Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2190
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8312"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8312"
    "slug" => "optimal-redistributive-taxation-in-credit-markets-with-adverse-selection"
    "yearMonth" => "2019-04"
    "year" => "2019"
    "title" => "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection"
    "description" => "DOSIS, A. (2019). <i>Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:1 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
        "bid" => "B00536871"
        "slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "I study optimal redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection. Under symmetric information, the tax system is non-distortionary and unambiguously benefits high-risk types at the expense of low-risk types. Under asymmetric information, a range of taxes exists that creates Pareto improvements relative to the (zero-tax) market allocation by increasing aggregate investment. For sufficiently high taxes, an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment."
      "en" => "I study optimal redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection. Under symmetric information, the tax system is non-distortionary and unambiguously benefits high-risk types at the expense of low-risk types. Under asymmetric information, a range of taxes exists that creates Pareto improvements relative to the (zero-tax) market allocation by increasing aggregate investment. For sufficiently high taxes, an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-16T23:21:46.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/dosis-anastasios">DOSIS Anastasios</a>"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">DOSIS Anastasios</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2019</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection</b><br><span>2019-04 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.7911215
  +"parent": null
}