Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233 ▼
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "676"
#_source: array:26 [
"id" => "676"
"slug" => "676-assessing-frances-joint-audit-requirement-are-two-heads-better-than-one"
"yearMonth" => "2009-11"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Assessing France's Joint Audit Requirement: Are Two Heads Better than One?"
"description" => "FRANCIS, J.R., RICHARD, C. et VANSTRAELEN, A. (2009). Assessing France's Joint Audit Requirement: Are Two Heads Better than One? <i>Auditing, A Journal of Practice and Theory</i>, 198(8-9), pp. 35-63. 
FRANCIS, J.R., RICHARD, C. et VANSTRAELEN, A. (2009). Assessing France's Joint Audit Requirement: Ar "
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "RICHARD Chrystelle"
"bid" => "B00183501"
"slug" => "richard-chrystelle"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "FRANCIS J.R."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "VANSTRAELEN A."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Co-commissariat"
1 => "Gestion du résultat"
2 => "Structure actionnariale"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "35-63"
"volume" => "198"
"number" => "8-9"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous avons étudié la question du choix de l'auditeur par une entreprise au regard du co-commissariat aux comptes français. Ce contexte particulier engendre un choix plus complexe que celui d'une simple dichotomie Big 4/Non Big 4. Nous avons cherché à savoir si la structure actionnariale d'une entreprise affecte le choix des co-commissaires et si cela a une conséquence en termes de gestion du résultat. Les résultats sont cohérents avec la théorie de l'agence et indiquent que plus l'asymétrie d'information est importante (contrôle familial moindre et structure actionnariale diversifiée), plus il est probable qu'un Big 4 (associé à un non Big 4) soit choisi, cette relation étant encore plus fortement prouvée lorsque deux Big 4 mènent l'audit légal. Nous avons également testé l'impact de ce co-commissariat sur la gestion du résultat et avons trouvé que les entreprises qui ont engagé un Big 4 (associé à un non Big 4) présente un lissage moindre que les entreprises qui n'emploient pas de Big 4, cet impact étant à nouveau plus fortement accentué si les entreprises embauchent deux Big 4. Nous avons étudié la question du choix de l'auditeur par une entreprise au regard du co-commissariat "
"en" => "We examine auditor choice for listed companies in France where two (joint) auditors are required by law. This unique setting creates more complex auditor choice than the typical Big 4/non-Big 4 dichotomy in other countries, and we study if a firm¿s ownership structure affects its auditor-pair choice as well the consequences on earning quality. The findings are consistent with agency theory and indicate that a Big 4 auditor (paired with a non-Big 4 auditor) is more likely to be used when there is greater information asymmetry (less family control and more diversified ownership structures), and these associations are even stronger for firms with two Big 4 auditors conducting the joint audit. We also test if a firm's auditor-pair choice affects earnings quality and find that firms using one Big 4 auditor (paired with a non-Big 4 auditor) have smaller income-increasing abnormal accruals compared to firms that use no Big 4 auditors, and once again this effect is even stronger for firms that use two Big 4 auditors. We examine auditor choice for listed companies in France where two (joint) auditors are required by "
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion"
"en" => "Accounting and Management Control "
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-04-15T09:21:42.000Z"
"docTitle" => "Assessing France's Joint Audit Requirement: Are Two Heads Better than One?"
"docSurtitle" => "Articles"
"authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/richard-chrystelle">RICHARD Chrystelle</a>, FRANCIS J.R., VANSTRAELEN A."
"docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">RICHARD Chrystelle, FRANCIS J.R., VANSTRAELEN A.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2009</span> <span class="document-property-authors">RICHARD Chrystelle, FRANCIS J.R., VANSTRAELEN A.</span><br>< "
"keywordList" => "<a href="#">Co-commissariat</a>, <a href="#">Gestion du résultat</a>, <a href="#">Structure actionnariale</a> <a href="#">Co-commissariat</a>, <a href="#">Gestion du résultat</a>, <a href="#">Structure actionna "
"docPreview" => "<b>Assessing France's Joint Audit Requirement: Are Two Heads Better than One?</b><br><span>2009-11 | Articles </span> <b>Assessing France's Joint Audit Requirement: Are Two Heads Better than One?</b><br><span>2009-11 | "
"docType" => "research"
"publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Assessing France's Joint Audit Requirement: Are Two Heads Better than One?</a> <a href="#" target="_blank">Assessing France's Joint Audit Requirement: Are Two Heads Better than On "
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 8.991936
+"parent": null
}
