Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6196
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "1206"
  #_source: array:25 [
    "id" => "1206"
    "slug" => "fear-of-novelty-a-model-of-scientific-discovery-with-strategic-uncertainty"
    "yearMonth" => "2015-01"
    "year" => "2015"
    "title" => "Fear of Novelty: A Model of Scientific Discovery with Strategic Uncertainty"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). Fear of Novelty: A Model of Scientific Discovery with Strategic Uncertainty. <i>Economic Inquiry</i>, 53(2), pp. 1132-1139."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "Economie des sciences"
      1 => "Global games"
      2 => "Jeu de coordinnation"
      3 => "Recherche"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12200"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "1132-1139"
      "volume" => "53"
      "number" => "2"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Une étude sur l'adoption des nouvelles idées scientifiques, qui fait apparaître une logique de conformisme. Le problème est étudié sous la forme d'un « global game »."
      "en" => "This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientific potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholars’ ability to properly assess the scientific value of new ideas."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2023-12-11T12:22:09.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Fear of Novelty: A Model of Scientific Discovery with Strategic Uncertainty"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2015</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Economie des sciences</a>, <a href="#">Global games</a>, <a href="#">Jeu de coordinnation</a>, <a href="#">Recherche</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Fear of Novelty: A Model of Scientific Discovery with Strategic Uncertainty</b><br><span>2015-01 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.459479
  +"parent": null
}