Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6196
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "4618"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "4618"
    "slug" => "fiscal-policies-rules-in-a-monetary-union-incentives-and-moral-hazard"
    "yearMonth" => "2004-01"
    "year" => "2004"
    "title" => "Fiscal Policies Rules in a Monetary Union: Incentives and Moral Hazard"
    "description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et WARIN, T. (2004). Fiscal Policies Rules in a Monetary Union: Incentives and Moral Hazard. Dans: <i>Proceedings of the IT&FA 15th International Conference</i>. Berkeley Electronic Press."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "FOURÇANS André"
        "bid" => "B00000199"
        "slug" => "fourcans-andre"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "WARIN T."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => "Proceedings of the IT&FA 15th International Conference"
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2023-03-03 13:06:39"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => ""
      "volume" => ""
      "number" => ""
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Actes d'une conférence"
      "en" => "Conference Proceedings"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Site internet. Cet article examine l'efficacité de règles fiscales telles que celles du Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance en Europe, et compare les différentes règles possibles. L'analyse précise où et comment les règles fiscales devraient être appliquées. Le modèle démontre que les règles ne sont pas obligatoirement utiles dans la mesure où les gouvernements ajustent leurs politiques en fonction de ces règles. Une règle composite est alors proposée pour satisfaire aux objectifs recherchés."
      "en" => "This paper addresses the question of the efficiency of a fiscal policy rule such as the Stability and Growth Pact of Europe, and compares the latter to alternative rules. The analysis sheds light on where and how fiscal rules should be applied. The model shows that rules may not be useful insofar as governements adjust their behavior to the new rules. A key composite fiscal rule is therefore the effective enforcement of the penalties associated."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-20T11:21:45.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Fiscal Policies Rules in a Monetary Union: Incentives and Moral Hazard"
    "docSurtitle" => "Actes d'une conférence"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/fourcans-andre">FOURÇANS André</a>, WARIN T."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">FOURÇANS André, WARIN T.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2004</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Fiscal Policies Rules in a Monetary Union: Incentives and Moral Hazard</b><br><span>2004-01 | Actes d'une conférence </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Fiscal Policies Rules in a Monetary Union: Incentives and Moral Hazard</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.002414
  +"parent": null
}