Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "3495"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "3495"
    "slug" => "constituency-directors-and-corporate-fiduciary-duties"
    "yearMonth" => "2014-07"
    "year" => "2014"
    "title" => "Constituency Directors and Corporate Fiduciary Duties"
    "description" => "GELTER, M. et HELLERINGER, G. (2014). Constituency Directors and Corporate Fiduciary Duties. Dans: <i>Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law</i>. 1st ed. Oxford University Press, pp. 302-320."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "HELLERINGER Geneviève"
        "bid" => "B00014202"
        "slug" => "helleringer-genevieve"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "GELTER M."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => "Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law"
    "keywords" => array:3 [
      0 => "Administrateur"
      1 => "Conflits d'intérêts"
      2 => "Gouvernement d'entreprise"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-09-06 14:06:32"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "302-320"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Chapitres"
      "en" => "Book chapters"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Le droit des sociétés américain, anglais, allemand et français impose en théorie des devoirs uniformes à l'ensemble des membres du conseil d'administration. La pratique apparaît plus contrastée en dépit de cette règle qui est appliquée de manière plus ou moins stricte, d'autant que l'intérêt social est aussi le fruit d'une délibération prenant place au sein du conseil."
      "en" => "From a theoretical standpoint, prevailing corporate law seems to be in conflict with possibly desirable constituency interest representation on the board. However imposed uniform duty strategy may not matter all that much. In practice, corporate actors select rules that they enforce more diligently than others, e.g., duty of confidentiality is strict in the book but can be seen as en entry point for turning the currently mandatory directors' duties into default law. In addition, there is little enforcement of the corporate purpose directors are expected to pursue. Finally, and importantly, the interest of the corporate  is determined primarily by board deliberation and permitting a specific type of director, along with specific interests, is pat of the corporate policy"
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Droit "
      "en" => "Business Law"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-03T17:21:44.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Constituency Directors and Corporate Fiduciary Duties"
    "docSurtitle" => "Chapitres"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/helleringer-genevieve">HELLERINGER Geneviève</a>, GELTER M."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">HELLERINGER Geneviève, GELTER M.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Droit </span> | <span class="document-property-year">2014</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Administrateur</a>, <a href="#">Conflits d'intérêts</a>, <a href="#">Gouvernement d'entreprise</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Constituency Directors and Corporate Fiduciary Duties</b><br><span>2014-07 | Chapitres </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Constituency Directors and Corporate Fiduciary Duties</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.208137
  +"parent": null
}