Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2205
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "7922"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "7922"
    "slug" => "banks-risk-race-a-signaling-explanation"
    "yearMonth" => "2009-01"
    "year" => "2009"
    "title" => "Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2009). <i>Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:6 [
      0 => "Arbitrage risque"
      1 => "Information imparfaite"
      2 => "rendement"
      3 => "Secteur bancaire"
      4 => "Signalisation"
      5 => "Stratégie de risque"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'article explique l'accumulation excessive de risque par les banques avant la crise de 2007-2009 par un mécanisme de signalisation en information imparfaite."
      "en" => "Many observers argue that the abnormal accumulation of risk by banks has been one of the major causes of the 2007-2009 financial turmoil. But what could have pushed banks to engage in such a risk race? The answer brought by this paper builds on the classical signaling model by Spence. If banks' returns can be observed while risk cannot, less efficient banks can hide their type by taking more risks and paying the same returns as the efficient banks. The latter can signal themselves by taking even higher risks and delivering bigger returns. The game presents several equilibria that are all characterized by excessive risk taking as compared to the perfect information case."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-25T16:21:46.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation"
    "docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2009</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Arbitrage risque</a>, <a href="#">Information imparfaite</a>, <a href="#">rendement</a>, <a href="#">Secteur bancaire</a>, <a href="#">Signalisation</a>, <a href="#">Stratégie de risque</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation</b><br><span>2009-01 | Documents de travail </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.768543
  +"parent": null
}