Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233 ▼
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2557"
#_source: array:26 [
"id" => "2557"
"slug" => "2557-supply-quality-management-with-optimal-wholesale-price-and-revenue-sharing-contracts-a-two-stage-game-approach 
2557-supply-quality-management-with-optimal-wholesale-price-and-revenue-sharing-contracts-a-two-stag "
"yearMonth" => "2014-07"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts: A Two Stage Game Approach Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts: A Two Stage Ga "
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2014). Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts: A Two Stage Game Approach. <i>International Journal of Production Economics</i>, 156(1), pp. 260-268. EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2014). Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing "
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Supply chain management"
1 => "Design quality"
2 => "Wholesale price contract"
3 => "Revenue sharing contract"
4 => "Dynamic games"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.06.006"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "260-268"
"volume" => "156"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "One of the main priorities of companies involved in supply chains is improving the quality of their products. However, as in other parts of supply chain management, decentralized decision-making in supply quality management is prevalent, which causes inefficiencies such as the well-known double marginalization phenomenon. Coordinating schemes, such as the revenue sharing contract, can contribute to mitigating this phenomenon. In this paper, we investigate the potential coordinating power of the revenue sharing contract in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one supplier that collaborate to improve the design quality of a particular finished product. We set the cooperative outcome as a benchmark and compare the efficiency of an optimal revenue sharing contract with an optimal wholesale price contract in improving design quality in the setup of a non-cooperative two-stage game. One of the main priorities of companies involved in supply chains is improving the quality of their "
"en" => "One of the main priorities of companies involved in supply chains is improving the quality of their products. However, as in other parts of supply chain management, decentralized decision-making in supply quality management is prevalent, which causes inefficiencies such as the well-known double marginalization phenomenon. Coordinating schemes, such as the revenue sharing contract, can contribute to mitigating this phenomenon. In this paper, we investigate the potential coordinating power of the revenue sharing contract in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one supplier that collaborate to improve the design quality of a particular finished product. We set the cooperative outcome as a benchmark and compare the efficiency of an optimal revenue sharing contract with an optimal wholesale price contract in improving design quality in the setup of a non-cooperative two-stage game. One of the main priorities of companies involved in supply chains is improving the quality of their "
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Systèmes d'Information, Data Analytics et Opérations"
"en" => "Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-04-06T13:21:40.000Z"
"docTitle" => "Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts: A Two Stage Game Approach Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts: A Two Stage Ga "
"docSurtitle" => "Articles"
"authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/el-ouardighi-fouad">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad</a>"
"docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Systèmes d'Information, Data Analytics et Opérations</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2014</span> <span class="document-property-authors">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad</span><br><span class="document-property- "
"keywordList" => "<a href="#">Supply chain management</a>, <a href="#">Design quality</a>, <a href="#">Wholesale price contract</a>, <a href="#">Revenue sharing contract</a>, <a href="#">Dynamic games</a> <a href="#">Supply chain management</a>, <a href="#">Design quality</a>, <a href="#">Wholesale price "
"docPreview" => "<b>Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts: A Two Stage Game Approach</b><br><span>2014-07 | Articles </span> <b>Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts: A Two Stage "
"docType" => "research"
"publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.06.006" target="_blank">Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts: A Two Stage Game Approach</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.06.006" target="_blank">Supply Quality Management with "
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 9.321822
+"parent": null
}
