Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "10579"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "10579"
    "slug" => "ceo-identity-and-labor-contracts-evidence-from-ceo-transitions"
    "yearMonth" => "2015-08"
    "year" => "2015"
    "title" => "CEO Identity and Labor Contracts: Evidence from CEO Transitions"
    "description" => "BACH, L. et SERRANO-VELARDE, N. (2015). CEO Identity and Labor Contracts: Evidence from CEO Transitions. <i>Journal of Corporate Finance</i>, 33(1), pp. 227-242."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "BACH Laurent"
        "bid" => "B00007940"
        "slug" => "bach-laurent"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SERRANO-VELARDE Nicolas"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:3 [
      0 => "CEO choice"
      1 => "Dynastic management"
      2 => "Labor contracts"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:38"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119915000103"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "227-242"
      "volume" => "33"
      "number" => "1"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "This paper assesses how CEO transitions shape labor contracts within firms. We argue that family links between a new CEO and his predecessor act as a commitment device for upholding implicit contracts with the workforce. Consistent with this view, we find evidence of a wage insurance mechanism during a CEO transition. Dynastically-promoted CEOs relative to external CEOs are associated with up to 25% less job separations and 20% lower wage growth. Crucially, we show that differences, in terms of job separations, between dynastic and non-dynastic CEO successions are significantly greater when labor markets are more frictional."
      "en" => "This paper assesses how CEO transitions shape labor contracts within firms. We argue that family links between a new CEO and his predecessor act as a commitment device for upholding implicit contracts with the workforce. Consistent with this view, we find evidence of a wage insurance mechanism during a CEO transition. Dynastically-promoted CEOs relative to external CEOs are associated with up to 25% less job separations and 20% lower wage growth. Crucially, we show that differences, in terms of job separations, between dynastic and non-dynastic CEO successions are significantly greater when labor markets are more frictional."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Finance"
      "en" => "Finance"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T14:21:48.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "CEO Identity and Labor Contracts: Evidence from CEO Transitions"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/bach-laurent">BACH Laurent</a>, SERRANO-VELARDE Nicolas"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">BACH Laurent, SERRANO-VELARDE Nicolas</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Finance</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2015</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">CEO choice</a>, <a href="#">Dynastic management</a>, <a href="#">Labor contracts</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>CEO Identity and Labor Contracts: Evidence from CEO Transitions</b><br><span>2015-08 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119915000103" target="_blank">CEO Identity and Labor Contracts: Evidence from CEO Transitions</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.990524
  +"parent": null
}