Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233 ▼
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10734"
#_source: array:26 [
"id" => "10734"
"slug" => "10734-pledges-as-a-social-influence-device-experimental-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). <i>Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence</i>. WP1908, ESSEC Business School. 
BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). <i>Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Eviden "
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Charity giving"
1 => "conformity -strategic pledges"
2 => "social influence"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02176269"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper reports the results from a two-person "pledge and give" experiment. Each persons endowment is private information available only to him. In the first stage, each agent informs the other about the amount he intends to give, or makes a pledge. In the second stage, each agent makes a contribution to the joint donation. A simple theoretical model shows that in this game the equilibrium pledge function is linear in the endowment of each agent. Furthermore, if agents have a strong taste for conformity, the optimal gift is positively related to one’s own endowment and to the pledge of his partner. Data from the lab experiment show that, indeed, subjects pledge approximately 60% of their endowment. Also, pledges have an important social influence role: an agent will increase his donation by 20 cents on average if his partner pledges one more euro. This paper reports the results from a two-person "pledge and give" experiment. Each persons endowmen "
"en" => "This paper reports the results from a two-person "pledge and give" experiment. Each persons endowment is private information available only to him. In the first stage, each agent informs the other about the amount he intends to give, or makes a pledge. In the second stage, each agent makes a contribution to the joint donation. A simple theoretical model shows that in this game the equilibrium pledge function is linear in the endowment of each agent. Furthermore, if agents have a strong taste for conformity, the optimal gift is positively related to one’s own endowment and to the pledge of his partner. Data from the lab experiment show that, indeed, subjects pledge approximately 60% of their endowment. Also, pledges have an important social influence role: an agent will increase his donation by 20 cents on average if his partner pledges one more euro. This paper reports the results from a two-person "pledge and give" experiment. Each persons endowmen "
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2025-03-31T02:21:47.000Z"
"docTitle" => "Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence"
"docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
"authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
"docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2019</span> <span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="documen "
"keywordList" => "<a href="#">Charity giving</a>, <a href="#">conformity -strategic pledges</a>, <a href="#">social influence</a> <a href="#">Charity giving</a>, <a href="#">conformity -strategic pledges</a>, <a href="#">social in "
"docPreview" => "<b>Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence</b><br><span>2019-06 | Documents de travail </span> <b>Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence</b><br><span>2019-06 | Documents de t "
"docType" => "research"
"publicationLink" => "<a href="https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02176269" target="_blank">Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence</a> <a href="https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02176269" target="_blank">Pledges as a Social Influenc "
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 8.751536
+"parent": null
}
