoat role.
SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). Lying about Delegation. ESSEC Business School.