Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2190
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "2485"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "2485"
    "slug" => "shareholder-investment-horizons-and-the-market-for-corporate-control"
    "yearMonth" => "2005-03"
    "year" => "2005"
    "title" => "Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control"
    "description" => "GASPAR, J.M., MASSA, M. et MATOS, P. (2005). Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control. <i>Journal of Financial Economics</i>, 76(1), pp. 135-165."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "GASPAR José-Miguel"
        "bid" => "B00015852"
        "slug" => "gaspar-jose-miguel"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "MASSA M."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "MATOS P."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "135-165"
      "volume" => "76"
      "number" => "1"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Cet article étudie comment l'horizon d'investissement des actionnaires institutionnels impacte le marché de contrôle de l'entreprise. Nous constatons que les sociétés-cibles, avec des actionnaires à court terme, reçoivent des offres d'achat plus fréquents mais obtiennent des primes inférieures. En outre, nous constatons que les acheteurs avec des actionnaires à court terme souffrent des retours anormaux négatifs autour de l'annonce de fusion, aussi bien qu'une performance négative dans le long terme. Ces résultats suggèrent que les sociétés tenues par les investisseurs à court terme aient une position de négociation plus faible dans les acquisitions. La surveillance plus faible des actionnaires à court terme permet aux directeurs de faire des mauvaises acquisitions au détriment de la rentabilité des actions."
      "en" => "This paper investigates how the investment horizon of a firm's institutional shareholders impacts the market for corporate control. We find that target firms with short-term shareholders are more likely to receive an acquisition bid but get lower premiums. In addition, we find that bidder firms with short-term shareholders experience significantly worse abnormal returns around the merger announcement, as well as higher long-run underperformance. These findings suggest that firms held by short-term investors have a weaker bargaining position in acquisitions. Weaker monitoring from short-term shareholders could allow managers to proceed with value-reducing acquisitions at the expense of shareholder returns."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Finance"
      "en" => "Finance"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-19T02:21:58.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/gaspar-jose-miguel">GASPAR José-Miguel</a>, MASSA M., MATOS P."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">GASPAR José-Miguel, MASSA M., MATOS P.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Finance</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2005</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control</b><br><span>2005-03 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.009203
  +"parent": null
}