Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2190
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "7968"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "7968"
    "slug" => "crowdfunding-with-overenthusiastic-investors-a-global-game-model"
    "yearMonth" => "2018-02"
    "year" => "2018"
    "title" => "Crowdfunding with Overenthusiastic Investors: A Global Game Model"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2018). <i>Crowdfunding with Overenthusiastic Investors: A Global Game Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "Crowdfunding"
      1 => "entrepreneurship -global games"
      2 => "overenthusiasm"
      3 => "behavioral IO."
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01718793/"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Crowdfunding platforms are providing funds to an increasing number of projects, among which many have a strong social/community impact. Under a all-or-nothing program, the success of the investment depends on the ability of a crowd of potential investors to put their funds into the project without an explicit coordination device. With heterogeneous information, such a problem can be analyzed as a typical global game. We assume that signals of at least some agents present a systematic positive bias, driven by positive emotions about projects with high social/community impact. The analysis reveals that if the number of such overenthusiastic persons is large enough, crowdfunding. finance might support financially inefficient projects. We then analyze how a monopolistic platform optimally determines transaction fees and unveil the relationship between overenthusiasm and the pro.t of the platform."
      "en" => "Crowdfunding platforms are providing funds to an increasing number of projects, among which many have a strong social/community impact. Under a all-or-nothing program, the success of the investment depends on the ability of a crowd of potential investors to put their funds into the project without an explicit coordination device. With heterogeneous information, such a problem can be analyzed as a typical global game. We assume that signals of at least some agents present a systematic positive bias, driven by positive emotions about projects with high social/community impact. The analysis reveals that if the number of such overenthusiastic persons is large enough, crowdfunding. finance might support financially inefficient projects. We then analyze how a monopolistic platform optimally determines transaction fees and unveil the relationship between overenthusiasm and the pro.t of the platform."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-19T17:22:15.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Crowdfunding with Overenthusiastic Investors: A Global Game Model"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT Damien"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT Damien</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2018</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Crowdfunding</a>, <a href="#">entrepreneurship -global games</a>, <a href="#">overenthusiasm</a>, <a href="#">behavioral IO.</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Crowdfunding with Overenthusiastic Investors: A Global Game Model</b><br><span>2018-02 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01718793/" target="_blank">Crowdfunding with Overenthusiastic Investors: A Global Game Model</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.961621
  +"parent": null
}