Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2188
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "5018"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "5018"
    "slug" => "quorum-rules-and-shareholder-voting"
    "yearMonth" => "2010-09"
    "year" => "2010"
    "title" => "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting"
    "description" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS, P., FAGART, M.C. et SOUAM, S. (2010). Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting. Dans: <i>Proceedings of the 59th Annual AFSE Conference</i>. Association Française de Science Economique (AFSE)."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia"
        "bid" => "B00000096"
        "slug" => "charlety-lepers-patricia"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "FAGART M.-C."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SOUAM S."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => "Proceedings of the 59th Annual AFSE Conference"
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "Assemblée générale"
      1 => "Règle de quorum"
      2 => "Structure actionnariale"
      3 => "Vote stratégique"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Actes d'une conférence"
      "en" => "Conference Proceedings"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Dans cet article nous caractérisons complètement les équilibres d'un jeu dans lequel les actionnaires d'une entreprise votent pour ou contre une résolution, le vote étant coûteux. Nous prenons en considération deux types d'actionnaires : les inconditionnels qui votent systématiquement pour ou contre, et les partisans qui votent de manière stratégique. Nous montrons que l'existence et la nature des équilibres dépend crucialement de la règle de quorum et de la structure de l'actionnariat."
      "en" => "In this paper, we completely characterize the equilibria of a costly voting game where shareholders of a firm vote for or against a proposed resolution. We do consider two types of shareholders: unconditional who always vote for or against the resolution and partisans who vote strategically. We show that the existence and nature of the equilibria crucially depends on the quorum rule and on the shareholding structure."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-23T21:21:56.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting"
    "docSurtitle" => "Conference Proceedings"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/charlety-lepers-patricia">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia</a>, FAGART M.-C., SOUAM S."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia, FAGART M.-C., SOUAM S.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2010</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Assemblée générale</a>, <a href="#">Règle de quorum</a>, <a href="#">Structure actionnariale</a>, <a href="#">Vote stratégique</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting</b><br><span>2010-09 | Conference Proceedings </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 7.7848244
  +"parent": null
}