Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233 ▼
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "13971"
#_source: array:26 [
"id" => "13971"
"slug" => "13971-who-gains-and-who-loses-from-more-information-in-technology-markets-evidence-from-the-sunshine-act 
13971-who-gains-and-who-loses-from-more-information-in-technology-markets-evidence-from-the-sunshine "
"yearMonth" => "2023-10"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Who gains and who loses from more information in technology markets? Evidence from the Sunshine Act"
"description" => "ZHANG, H., BRANSTETTER, L., CONTI, R. et MAMADEHUSSENE, S. (2023). Who gains and who loses from more information in technology markets? Evidence from the Sunshine Act. <i>Strategic Management Journal</i>, 44(10), pp. 2377-2412. ZHANG, H., BRANSTETTER, L., CONTI, R. et MAMADEHUSSENE, S. (2023). Who gains and who loses from more "
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTI Raffaele"
"bid" => "B00791032"
"slug" => "conti-raffaele"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ZHANG Huiyan"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "BRANSTETTER Lee"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "MAMADEHUSSENE Samir"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "information environment"
1 => "innovation rate"
2 => "markets for technology"
3 => "medical device industry"
4 => "Sunshine Act"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-31 13:51:19"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3511"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "2377-2412"
"volume" => "44"
"number" => "10"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We consider the context of a technology market where participants (in particular, sellers) differ in reputation, and sellers observed participating in the transactions might suffer a reputation loss. Our theoretical model predicts that low-reputation idea sellers, thanks to the improvement in information disclosure, are more likely to be involved in technology transactions; at the same time, high-reputation idea sellers, to protect their reputations, might prefer avoiding any transactions. This shift in seller composition might affect the quantity and quality of collaborations. To test our theory, we assess the effect of the Physician Payment Sunshine Act on physician-firm collaborations. Overall, our findings indicate that while information disclosure might benefit some market participants, it can have unintended negative consequences for others. We consider the context of a technology market where participants (in particular, sellers) differ in "
"en" => "We consider the context of a technology market where participants (in particular, sellers) differ in reputation, and sellers observed participating in the transactions might suffer a reputation loss. Our theoretical model predicts that low-reputation idea sellers, thanks to the improvement in information disclosure, are more likely to be involved in technology transactions; at the same time, high-reputation idea sellers, to protect their reputations, might prefer avoiding any transactions. This shift in seller composition might affect the quantity and quality of collaborations. To test our theory, we assess the effect of the Physician Payment Sunshine Act on physician-firm collaborations. Overall, our findings indicate that while information disclosure might benefit some market participants, it can have unintended negative consequences for others. We consider the context of a technology market where participants (in particular, sellers) differ in "
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-04-07T10:21:42.000Z"
"docTitle" => "Who gains and who loses from more information in technology markets? Evidence from the Sunshine Act"
"docSurtitle" => "Articles"
"authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/conti-raffaele">CONTI Raffaele</a>, ZHANG Huiyan, BRANSTETTER Lee, MAMADEHUSSENE Samir"
"docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CONTI Raffaele, ZHANG Huiyan, BRANSTETTER Lee, MAMADEHUSSENE Samir</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Management</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2023</span> <span class="document-property-authors">CONTI Raffaele, ZHANG Huiyan, BRANSTETTER Lee, MAMADEHUSSENE "
"keywordList" => "<a href="#">information environment</a>, <a href="#">innovation rate</a>, <a href="#">markets for technology</a>, <a href="#">medical device industry</a>, <a href="#">Sunshine Act</a> <a href="#">information environment</a>, <a href="#">innovation rate</a>, <a href="#">markets for te "
"docPreview" => "<b>Who gains and who loses from more information in technology markets? Evidence from the Sunshine Act</b><br><span>2023-10 | Articles </span> <b>Who gains and who loses from more information in technology markets? Evidence from the Sunshine A "
"docType" => "research"
"publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3511" target="_blank">Who gains and who loses from more information in technology markets? Evidence from the Sunshine Act</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3511" target="_blank">Who gains and who loses from more informa "
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 8.776105
+"parent": null
}
