Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8039"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8039"
    "slug" => "experimentation-in-dynamic-rd-competition"
    "yearMonth" => "2019-04"
    "year" => "2019"
    "title" => "Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition"
    "description" => "DOSIS, A. et MUTHOO, A. (2019). <i>Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
        "bid" => "B00536871"
        "slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "MUTHOO A."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "We study a two-stage, winner-takes-all, R&D race, in which, at the outset, firms are uncertain regarding the viability of the project. Learning through experimentation introduces a bilateral (dynamic) feedback mechanism. For relatively low-value products, the equilibrium stopping time coincides with the socially efficient stopping time although firms might experiment excessively in equilibrium; for relatively high-value products, firms might reduce experimentation and stop rather prematurely due to the fundamental free-riding effect. Perhaps surprisingly, a decrease in the value of the product can spur experimentation."
      "en" => "We study a two-stage, winner-takes-all, R&D race, in which, at the outset, firms are uncertain regarding the viability of the project. Learning through experimentation introduces a bilateral (dynamic) feedback mechanism. For relatively low-value products, the equilibrium stopping time coincides with the socially efficient stopping time although firms might experiment excessively in equilibrium; for relatively high-value products, firms might reduce experimentation and stop rather prematurely due to the fundamental free-riding effect. Perhaps surprisingly, a decrease in the value of the product can spur experimentation."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-20T00:21:42.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition"
    "docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/dosis-anastasios">DOSIS Anastasios</a>, MUTHOO A."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">DOSIS Anastasios, MUTHOO A.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2019</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition</b><br><span>2019-04 | Documents de travail </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.53007
  +"parent": null
}