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Working Papers (2011), ESSEC Business School

Experimental Evidence on the "Insidious" Illiquidity Risk


This paper brings experimental evidence on investors’ behavior subject to an "illiquidity" constraint, where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment context. Results confirm the insidious nature of the illiquidity risk: as long as a first illiquidity default does not occur, investors do not seem able to fully internalize it. After several defaults, agents manage to coordinate on a default probability above which they refuse to participate to the project. This default probability is lower than the default probability of the first illiquidity default.

BESANCENOT, D. and VRANCEANU, R. (2011). Experimental Evidence on the "Insidious" Illiquidity Risk. ESSEC Business School.