Year
2013
Abstract
Despite an extensive body of economic literature discussing partner selection based on rational anticipation of the other people’s behavior, the influence of players’ behavioral patterns on the path of their collaborative decisions has as yet rarely been evaluated in the context of a dynamic game. This paper seeks to fill that gap by proposing to evaluate how certain specific behavioral patterns, namely propensity to forgiveness and propensity to attachment, can give rise to different collaborative archetypes. These two behavioral patterns are important as both are prominent in the most influential game theory and managerial approaches to cooperation. They are therefore used to derive a typology of behavioral profiles. Computation of each profile’s equilibrium effort leads to a ranking of the possible player profiles. The results suggest that the proposed behavioral profiles could be used for selection of potential partners.
EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2013). Attachment and Forgiveness in a Behavioural, Non-Cooperative Dynamic Game. Dans: Models and Methods in Economics and Management Science: Essays in Honor of Charles S. Tapiero. 1st ed. Springer, pp. 107-130.