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Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233 ▼
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "7003"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "7003"
    "slug" => "7003-quorum-rules-and-shareholder-voting"
    "yearMonth" => "2012-07"
    "year" => "2012"
    "title" => "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting"
    "description" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS, P., FAGART, M.C. et SOUAM, S. (2012). Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting. Dans: 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Games 2012). CHARLETY-LEPERS, P., FAGART, M.C. et SOUAM, S. (2012). Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting. Dans: 4t "
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia"
        "bid" => "B00000096"
        "slug" => "charlety-lepers-patricia"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "FAGART M.-C."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SOUAM S."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => "4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Games 2012)"
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
      "en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Dans cet article nous caractérisons complètement les équilibres d'un jeu dans lequel les actionnaires d'une entreprise votent pour ou contre une résolution, le vote étant coûteux. Nous prenons en considération deux types d'actionnaires : les inconditionnels qui votent systématiquement pour ou contre, et les partisans qui votent de manière stratégique. Nous montrons que l'existence et la nature des équilibres dépend crucialement de la règle de quorum et de la structure de l'actionnariat. Dans cet article nous caractérisons complètement les équilibres d'un jeu dans lequel les actionnaire "
      "en" => "In this paper, we completely characterize the equilibria of a costly voting game where shareholders of a firm vote for or against a proposed resolution. We do consider two types of shareholders: unconditional who always vote for or against the resolution and partisans who vote strategically. We show that the existence and nature of the equilibria crucially depends on the quorum rule and on the shareholding structure. In this paper, we completely characterize the equilibria of a costly voting game where shareholders  "
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2025-04-05T23:21:40.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting"
    "docSurtitle" => "Communications dans une conférence"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/charlety-lepers-patricia">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia</a>, FAGART M.-C., SOUAM S."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia, FAGART M.-C., SOUAM S.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2012</span> <span class="document-property-authors">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia, FAGART M.-C., SOUAM S.</span><br>< "
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting</b><br><span>2012-07 | Communications dans une conférence </span> <b>Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting</b><br><span>2012-07 | Communications dans une conférence </s "
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.247957
  +"parent": null
}