Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2190
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "1173"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "1173"
    "slug" => "experimental-evidence-on-the-insidious-illiquidity-risk"
    "yearMonth" => "2014-12"
    "year" => "2014"
    "title" => "Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2014). Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk. <i>Research in Economics</i>, 68(4), pp. 315-323."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "Coordination game"
      1 => "Illiquidity risk"
      2 => "Threshold strategy"
      3 => "Overconfidence"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1090944313000525"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "315-323"
      "volume" => "68"
      "number" => "4"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'article propose une expérience dans laquelle un groupe d'investisseurs doivent se coordonner pour participer à un projet risqué. Au risque intrinsèque du projet s'ajoute donc le risque stratégique. Nous montrons que dans un premier temps les investisseurs ont tendance à sous-évaluer le risque stratégique."
      "en" => "This paper introduces an experiment aiming to investigate the contribution of illiquidity risk to the total risk of a collective investment project. If implemented, the project succeeds with a known probability. Yet the project fails if the quota of investors is not reached in the first place. Hence strategic uncertainty compounds its effect with the "intrinsic risk" of the project. Results confirm the insidious nature of illiquidity: as long as a first collective default does not occur, investors accept high intrinsic risk projects. After a first default, they become extremely prudent and come back to market only gradually. After several defaults, private agents manage to coordinate on a relatively low intrinsic risk above which they refuse to participate in the project. Macroeconomic policy implications follow."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-19T08:22:02.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2014</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Coordination game</a>, <a href="#">Illiquidity risk</a>, <a href="#">Threshold strategy</a>, <a href="#">Overconfidence</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk</b><br><span>2014-12 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1090944313000525" target="_blank">Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.611485
  +"parent": null
}