Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2190
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "709"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "709"
    "slug" => "banks-risk-race-a-signaling-explanation"
    "yearMonth" => "2011-05"
    "year" => "2011"
    "title" => "Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2011). Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation. <i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i>, 20(4), pp. 784-791."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:5 [
      0 => "Banking sector"
      1 => "Risk strategy"
      2 => "Signaling"
      3 => "Imperfect information"
      4 => "The Great Recession"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1059056011000219"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "784-791"
      "volume" => "20"
      "number" => "4"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'article étudie la course au risque dans laquelle les banques étaient engagées avant la Grande Récession, à travers un jeu de signalisation en information imparfaite."
      "en" => "Many observers argue that one of the major causes of the 2007-2009 recession was the abnormal accumulation of risk by banks. This paper provides a signaling explanation for this race for risk. If banks' returns can be observed while risk cannot, the less efficient banks can hide their type by taking more risks and paying the same returns as the more efficient banks. The latter can signal themselves by taking even higher risks and delivering bigger returns. The game presents several equilibria that are all characterized by excessive risk taking as compared to the perfect information case."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-20T11:21:45.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2011</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Banking sector</a>, <a href="#">Risk strategy</a>, <a href="#">Signaling</a>, <a href="#">Imperfect information</a>, <a href="#">The Great Recession</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation</b><br><span>2011-05 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1059056011000219" target="_blank">Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.788868
  +"parent": null
}