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Journal articles (2009), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 165 (3), pp. 508-534

Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration

CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia , FAGART M.-C., SOUAM S.

We analyze the incentives for a controlling shareholder to acquire silent or controlling shares in a competitor. When it occurs, the acquisition is detrimental to minority shareholders of his firm, or to the target, or even to both. The ownership structure of firms turns out to be a key variable. The possession of initial silent toeholds in rivals unambiguously encourages further partial acquisitions, both controlling and silent. However, a higher initial controlling share generally stimulates controlling acquisitions, but always discourages silent ones.

CHARLETY-LEPERS, P., FAGART, M.C. and SOUAM, S. (2009). Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 165(3), pp. 508-534.

Keywords : #Actionnaires-minoritaires, #Gouvernance-d'entreprise, #Pouvoir-de-marché, #Prises-de-participation