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Working Papers (2008), ESSEC Business School

Migratory Policy in Developing Countries: How to Bring Best People Back?

BESANCENOT D., VRANCEANU Radu

This paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model with exogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and good workers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers. Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to the perfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher the incentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow.

BESANCENOT, D. and VRANCEANU, R. (2008). Migratory Policy in Developing Countries: How to Bring Best People Back? ESSEC Business School.

Keywords : #Migration-temporaire, #Retour-des-migrants, #Signalisation