Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "12776"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "12776"
    "slug" => "12776-balance-billing-as-an-adherence-to-treatment-signalling-device"
    "yearMonth" => "2021-06"
    "year" => "2021"
    "title" => "Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D., LAMIRAUD, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2021). <i>Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device</i>. 2103, ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "LAMIRAUD Karine"
        "bid" => "B00278040"
        "slug" => "lamiraud-karine"
      ]
      1 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "Balance billing"
      1 => "Treatment adherence"
      2 => "Signalling game"
      3 => "Health care systems"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2023-01-27 01:00:41"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => ""
      "volume" => ""
      "number" => ""
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Cahier de Recherche"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in the regulated sector where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance (whether public, private or mixed), or a physician working in the unregulated sector, where a balance billing scheme operates. In the latter, fees might not be fully covered by health insurance, and patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyses the signalling properties of this mechanism in a context where patients are heterogenous with respect to their propensity to adhere to the prescribed treatment. The model - reveals that a small extra fee allows to obtain a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and benefit of a higher care effort on behalf of their physician. We also analyse the other equilibria of the game and comment on their welfare properties."
      "en" => "In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in the regulated sector where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance (whether public, private or mixed), or a physician working in the unregulated sector, where a balance billing scheme operates. In the latter, fees might not be fully covered by health insurance, and patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyses the signalling properties of this mechanism in a context where patients are heterogenous with respect to their propensity to adhere to the prescribed treatment. The model - reveals that a small extra fee allows to obtain a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and benefit of a higher care effort on behalf of their physician. We also analyse the other equilibria of the game and comment on their welfare properties."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2025-12-13T05:21:44.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device"
    "docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/lamiraud-karine">LAMIRAUD Karine</a>, <a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT Damien"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">LAMIRAUD Karine, VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT Damien</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2021</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Balance billing</a>, <a href="#">Treatment adherence</a>, <a href="#">Signalling game</a>, <a href="#">Health care systems</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device</b><br><span>2021-06 | Documents de travail </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_score": 8.774437
  +"_ignored": array:2 [
    0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
    1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
  ]
  +"parent": null
}