Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6196
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8032"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8032"
    "slug" => "excessive-liability-dollarization-in-a-simple-signaling-model"
    "yearMonth" => "2004-02"
    "year" => "2004"
    "title" => "Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2004). <i>Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'article propose une explication à l'accumulation des dettes externes libellées en dollars par les PVD, dans le cadre d'un modèle de signalisation. Par hypothèse, les banques n'ont aucun moyen direct de déterminer la situation financière des firmes. Les firmes solides seraient tentées de s'endetter en dollars moyennant des coûts administratifs élevés uniquement pour signaler leur type. Le succès d'une telle politique dépend du comportement des firmes fragiles : si le coût administratif lié à l'emprunt en dollars est faible, le secteur privé dans son ensemble peut choisir la dollarisation. Dans ce cas, l'effet de signal disparaît, tandis que toutes les firmes subissent des coûts administratifs élevés."
      "en" => "If a dollar denominated external debt comes with so many risks, why do emerging economies allow for such an imbalance to accumulate ? The explanation provided in this paper builds on a simple signaling model. By assumption, lenders have no direct possibility to infer a firm's financial stance. Therefore sound firms might want to borrow dollars and bear a high clearance cost, just in order to signal their type. The success of this policy depends on the behavior of bad firms. When dollar borrowing clearance costs are relatively small with respect to the clearance cost of borrowing in the local currency, the whole private sector would opt for liability dollarization. In this case the signaling effect vanishes, while all firms bear high clearance costs."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-19T18:21:56.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model"
    "docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2004</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model</b><br><span>2004-02 | Documents de travail </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.910406
  +"parent": null
}