Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2190
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "5019"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "5019"
    "slug" => "real-market-concentration-through-partcal-acquisitions"
    "yearMonth" => "2004-09"
    "year" => "2004"
    "title" => "Real Market Concentration through Partcal Acquisitions"
    "description" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS, P., SAGART, M.C. et SOUAM, S. (2004). Real Market Concentration through Partcal Acquisitions. Dans: <i>EARIE'04 Proceedings</i>. Europen Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE)."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia"
        "bid" => "B00000096"
        "slug" => "charlety-lepers-patricia"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SAGART M.C."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SOUAM S."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => "EARIE'04 Proceedings"
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Actes d'une conférence"
      "en" => "Conference Proceedings"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Site Internet. Nous analysons les prises de participations dans une industrie oligopolistique en l'absence de synergies. Contrairement aux résultats existants, nous montrons qu'un actionnaire dominant peut avoir intérêt à prendre des participations (passives ou contrôlantes) chez ses concurrents au détriment d'actionnaires minoritaires et que celles-ci conduisent à une diminution de bien-être. De plus, des intérêts initiaux chez les concurrents favorisent ces prises de participations."
      "en" => "We study horizontal partial acquisitions in an oligopolistic industry in the absence of synergies. Contrary to existing results, we show that a dominant shareholder may choose to acquire toeholds in rivals, silent or controlling, which harm other shareholders and decrease welfare. Moreover, the existence of initial toeholds in rivals generally entrance the incentive to acquire."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-18T09:22:01.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Real Market Concentration through Partcal Acquisitions"
    "docSurtitle" => "Conference Proceedings"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/charlety-lepers-patricia">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia</a>, SAGART M.C., SOUAM S."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia, SAGART M.C., SOUAM S.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2004</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Real Market Concentration through Partcal Acquisitions</b><br><span>2004-09 | Conference Proceedings </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Real Market Concentration through Partcal Acquisitions</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.16045
  +"parent": null
}