Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2190
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "1090"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "1090"
    "slug" => "emu-optimal-fiscal-strategy-and-the-punishment-effectiveness"
    "yearMonth" => "2001-08"
    "year" => "2001"
    "title" => "EMU: Optimal Fiscal Strategy and the Punishment Effectiveness"
    "description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et WARIN, T. (2001). EMU: Optimal Fiscal Strategy and the Punishment Effectiveness. <i>Review of International Economics</i>, pp. 494-504."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "WARIN T."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "494-504"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Nous nous interrogeons sur la capacité du Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance à bloquer de manière efficace les dérapages budgétaires des pays membres de l'UME. La réponse est négative si le problème est posé dans le cadre d'un jeu à une période. Cependant, dans le cadre d'un jeu à plusieurs périodes, le pacte apparaît comme inutile."
      "en" => "This paper investigates the ability of the Stability and Growth Pact to prevent governments in the "euro zone" from running excessive budget deficits. It is shown that in a static two-country game, the Pareto-optimal strategy of no excess deficits cannot be systematically enforced, whatever the toughness of the sanction under the Pact. However, in a multiperiod setting, the Pareto-optimal configuration of no excess deficits would prevail even if no sanctions were applied to deviant governments. In this case, neither a heavily punitive SGP, nor a centralized budget appears to be helpful in the EMU context."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-19T17:22:15.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "EMU: Optimal Fiscal Strategy and the Punishment Effectiveness"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, WARIN T."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, WARIN T.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2001</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>EMU: Optimal Fiscal Strategy and the Punishment Effectiveness</b><br><span>2001-08 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">EMU: Optimal Fiscal Strategy and the Punishment Effectiveness</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.961621
  +"parent": null
}