Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2190
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "1218"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "1218"
    "slug" => "financial-distress-and-bank-communication-policy-in-crisis-times"
    "yearMonth" => "2010-04"
    "year" => "2010"
    "title" => "Financial Distress and Bank Communication Policy in Crisis Times"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2010). Financial Distress and Bank Communication Policy in Crisis Times. <i>Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting</i>, (1), pp. 5-20."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:5 [
      0 => "Financial distress"
      1 => "Financial crisis"
      2 => "Banks"
      3 => "Disclosure"
      4 => "Transparency"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2023-01-28 01:00:14"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227489745_Financial_Distress_And_Banks'communication_Policy_In_Crisis_Times"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "5-20"
      "volume" => ""
      "number" => "1"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'article étudie la communication bancaire en temps de crise sous la forme d'un jeu à information imparfaite. Nous montrons qu'une transparence excessive en temps de crise peut augmenter le risque de defaillance des banques."
      "en" => "This paper analyzes banks communication policies in crisis times and the role of imperfect information in enhancing banks' financial distress. If banks differ in their exposure to dubious assets, fragile banks may claim to be sound only in order to manipulate investors' expectations. Then sound banks must pay a larger interest rate than in a perfect information set-up. A stronger sanction for false information would improve the situation of the low-risk banks but would deteriorate the situation of the high-risk banks. The total effect on the economy-wide frequency of default of credit institutions is ambiguous. It can be shown that, in some cases, the optimal sanction is lower than the sanction that rules out any manipulatory behavior."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-16T06:22:03.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Financial Distress and Bank Communication Policy in Crisis Times"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2010</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Financial distress</a>, <a href="#">Financial crisis</a>, <a href="#">Banks</a>, <a href="#">Disclosure</a>, <a href="#">Transparency</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Financial Distress and Bank Communication Policy in Crisis Times</b><br><span>2010-04 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227489745_Financial_Distress_And_Banks'communication_Policy_In_Crisis_Times" target="_blank">Financial Distress and Bank Communication Policy in Crisis Times</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.244484
  +"parent": null
}